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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Government defense contracting is a multi-billion dollar annual 
activity. Speaking to the Ninth Annual Institute on Government Contracts 
Dallas, Texas, September 11, 1969, Elmer Staats stated: 
Government procurement this yea~ to speak in general terms, is 
approaching a 60 billion dollar business. For fiscal year 
1970 the total Government procurement budget for supplies, 
materials, and equipment amounts to more than 57 billion 
dollars. Approximately 86 percent of this amount is for 
national defense. This means that DOD's1proturement this 
year amounts to over 49 billion dollars. 
In addition, Staats stated that 89 percent of defense procurements are 
on a negotiated, noncompetitive basis and more than one-half of the 
contracts are from a single source. 2 
In testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Admiral Hyman Rickover, U. S. Navy, cited problems resulting from this 
noncompetitive situation: (1) the substantially increased costs of 
procurement, (2) the difficulties in having contractors carry out 
defense work under contracts providing adequate safeguards to insure 
against excessive profits, and (3) Government agencies having to accept 
other contract terms substantially less favorable to the Government 
than was previously necessary. 3 Rickover further stated that he believed 
the establishment pf uniform accounting standards could save the Depart-
4 
ment of Defense $2 billion a year. 
Rickover's testimony caused the Committee to doupt the 
1 
effectiveness of section 707 of the Defense Production Act. The perti-
nent part reads: 
No person shall discriminate against orders or contracts to 
which priority is assigned or for which materials or facili-
ties are allocated under title I of this Act or under any 
rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, by charging 
higher prices or by imposing different terms or conditions 
for such orders or contracts than for other generall~ com-
parable orders or contracts, or in any other manner. 
"Because of the apparent ineffectiveness of this provision," the Com-
mittee proposed that the General Accounting Office be "required to 
develop and recommend uniform accounting standards which would provide 
6 the Government with production costs and profits by individual order." 
In House debate some members claimed that the establishment of 
uniform accounting standards (sometimes referred to in the debate as 
either uniform procedures or uniform systems) would simplify the nego-
tiation and audit processes relating to such Government contracts. 
Various associations of Government contractors, individual indus-
trial firms, and some Congressmen opposed the proposed establishment 
of uniform accounting standards. Initially, accounting organizations 
and Government agencies gave little or no support to the proposal. In 
spite of opposition by these various groups the Cost Accounting Stan-
dards Board (CASB) was established in August, 1970. 
During its six-year existence, the CASB's impact has been signifi-
cant. This is evidenced by the oral and written testimony presented at 
the first CASB Evaluation Conference held in Rosemont, Illinois, 
June 11, 1975. The agenda of the meeting was limited to the Board's 
regulations concerning contracting and disclosure requirements and Cost 
Accounting Standards (CAS) 401 through 406. Several companies, through 
their spokesmen, said that the lack of interpretative guidance on the 
2 
3 
Board's Standards, Rules, and Regulations created significant problems. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's testimony succinctly summarizes the con-
cern expressed by other respondents. 
We believe the most frustrating and difficult problem we have 
faced to date in the administration of CAS contracts is the 
absence of an effective source of authoritative interpretative 
guidance on CAS Standards, Rules and Regulations. 
This problem is growing and is adversely impacting both the 
Government agencies and contractors alike. We think the CAS 
Board's assumed passive role in this regard is no longer appro-
priate and if not reversed will result in an implementation of 
its promulgations that is seriously lacking in uniformity and 
consistency. 7 
Several of the industry representatives indicated that Standards 
401 through 406 have had minimal effects on their cost accounting 
systems or practices. However, the Board's impact is not always solely 
reflected in changes in cost accounting systems or practices. A repre-
sentative of Martin Marietta Aerospace stated: 
With respect to the topics to be reviewed, these promulgations 
have had relatively minor effect on our cost accounting prac-
tices. As of now, the principal effect of Cost Accounting 
Standards is the amount of effort that has been expended in 
studying and communicating regarding research of developments 
and implementing the Standards. 
The impact of Cost Accounting Standards has proven not to be 
cost beneficial to us. Because the subject is so complex, 
those efforts involved in the Administration of Cost Account-
ing Standards have consumed the efforts of many of our highly 
competent and qualified personnel. To measure precisely the 
cost values of their associated efforts is impossible at this 
time. . . . We cannot see any benefit to us for having 
expended these substantial funds in this effort • . . . To 
date, there has (sic) been no demonstrable benefits and instead, 
significant indications of substantial increa§ed costs to 
Government and to industry have materialized. 
Other in~ustry representatives expressed similar views. 9 
Evidently, concerns expressed by industry representatives were not 
shared by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
In a written statement presented to the Board, Donald J. Hayes, Chairman, 
Committee for Liaison with the CASB of the AICPA said: 
While the Subcommittee_ has previously addressed concepts and 
possible implementation problems in its letters of comments on 
each of these standards when they were under consideration by 
the Board, our experience with the problems of their implemen-
tation derived in the course of annual examinations of contrac-
tors financial statements through 1974 has not been extensive. 
In part, this is due to the fact that, to a large extent, 
application of these standards in practice has not yet been 
challenged by audit. Also, since these standards have not had 
a major impact on the financial reporting process, audit 
engagements are not likely to produce substantial and detailed 
information of the type the Board desires. 10 
In contrast to this statement, Mr. Gerald E. Gorans, a member of the 
AICPA and partner-in-charge, Seattle office, Touche Ross and Co., . 
stated in his oral presentation and in a later written state-
ment submitted at the request of the CASB, that Standards (a) 
have begun to conflict with and to undermine the basic objec-
tives of management information systems, (b) can have detri-
mental effects on business decisions, (c) in some cases, 
conflict with generally accepted acr~unting principles, and 
(d) in other cases are unnecessary. 
The statement of the AICPA subcommittee reflects an apparent lack of 
concern of the impact, present or potential, of CASB regulations on 
4 
financial reporting. As is indicated by Gorans' testimony, this lack of 
concern is not shared by all parties. In addition, the Aerospace 
Industries Association of American, Inc. (AlA) felt it advisable in 
May, 1975, "to bring to the attention of the senior officials of account-
ing firms auditing AlA comp~nies the impact of Cost Accounting 
Standards on client companies as well as on the public accounting 
profession."12 
AlA made available to Division A members copies of a 20 page 
document entitled, "Cost Accounting Standards and the Public Accounting 
Profession," and suggested that these members discuss the subject with 
the CPA firm's managing partner. The document includes sections 
describing the CASB background, the effect of CASB regulations on the 
clients of public accountants, the effect of CASB regulations on public 
5 
accountants, suggestions as to how the public accounting profession can 
help in solving some of the alleged problems created by the CASB, and 
conclusions concerning the involvement of the top management of account-
ing firms, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the 
CASB. 
Originally, cost accounting standards applied to defense contractors 
and subcontractors with negotiated contracts of $100,000 or more. Since 
passage of the law creating the CASB, the General Services Administration, 
by regulation, expanded the coverage of the law to apply to all negotiated 
Federal contracts of $100,000 or more. In addition, in 1975, the Board 
"established an exemption for companies having no negotiated defense 
. 13 
contracts or subcontracts in excess of $500,000." However, this 
exemption applies only to new contracts. 
Purpose of the Study 
Federal laws and regulations having an impact on accounting policy 
were enacted by the United States Government during the last 65 years: 
e.g., Treasury Department regulations regarding depreciation and inven-
tory methods, Security and Exchange Commission requirements regarding 
financial reporting, and the Congressional statement regarding the in-
vestment credit. One of the more recent laws, Public Law 91-379, esta-
blished the CASB. The basic purpose of this study is to analyze the 
events leading to the establishment of the CASB and to seek to determine 
what caused Congress to establish the CASB. 
As noted in the introduction, many individuals questioned the need 
for uniform accounting standards and yet Congress chose to establish 
the CASB. Six years after the Board's establishment, questions linger. 
Not only has the need, the activities, and the methods of operation of 
the Board been questioned but the AlA has suggested "the need for an 
impartial, independent study to determine what the future of Cost 
Accounting Standards should be."14 An understanding of the past should 
provide a sounder basis for understanding the present and projecting 
into the future; thus the justification of the historical analysis made 
via this dissertation. 
A systematic analysis by a disinterested party concerning the 
evolutionary aspects of the CASB is conspicuous by its rarity. Few 
authors have examined the significance of the relevant events that 
preceded the establishment of the CASB. 
In carrying out the aim of this study, the development of the CASB 
6 
will be viewed from a historian's perspective. Attempts will be made to 
explain the past and the present with respect to the CASB; to determine 
the economic, social, and political factors at work; to understand the• 
roles played by various persons and organizations; and to understand 
why Congress made certain choices. 
Research Methodology 
The methodology used in this study relies heavily upon the seven 
postulates of historical investigation specified by Hexter: 
1. That the object of investigation of historians, the human 
past, is incommensurably different from nature, the object 
of inves~igation of natural scientists; 
2. That the special language of historical discourse is common 
langu{lge, not one of the uncommon languages characteristic 
of the natural sciences; 
3. That the thrust of their special language requires histor-
ians to rely on common-sense judgments far more frequently 
than they do on strict logical entailments; 
4. That the reliance of historical discourse on common lan-
guage and common sense renders it inherently and inerradi-
cably valuative rather than value-free; 
5. That in history credibility rather than necessary and suf-
ficient causes provides the standard of adequacy of explana-
tion; 
6. That the exploration of truth values in historical discourse 
requires the examination of large historical texts and con-
texts and not just of minute fragments wrenched out of 
context; 
7. That historical discourse is functionally processive rather 
than formally logical in two respects: (a) of affording 
readers enough to be going on with and (b) of dealing 
competently with ey!dence of change, becoming, or process 
in the human past. 
An analytical historical approach is used to achieve the aim of 
this study. The approach uses, but is not limited to, a combination of 
features common to the genetic methodology, the Hempelian methodology, 
the Collingwood methodology, and Hexter's historical storytelling. A 
basic description of each of these methods follows. 
Nagel states: 
a genetic explanation of a particular event is in general 
analyzable into a sequence of probablistic explanations 
whose instantial premises refer to events that happen at 
different times rather than concurrently, and that are at 
best only some of the necessary conditions rather than a 
full complement of sufficient ones for 6the occurrences 
which those premises help to explain. 
Hempel maintains that general laws have functions analogous in 
history as in the natural sciences. 
Historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event 
in question was not "a matter of chance," but was to be 
expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous 
conditions. The expectation referred to is not prophecy or 
divination, but rational scientific anticipation which rests 
on the assumption of general laws.l7 
7 
8 
Collingwood says that all history is history of thought and that to 
explain previous events the researcher needs to reenact the past in his 
own mind. This involves acquiring an awareness of the personalities of 
the individuals involved, of the situations confronting them, and it 
also involves an attempt by the researcher to put himself in the situa-
tion in which the events occurred. 
Historical storytelling rests upon the seven postulates given on 
pages 6 and 7 of this study. The beginning point for the historical 
storyteller is an observation point, " .•. the place where he takes his 
stand and from which he surveys the record of the past in order to make 
the indispensable decisions on a sound rhetorical strategy for his 
18 
story." A constant awareness of the outcome of the story aids the 
historian as he selects and evaluates actions that had a bearing on the 
event that is being explained. Selection of data for their bearing on 
the pivotal point of the historical study involves judgment, not bias. 
In applying the analytical historical approach used in this study 
the investigator gives special attention to the nature of the testimony, 
the soundness of the testimony, and the credibility of the witnesses 
and members of Congress with respect to the technical nature of the 
subject matter. 
Significance of the Study 
Little, if any, research of the type undertaken in this study has 
been done in the past with respect to the CASE. As indicated in the 
introduction, various persons have raised questions concerning CASE 
activities and even the need for the CASE. This study represents an 
independent (in the sense that the author is neither an employee of the 
Federal Government, a Government contractor, or any other firm dealing 
with the CASB) and objective (in the sense that the author has no 
vested interests in the outcome) examination of the events surrounding 
the creation of the CASB. The study does not try to justify the 
existence, nor necessarily question the existence, of the CASB but 
rather attempts. to explain why it exists and also presents implications 
of its creation and existence. 
9 
Accountants, industry representatives, and Gpvernment officials may 
find that an understanding of how and why the CASB came into being can 
be very helpful in providing guidance in making future decisions if and 
when they are confronted with the possibility of additional Congressional 
legislation in areas which may affect accounting policy. 
Scope of the Study 
The time period covered by this study begins with events that 
occurred in the late 1950's and ends with the signing of the law creating 
the CASB in 1970. No effort is made in this study to go beyond the 
establishment of the CASB. Reasons for ending the study with the sign-
ing of the law creating the CASB in 1970 follow. 
First, the principal purpose of this study is to critically examine 
the events leading to the establishment of the CASB. While the activi-
ties of the Board during the last five years are significant and provide 
fertile ground for research, both historical and nonhistorical, these 
activities are of an entirely different nature than those considered in 
this study and therefore not appropriate for inclusion. 
The second reason relates to the methodology used in this study. 
With the exception of Congress, the study focuses on the actions and 
10 
oral or written testimony of a relatively small number of individuals. 
While the research method employed conceivably could be extended to the 
actions of the Board and its research staff, the limited resources 
available to this researcher preclude such a prodigious undertaking. 
The primary data sources for this study are Congressional hearings, 
Congressional reports, the GAO Feasibility Study, and the Congressional 
Record. Biographical and socio/economic/political information will come 
from appropriate sources and for an appropriate time period in order to 
determine needed facts. 
Organization of the Study 
The introductory chapter sets forth the problem.the purpose of the 
study, the research methodology, the significance of the study, the 
scope of the study, and the organization of the study. 
Chapter III will contain a description of the general features of 
historical methodology, a very brief description of several types of 
accepted historical methodologies, a detailed description of the genetic 
methodology, the Hempelian methodology, the Collingwood methodology, the 
Hexterian methodology, a description of the methodologies to be used in 
this study, and a statement of why the methods were chosen. 
Chapter III will present the socio/economic/political setting and 
biographical view of major features having a role in the establishment of 
the CASB. This material will serve as a basis for attempting to deter-
mine the philosophy of the individuals and groups involved in events 
leading to the establishment of the CASB. 
Chapters IV, V, and VI will contain the historial analysis of the 
events leading to the establishment of the CASB. The analysis will 
begin with the House of Representatives Committee Hearing of 1968 and 
end with the signing of Public Law 91-379. 
The final chapter will provide the summary, conclusions, implica-
tions of the research, and suggestions for further study. 
11 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS OF HISTORICAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Chapter I indicated that some types of historical research method-
ologies are used in conducting this study. Chapter II, which provides a 
description of some of the methods of historical study and analysis, is 
presented for the following reasons: (1) The use of historical tech-
niques and approaches is to a large extent an untapped and unappreciated 
area for many researchers and it is hoped that this chapter will provide 
a description that will enable the reader to appreciate the value and 
complexities of this type research. (2) As in other types of research, 
competing philosophies and approaches exist from which one must choose 
and this chapter highlights some of the competing philosophies and 
approaches to give the reader an awareness of the concepts and methods 
available to the historian. (3) This chapter develops the philosophy 
and approaches used in this study. 
This chapter presents the methods of historical study and analysis 
using the following format: (1) Limitations of Historical Methods, (2) 
General Features of Historical Methods, (3) Assessments vs. Conclusions, 
(4) History vs. Natural Science, (5) Some Specific Philosophies of 
History, (6) Specific Methods of Historical Analysis, and (7) Methodology 
Used. 
14 
Limitations of Historical Methods 
Introduction 
In some respects the research problems faced by the historian are 
analogous to those encountered by any researcher; in other respects 
15 
the problems are unique. Since some of the problems are of a different 
nature, it follows that the analysis may also differ. An awareness of 
the similarities and differences is indispensable to a proper under-
standing of historical analysis. This section presents the fundamental 
problems of historical study and analysis and provides the basis for the 
methodology used in this study. 
Selection of Variables for Study 
As in all research, one of the most difficult tasks confronting the 
historian is determining what aspects of a subject to study. It is 
impossible to exhaust a subject; in most cases the researcher will re-
strict his study to biographical details of the principal parties, the 
economic or social factors present at the time in question, the political 
forces at work, or a combination of some or all of these variables. The 
problem of selection is usually resolved when the researcher selects for 
study those aspects of the problem that are of greatest interest to him. 
Inherent in the selection process is the omission of certain facts. It 
is not a question of whether facts will be ignored; but rather, what 
facts. If the historian fails to be selective in his definition of the 
problem for study, he may assemble too much detailed data and be unable 
to perform a proper analysis and arrive at meaningful conclusions. 
It is at this point that, to some extent, subjectivity and 
16 
arbitrariness are present. The historian, in limiting his problem, is 
not able to consider everything. But is it necessary to know everything 
in order to understand? Suppose someone asked for a description of the 
campus of Oklahoma State University. How much purposeful knowledge is 
conveyed if the description contains details of the number of windows 
in each building, the number of rooms in each building, the number of 
parking spaces available, and the total number of bricks used in all 
buildings on campus? It might be argued that this example is absurd! 
However, it is not absurd if it is assumed that knowledge of a subject 
matter must be identical with that subject matter or must in someway 
reproduce it. 1 It makes more sense to argue that the assumption is 
absurd. 
At some point, determined by a subjective opinion tempered by 
common sense, a person would develop a meaningful and purposeful 
description of the campus of Oklahoma State University. Likewise, sub-
jectivity and arbitrariness play a part in decisions made by the histor-
ian as to what to include in this study. 
Repeatability of Historical Events 
In a laboratory setting or computer simulation it is possible to 
repeatedly set up an experiment and determine what happens as a result 
/ 
of changing the composition of the variables involved. In some social 
science research, historical analysis in particular, laboratory 
experiments cannot be conducted to confirm that a given event or insti-
tution resulted from a given set of events or variables since no 
possibility exists of completely reproducing the situation or setting 
that produced the event or institution. This is not to say that there 
17 
are no historical methods for confirming that certain events or actions 
resulted in certain other events or institutions; rather this merely 
" •.• points to a genuinely distinctive feature of the subject-matter 
and consequently the methodology of the historian .,2 Unlike the 
natural and physical sciences, the historian does not have a body of 
general laws with which to dev~lop explanations of past events. 
Observability of Past Events 
It is a well established fact that the actions and events that a 
historian describes explains, and interprets cannot be directly observed. 
Upon what then does the historian base his descriptions, explanations, 
and interpretations? Primarily, there are three basic sources available 
to the historian for such analyses: (1) His own personal memory, (2) 
The memory of others, and (3) Various types of documents and written or 
orally recorded testimony. 
When a historian relies upon his own memory, he must be aware that 
• "it is his present memory with which he begins and whose accuracy 
he must evaluate .,3 Likewise, it is the present memories of 
others he is relying on if he is involved in interviewing or questioning 
them and he must evaluate the accuracy of such memories. 
Old people's recollections are notoriously fallible. Some 
years ago a graduate student in The Ohio State University 
personally interviewed an·aged politician concerning his 
attitude toward Mr. Bryan during the campaign of 1896, and 
was informed by the gentleman that he had been unable to 
follow Mr. Bryan's leadership. Later the student found 
contemporary accounts of speeches by this Ohio politician 
advocating Mr. Bryan's election.4 
The fallibility of memory is not limited to olqer persons; Watergate 
attests to this fact. 
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Memories are often colored by events that occur between the point 
of time in question and the present. In most cases, the recorded state-
ments of the parties that were involved provide a more accurate basis for 
analysis than their present recollections of past events. 
If the historian has no personal memory of the past events in 
question and if he seriously questions the validity of relying upon the 
memories of others, he is faced with problems relating to describing, 
explaining, and interpreting past events on the basis of the oral or 
written evidence of the past that is currently present. Any knowledge 
we have of the past rests upon the evidence that is presently available. 
The task of the historian is to carefully examine this evidence to 
determine its validity. In many cases the available evidence is so 
plentiful and has so many facets that the historian lacks the sufficient 
knowledge and imagination to properly analyze and interpret it. 
Analysis of Human Beings and Change Through Time 
One thing is common to many formal definitions of history: the 
inclusion of the human aspect. Hexter states that history "means any 
patterned, coherent account, intended to be true, of any past happenings 
involving human intention or doing or suffering."5 
.•• Pirenne suggests to us the individual qualities of mind 
that must have been responsible for the economic development 
that his story unfolds: initiative, courage, desperation, sense 
of the main chance, flair for leaping on the bandwaggon, whether 
displayed by a Lincolnshire peasant or a Flanders merchant or a 
Scandinavian navigator linking western European trade with the 
Black and the Caspian seas! Pirenne's book is, no doubt, gen-
erally prized for its brilliant correction of a number of long-
standing prejudices and errors regarding mediaeval economic 
institutions, but few works of history convey better the truth 
of the dictum that it is meq who make history. To understand 
what happened in a given economic epoch we must certainly appre-
ciate first what possibilities of expansion it actually con-
tained: but those limits once grasped, our understanding of 
what was accomplished must be in terms of the choices and 
deeds, even if largely conjectured, of individual men, even 
if their names have usually been forgotten.6 
These quotations emphasize the role of man in history. Because of the 
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highly significant role that man plays in history the historian must be 
aware of forces that help to shape human behavior. The historian must 
not only be cognizant of present day aspects of behavior but also of 
aspects of the past. 
In essence, the historian must attempt to provide an adequate 
description, explanation, and interpretation of human behavior and 
activity over time. His analysis should include the following functions; 
all of which introduce obvious problems: (1) ascertain what has 
happened, (2) identify events in sequence, (3) analyze interrelationships 
among those events, and (4) discover how and why they occurred in a given 
7 
order. 
In many cases, ascertaining what happened or identifying the 
sequence of events that led to the happening.are not difficult tasks. 
Problems arise when an attempt is made to investigate interrelationships 
among events. Not only must the historian be familiar with relationships 
existing between events, but also he must appreciate that events "are 
related by their position in time .. s Historical development is a 
dynamic process; the investigator must recognize this fact and give con-
sideration to it in his analysis. 
Discovering how and why events occurred in a given order may require 
a study of the parties responsible for the events taking place. According 
to Collingwood, "The cause of the event, ... , means the thought in the 
mind of the person by whose agency the event came about .. 9 If 
Collingwood is correct, then seemingly when one is able to understand 
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the variables affecting the behavior of the responsible parties, he is 
nearer to an explanation of why events happened in a certain sequence. 
An additional problem arises--how does one show that a particular vari-
able caused a historical character to behave in a certain manner? 10 
General Features of Historical Methods 
Introduction 
Before selecting his method of analysis the investigator should 
recognize there is no such thing as THE method. The objective of the 
study will determine the method used by the researcher. There are many 
approaches available and the particular nature of the research may 
suggest one approach is more appropriate than others. The researcher 
should choose a method that employs concepts which aid in discriminating: 
to decide what is or is not significant, to aid in systematic appraisal, 
and to aid in the evaluation of changes over time. 11 
Causation 
The Committee on Historiography of the Social Science Research 
Council states that the "fundamental problem of historical study is the 
12 
analysis of change over time." When the historian attempts to 
evaluate changes over time he is involved in causal analysis: what 
caused the changes to take place? 
In attempting to answer this question the historian faces a host 
of types of causes: greater causes, lesser causes, more important 
causes, most important cause (or key cause), the immediate (or precipi-
tating) cause, underlying (or basic) causes, necessary conditions, and 
sufficient conditions. The investigator must exercise judgment in 
13 investigating causes. Distinguishing between greater and lesser 
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causes is relatively easy in many cases. Trying to identify a factor as 
the most important or key cause is a very troublesome problem. 
Ernest Nagel says an immediate cause of an event 
is usually some occurrence of relatively short duration that 
initiates the collective one; it may be a "natural event" 
(e.g., a cataclysmic earthquake), an individual action 
(the deed of an assassin), or a collective happening (a mili-
tary defeat). The underlying causes to which historians 
frequently refer are commonly designated, in obviously meta-
phorical terms, as "social forces" and are constituted out of 
relatively enduring modes of action as well as of less normal 
forms of behavior whic~4are manifested by various groups of 
anonymous individuals. 
Social forces related to this study include such things as the existing 
political conditions; the social attitudes toward the military, industry, 
economic conditions; and "the operation of various beliefs, ideas, and 
aspirations as manifested in the attitudes and activities of those who 
15 
entertain them." 
To gain a proper understanding of historical events, the historian 
looks at the structure of the situation in which events took place. 
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"The degree and mode of organization in a situation is its structure." 
An interdependency exists between the social organizations of which an 
individual is a member and his observed behavior. Power-wielding groups 
influence individual behavior; likewise, cultural forces, other social 
forces, and individual behavior affect power-wielding groups. 
In addition to looking at the structure of the situation, the his-
torian may elect to view historical events in terms of process. This 
involves a careful examination of the changes in a structure. An aware-
ness of the changes in the structure helps the historian to see various 
interrelationships and provides insight into the possible underlying 
causes of the observed actions or events. 
It should be obvious that in determining the causes of human actions 
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of the past the first step is not a close scrutiny of the documents 
but rather an informed understanding of the social forces at work. 
Understanding present human behavior helps in developing an understanding 
of the particular social forces that caused past human actions. In 
addition to identifying the social forces, it is important that the 
historian determine that they were present when the action was taken. 
Too, the presence of a factor does not necessarily mean it was causally 
operative. For example, it may be determined that an individual or 
group had a certain disposition. To say that an action displayed by 
an individual or a group resulted from the identified disposition may 
be an unwarranted conclusion because something else may have caused the 
action. This being true, the question arises as to how the researcher 
can impute causation to a particular human action or event. Negal 
states: 
By assuming that when the given factor is a circumstance under 
which men act, they generally conduct themselves in a manner 
similar to the particular action described in the imputation, 
so that the individual discussed by the historian presumably 
also acted the way he did because the given factor was present. 
In short, generalizations of some sort are required in his~ 
torical explanations of individual actions.l7 
In addition to the awareness that not all conditions present may 
be operative, the historian must realize that he is not searching for 
all the causes; but rather, the meaningful causes. How can the histor-
ian differentiate true and spurious causes? The use of the logician's 
definition of the cause of an event may be helpful: The cause of any 
event is the sum of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
event's occurrence. A necessary condition exists if the event could 
not have taken place without its occurrence. A sufficient condition is 
present if its occurrence is enough to cause the event to take place. 
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The following example illustrates the application of testing between true 
and spurious causes. 
In the early weeks of the war the German government published 
a collection of documents intended to prove that the Poles had 
been guilty of atrocities against the German minority living 
in Poland. According to the Germans, these atrocities cried 
out for German intervention, thus were the real cause of the 
war. There are two problems here. Did such atrocities 
actually occur, or was the evidence of the German documents 
fabricated: This is a problem of historical fact .•.. But 
the other problem is one of causation. Even if such incidents 
actually occurred, were these the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the German action? On this, the evidence from 
captured German documents seems clear. Hitler was determined 
to seize Polish territory in any case, and the alleged atroc-
ities served as a pretext rather than a true cause for his 
action.l8 
This example also illustrates the post hoc, ergo propter hoc 
fallacy (after this, therefore because of this). 19 Merely because 
events follow one another in time does not mean that one event caused 
another event. To impute causation, a logical relationship must be 
established. 
Finally, in undertaking a causal analysis the historian must realize 
that the analysis may not produce definitive results. In many cases the 
nature of the evidence may be such that it does not yield complete 
knowledge concerning the subject in question. At times like this the 
researcher must willingly admit that he does not have the answer. 
Assessments vs. Conclusions 
Introduction 
"The historian, like the general or the statesman, tends to assess 
20 
rather than to conclude." The historian can never examine all the 
variables and the nature of his research is such that he can never 
conclude he has found the cause of an event. In assessing, he is judging 
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the relative importance of various factors upon the event in question. 
This judgment may lead to a conclusion in the sense that an opinion is 
formed but not in the sense that a 'final answer is determined. 
The primary concern of the historian is not to establish general 
statements testable by experimentation but to -develop explanations about 
the actions of certain persons and/or certain events. In some instances 
the historian is unable to make an assessment and therefore fails to 
provide an explanation. In any assessment or conclusion the historian 
makes, judgment is involved and the question of objectivity is rais.ed. 
Objectivity 
Hexter states in his seven postulates of historical investigation 
that the " .•. reliance of historical discourse on common language and 
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common sense renders it ... valuative rather than value-free. Does 
this statement imply that the historian cannot be objective in his 
search for the truth? Is there any sense in which the historian can be 
objective? 
Included in Webster's definitions of objective are the following: 
1. of or having to do with a known or perceived object as 
distinguished from somethin existing only in the mind of 
the subject, or person thinking •.. 
4. without bias or prejudice; detached; impersona1. 22 
The Committee on Historiography says that objectivity "need not be 
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equated with certainty and completeness ,of knowledge." In many 
cases researchers in the natural sciences settle for less than full 
certainty and completeness of knowledge in forming their conclusions 
concerning their findings. Too, in conducting their research they often 
rely on value judgments in selecting the variables they feel are impor-
tant to the solution of the problem. In the same way the historian 
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introduces his biases and prejudices into his research. 
In the senses discussed above it seems that neither the historian 
nor the scientist is completely objective in his research. However, 
there is an important sense in which both researchers can be objective. 
Objectivity requires us to be prepared on the basis of the 
evidence to abandon our most cherished hypothesis. One 
must, therefore, distinguish the subjective element in 
objective investigation to prevent distortion through bias. 
Distortion does not necessarily follow even though values 
influence the choice of hypotheses and the selection of 
data.24 
In order to be objective, in this sense of the word, and to limit the 
amount of distortion present, the historian must be sure that the data 
and factors he selects for examination are relevant to the situation and 
that they are consistent with other evidence. Admittedly, his selection 
process is influenced by value judgments and his language consists of 
many words which carry value overtones. Without the use of value-words 
in the description of his analysis the historian would have an even more 
difficult task in trying to create in the minds of the readers mental 
images of an action or event he has developed in his own mind. 
Perhaps the use of value judgments has some other commendable quali-
ties. Coats 
pointed to the fertility of conjectural hypotheses that were 
nonempirical; by such "unsupported theories" historians have 
discovered new facts and relationships. Moreover, he doubted 
whether a hypothesis applied with cold neutrality "could yield 
that full insight of which it is capable when it is the deep 
conviction of an original mind."25 
Even though disagreements exist as to the desirability of the use of 
value judgments in historical research, there is agreement that histor-
ians and nonhistorians do make such judgments. Perhaps it is just a 
question of the extent of usage. In any case, the salient point the 
researcher must remember is to make it clear to the reader when value 
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judgments are present. "The safeguard against bias in the writing of 
history, as in the natural sciences, is not to indulge in useless resolu-
tions to be free of bias but rather to explore one 1s preconceptions, to 
k h 1 . . d h . 1 . " 26 rna e t em exp ic1t, to cons1 er t e1r a ternat1ves .... 
Historical Criticism 
In his quest for truth the historian faces problems similar to 
those facing the auditor in his internal control review and in his audit. 
The historian must maintain a doubting attitude toward any documents or 
evidence he examines until he has critically tested them with both 
external and internal criticism. 
The purpose of external criticism is to determine the origin and 
authenticity of the document being examined. Questions to be considered 
include the following: Who was the author? When was it written? How 
does one detect spurious documents? Has the original form been 
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corrupted? 
External criticism can be viewed as a macro-type approach of 
investigation and internal criticism as a micro-type approach. External 
28 
criticisms is concerned with the documents as a whole. Internal 
criticism centers its attention upon statements within the documents 
and the historian attempts to "determine the meaning and trustworthiness 
,.29 1 d d of statements . .•• Interna criticism is sometimes ivied into two 
kinds--positive criticism and negative criticism. 
Positive criticism involves an attempt by the historian to deter-
mine the meaning of a statement as intended by the person making the 
statement. The historian must be careful that he does not impute meaning 
to a statement which the maker did not intend to convey. 
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Positive criticism begins with a determination of the literal 
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meaning of statements. The historian is especially alert for the 
use of technical terms, unfamiliar terms, and familiar terms used in 
an unfamiliar sense. A proper understanding of the terms, as they 
were literally used, enables the historian to have a better basis for a 
correct explanation of an historical happening. 
After the historian determines the literal meaning of statements he 
next attempts to uncover the real meaning of the statements. In some 
cases difficulty arises in trying to distinguish the literal and real 
meaning of a statement. 
Misunderstandings are not easy to avoid. It is nearly always 
difficult to determine exactly what meaning figurative language 
is intended to convey, and often, indeed, not even easy to 
recognize a figure of speech. Preceding the House election 
of 1825 John Quincy Adams, as his diary records, received an 
anonymous letter from a partisan of a rival candidate threat-
ening to "raise the standard of revolt and civil war" if his 
favorite was defeated. These words might have expressed the 
actual intent of the writer or merely threatened persistent 
political opposition, such as, in fact, followed Adams's 
election.31 
It is apparent that the historian must exercise sound judgment in deter-
mining .the literal and real meaning of historical statements. 
Having determined what statements say and mean, the historian 
faces the problems of negative criticism--determining the credibility, 
truthfulness, reliability, and trustworthiness of statements. Negative 
criticism includes such problems as attempting to determine if the 
author of a statement was competent to make such a statement, and whether 
there were any personal or social factors in hts background which would 
tend to negate the value of his testimony. Langlois and Seignobos say 
that the historian " ought to distrust ~ priori every statement of 
an author, for he cannot be sure that it is not mendacious or mistaken. 
32 At best it affords a presumption." Shafer provides the following 
checklist for internal criticism that aids researchers and points out 
that while all steps will not apply to all items of evidence there may 
be some points that need to be considered which are not contained in 
the checklist. 
1. Is the real meaning of the statement different from its 
literal meaning? Are words used in s.enses not employed 
today? Is the statement meant to be ironic (i.e., mean 
other than it says)? 
2. How well could the author observe the thing he reports? 
Were his senses equal to the observation? Was his 
physical location suitable to sight, hearing, touch? Did 
he have the proper social ability to observe: did he 
understand the language, have other expertise required 
(e.g., law, military); was he not being intimidated by 
his wife or the secret police? 
3. How did the author report?, and what was his ability to do 
so? 
a. Regarding his ability to report, was he biased? Did 
he have proper time for reporting? Proper place for 
reporting? Adequate recording instruments? 
b. When did he report in relation to his observation? 
Soon? Much later? 
c. What was the author's intention in reporting? For 
whom did he report? Would that audience be likely to 
require or suggest distortion to the author? 
d. Are there additional clues to intended veracity? Was 
he indifferent on the subject reported, thus probably 
not intending distortion? Did he make statements 
damaging to himself, thus probably not seeking to 
distort? Did he give incidental or causal information, 
almost certainly not intended to mislead? 
4. Do his statements seem inherently improbable: e.g., contrary 
to human nature, or in conflict with what we know? 
5. Remember that some types of information are easier to observe 
and report on than others. 
6. Are there inner contradictions in the document? 
7. Are your own biases or preconceptions distorting your view 
of the document or the exact statement in it? 
8. Consult reference works as required to resolve doubts. 
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9. Does the statement leave you sufficiently confident of your 
knowledge of that detail so that no corroboration is 
required?33 
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An examination of the above series of questions and statements re-
veals that internal criticism relates to both the author of the docu-
ments being examined and the historian performing the investigation. 
The investigator must constantly guard against letting his own biases 
or preconceptions distort his view of the document or statements 
contained therein. An example of what can happen when the investigator 
fails to properly interpret authentic documents follows. 
United States Senator James Eastland of Mississippi a few 
years ago made a speech in the Senate in which he cited "evi-
dence" and statistics (often so convincing to the uncritical) 
to give the impression that judges of the Supreme Court under 
Earl Warren were procommunist. Eastland based his charge on 
voting behavior in 1953-62, which he asserted showed that 
Warren voted "pro" communist in 62 of 65 decisions, that 
Justice Black "supported" the position of the Communist Party 
in all (102) of his decisions, and that Justice Douglas 
"reached a conclusion favorable to" the Communist Party in 97 
of 100 cases. Eastland's speech offered no real basis for 
such assertions. Also, it ignored the complicated question 
of jurisprudence involved in the cases before the court, re-
ducing everything to a simplistic and unreal division into 
"for" and "against" communism. The latter was not the issue 
in the cases, and Eastland ignored the great constitutional 
issued that were involved.34 
Gottschalk characterizes the historian as being a combination 
. d f . d d . 35 prosecut1ng attorney, e ense attorney, Ju ge, an Jury. In this 
combination of roles the historian examines each statement of each 
document to determine the credibility of the statement. Gottschalk 
states that a statement is credible as historical evidence if the state-
ment pas~es the following four tests. 
1. Was the ultimate source of the detail (the primary wit-
ness) able to tell the truth? 
2. Was the primary witness willing to tell the truth? 
3. Is the primary witness accurately reported wi'th regard to 
the detail under examination? 
4. Is there any independent corroboration of the detail 
under examination?36 
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In addition to Shafer's checklist, Gottschalk gives five conditions 
that he feels are favorable to credibility when present and also general-
ly easy for the historian to recognize: (1) The witness is likely to be 
unbiased when the purport of the statement is a matter of indifference 
to the witness; (2) The statement is probably truthful when it is in 
some way prejudicial to the witness; (3) If the matters under considera-
tion are of common knowledge, it is improbable the witness would be 
mistaken or attempt to mislead; (4) Some statements are'both incidental, 
in the sense of being of secondary importance, and probable to such an 
extent that the probability of error or an attempt to mislead appears 
small; and (5) Statements have a high degree of credibility when a 
witness gives testimony that is contrary to the testimony one would 
h . . 37 expect t e w1tness to g1ve. 
Both Shafer and Gottschalk mention the idea of corroboration in 
their discussion of internal criticism. Murphey succinctly describes 
this idea as follows. 
Where independent observers who are individually credible 
witnesses agree as to what occurred, th~t upon which they 
agreed is regarded as fact, and the more independent wit-
nesses there are, the higher the certainty is supposed to 
be. Conversely, the testimony of a single witness, however 
credible, is never regarded as sufficient to establish a 
matter of "fact," and the matter in question may be referred 
to only as the witness's opinion.38 
Notice that Murphey's description begins with "Where independent observ-
ers who are individually credible witnesses agree as to what occurred, 
that upon which they agree is regarded as fact, •..• " There are cases 
where a lack of independence between observers results in agreement as 
to what occurred. Also, there may be other reasons why witnesses who 
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agree may not be credible. 
If ten different parties agree concerning a particular matter, it 
may or may not establish a matter of fact. The ten parties may be 
unacquainted with the underlying background of the situation. Too, it 
sometimes happens that "A'' makes his investigation and determines what 
he believes the facts to be and then other parties (due to indifference, 
respect for or confidence in A) rely on the judgment of A and do not 
make their own observation. Instead of having ten observations of a 
single situation we have one observation of that situation. Agreement 
exists, but the agreement is not conclusive in establishing a matter of 
fact. Conclusive agreement only results from independent observations. 
The question thus becomes--when a~e observations independent? Langlois 
and Seignobos state: "The only observations which are certainly inde-
pendent are those which are contained in different documents, written by 
different authors, who belonged to different groups, and worked under 
different conditions. Cases of perfectly conclusive agreement are thus 
rare, except in reference to modern periods."39 
When the statements of two or more parties do not agree it does not 
necessarily reflect unfavorably upon the credibility of either party. 
Contradiction between statements sometimes is illusory rather than real. 
The lack of agreement is illusory when statements do not relate exactly 
to the same unique features of a particular observation. Therefore, the 
historian must determine whether the individual statements relate 
exactly to the same unique features of a particular observation. Only 
then can he determine if the contradiction is in fact real. 
If he determines the contradiction is real, he faces the problem of 
deciding which statement(s) is/are true. At this point the historian 
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examines all of the evidence relating to the statements and decides 
which statement has the greater probability of being true. He may be 
unable to reach a definite conclusion. 
Historical criticism, consisting of both external and internal 
criticism, forms the foundation for any method of historical analysis. 
History vs. Natural Science 
Introduction 
No matter what method of analysis the historian uses, it is clear 
that some overriding philosophy guides his thinking. In many cases he 
may not give conscious thought to his philosophy, perhaps because it has 
become such a part of his nature, but the fact remains--he is guided by 
some philosophy. This philosophy serves as his criterion for developing 
form and meaning for his explanation. 
Philosophers of history have written profusely as to whether history 
is a science. One group of philosophers (Popper, Hempel, and others) has 
viewed explanation in history as being analogous to explanation in the 
natural sciences. As such they assume that " ••• all explanation takes 
the form of relating one event, •.• , to another event or set of events 
which 'cause' or 'condition' it. 40 The basic thesis of this group is 
succinctly stated by Gardiner as follows. 
Hume argued that when we are said to explain an event, we refer 
to another event, or set of events, of a type which has always 
been observed in our previous experience to accompany the type 
of event to be explained. Another way of putting this is to 
say that an event is explained when it is brought under a gener-
alization or law. It becomes an instance of a general rule 
stating that, given the presence of certain initial conditions, 
events similar to the one to be explained will occur. Such a 
rule or universal hypothesis may be regarded as asserting a 
regularity of the following type: whenever an event of a 
specified kind C occurs at a certain place and time, an event 
of a specified kind E will occur at a place and time which is 
related in the specified manner to the place and time of the 
first event. Thus the explanation of a given event consists 
in (1) stating a universal law, or set of laws, (2) the exist-
ence of a set of initial conditions Cl . . . . . . . . • Cn, so 
that from these two statements a third statement describing the 
event in question follows.41 
This basic thesis is the foundation upon which Hempel (and others to a 
lesser degree) argues that" ... general laws have quite analogous 
functions in history and in the natural sciences, that they form an 
indispensible instrument of historical research, and that they even 
constitute the common basis of various procedures which are often con-
sidered as characteristic of the social in contradistinction to the 
42 
natural sciences." 
Hempel's argument is primarily in response to Collingwood's claim 
that history is a kind of "empirical knowledge which could not be 
accounted for by the methods empiricists were willing to allow." 43 
Leading proponents of this idea and reactionists to Hempel include: 
Collingwood, Dray, and Hexter. A discussion of the salient features 
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of ideas of Hempel, Collingwood, Dray, and others is delayed until after 
a brief presentation contrasting some of the general features of history 
and science. 
Data Selection Basis 
Rickert claims that the .•. "principal of selection that governs 
historical thought and writing is of an entirely different sort from 
that employed in the natural sciences."44 Selection of data by the 
scientist is guided by universal laws he believes hold between the 
general ~roperties of those data. Selection of data by the historian 
is governed mainly by his interest in a subject; e.g., institution, 
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individual, or event. The subject being studied is the center of 
attention and the basis for inclusion or exclusion of data. The histor-
ian selects data he thinks will be helpful in understanding and explain-
ing his subject. His data selection process is not guided by universal 
laws. 
Evidential Base 
The scientist enjoys what, from the viewpoint of the historian, 
might be considered a luxury. When a chemist combines two parts hydrogen 
and one part oxygen he gets water. He can repeat this process over and 
over and thereby add to the record confirming the explanation of the 
formation of water. In addition, the chemist has the option of trying 
various combinations of hydrogen and oxygen to see if water results. 
Too, he can add other chemicals to see their effect, if any, on the 
process of forming water. 
The evidential base of the historian allows no such experimentation. 
In explaining the cause of World War II the historian cannot recreate 
the actual situations that existed; nor can he assemble a similar 
situation. Also, he cannot manipulate the variables that were present 
to see the effect of such manipulation on the outcome. 
Historical Subject Matter 
The previous two sections indicate that the basic difference 
generally seen between explanation in history and the natural sciences 
reduces down to the subject matter of history. Is history autonomous? 
Is there a world of history and a world of science? Patrick Gardiner, 
in The Nature of Historical Explanation devotes a ~hapter to a discussion 
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of these questions. This chapter is built around four propositions 
frequently used to suppor~ the idea that history is an autonomous branch 
of study: 
A. Historical events are past events and hence cannot be 
known in the manner in which present events are known. 
B. Historical events are unique and unclassifiable. 
C. History describes the actions, statements, and thoughts 
of human beings, not the behavior of "dead matter" with 
which science is concerned. 
D. Historical events have an irreducible richness and 
complexity.45 
Gardiner says that we may conclude, if we choose, .•• "that the subject 
matter of history is different from that of science."46 Care must be 
exercised however because: "The world is one: the ways we use to talk 
about it, various. And the fact that in some cases we decide to describe 
47 it in one way rather than another is contingent upon our purposes. 11 
Basic Difference Between Scientist and Historian 
Gardiner believes that the crux of the distinction between the 
scientist and the historian is as follows. "The scientist frames hypo-
theses of precision and wide generality by a continual refining away of 
irrelevant factors." The historian, on the other hand, talks "about 
what happeded on particular occasions in all its variety, all its rich-
ness, and his terminology is adapted to this object."48 
Hexter takes a little different view in his statement of the major 
difference between science and history. Using an example involving a six 
year old boy he shows how the boy performs highly complex historical 
operations but cannot perform relatively simple mathematical-scientific 
operations. Historical explanations are relatively easy because most 
people have been giving explanations of past events all of their lives; 
I 
most people generally have a sufficient amount of data, or it is readily 
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obtainable, to explain any historical matter that may confront them; 
and, the language of historians is the common lang11age. 
Alternatively, scientific explanations are foreign to most indivi-
duals because they do not perform scientific experiments and give 
scientific explanations often, if ever; they do not have the data, or 
access to the data; and the sciences have technical languages unknown 
to the common man. 
Hexter makes the following statements in contrasting science and 
history. 
The highest attainments of science give us a sense of discovery 
through innovation. What was hidden is suddenly uncovered by 
men who have done something radically new. The better works 
of historians impart to us a sense of recognition achieved 
through renovation. By clearing away so confusing rubbish, a 
good historian enables us to see clearly what we already dimly 
sense might be there .... Each point about it has just that 
air of obviousness which everyone can agree to, but which no 
previous writer seems to have attained ••.• Between the 
scientists' "Is that a legitimate logical or mathematical 
inference?" and the historians' "Does that make sense?" there 
is a world of difference. To say this is not to depreciate 
the work of professional historians. They do what is appro-
priate to their calling.49 
The above discussion of history vs. science is by no means exhaust-
ive. It is merely presented to give the reader, unfamiliar with the 
philosophy of history, a glimpse of the highly controversial nature of 
t~is subject matter and to prepare him for a review of the basic tenets 
of the specific philosophies of history which follow. 
Some Specific Philosophies of History 
Inside-Outside 
Collingwood reacts to philosophers who hold the view that historical 
knowledge is a type of empirical knowledge that can be explained by 
methods used in the natural and physical sciences. He maintains that 
the 
science of human nature was a false attempt--falsified by 
the analogy of natural science--to understand the mind itself, 
and that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by 
the methods called scientific, the right way of investigating 
mind is by the methods of history. I shall contend that the 
work which was to be done by the science of human nature is 
actually done, and can only be done, by history: that history 
is what the science of human nature professed to be, and that 
Locke was right when he said (however little he understood 
what he was saying) that the right method for such an inquiry 
is the historical, plain method.SO 
The basic reason Collingwood thinks methods different from those 
used in the natural sciences are needed in explaining history is that 
he thinks the subject matter is different. Collingwood presents the 
following idea: 
For science, the event is discovered by perceiving it, and the 
further search for its cause is conducted by assigning it to 
its class and determining the relation between that class and 
others. For history, the object to be discLvered is not the 
mere event, but the thought expressed in it. To discover that 
thought is already to understand it.Sl 
Collingwood's method has been labeled by some the "Inside-Outside 
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Theory of Human Events." In contrasting human nature and human history 
Collingwood gives the following example to illustrate his conception of 
how a historian investigates his subject matter. 
The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a 
distinction between what may be called the outside and the 
inside of an event. By the outside of the event I mean every-
thing belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies 
and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by 
certain men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date .... 
By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be 
described in terms of thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican 
law, or the clash of constitutional policy between himself and 
his assassins. He is investigating not mere events (where by a 
mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) 
but actions, and an action is the unity o~ the outside and in-
side of an event. He is interested in the crossing of the 
Rubicon only in its relation to Republican law, and in the 
spilling of Caesar's blood only in its relation to a 
constitutional conflict. His work may begin by discovering the 
outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always 
remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is 
to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its 
agent. 52 
In continuing this line of reasoning Collingwood states: 
The processes of nature can therefore be properly described as 
sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They 
are not processes of mere events but processes of actions, 
which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought; 
and what the historian is looking for is those processes of 
thought. All history is the history of thought.53 
The crux of Collingwood's approach is the inside of an event. To be 
aware of the inside of an event the historian must discover the 
thoughts of the individual who performed the action which created the 
event. This requires, to some extent, a reenactment, a reliving, a 
recreation, a rethinking. Somehow, the historian must rethink the 
thoughts of the subject in question. How can this be done? 
To achieve this, Collingwood believes the historian must recon-
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construct the situation as it existed and he must perceive the manner in 
which the agents of the actions envisaged it. In rethinking the event 
he must see the alternatives available to the agent, the possible out-
comes of each alternative, and the reasons for choosing one alternative 
over the others. Only when the historian utilizes all of his accumulated 
knowledge concerning the situation and the agents involved is he able to 
do this. Be reenacting past thoughts in his own context the historian 
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also is able to critically evaluate the thoughts. 
Covering Law 
Hempel reacts to Collingwood and those who hold views similar to 
Collingwood by arguing that " general laws have quite analogous 
functions in history and in th~ natural sciences, that they form an 
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indispensable instrument of historical research, and that they even con-
sritute the common basis of various procedures which are often consider-
ed as characteristic of the social in contradistinction to the natural 
55 
sciences." Hempel frequently uses the term "universal hypothesis" 
instead of "general law." In an artical entitled "The Function of 
General Laws in History" Hempel states: 
•.• a universal hypothesis may be assumed to assert a regularity 
of the following type: In every case where an event of a speci-
fied kind C occurs at a certain place and time, an event of a 
specified kind E will occur at a place and time which is related 
in a specified manner to the place and time of the occurrence of 
the first event. (The symbols "C" and "E" have bee:p. chosen to 
suggest the terms "cause" and "effect," which are often, though 
by no means always, applied to events related by a law of the 
above kind.)56 . 
In the natural sciences the primary function of general laws is to 
enable the experimenter to predict and provide causal explanations. The 
explanation of the occurrence of an event, E, is usually stated in terms 
of the factors causing E. If it can be said that a certain set of events 
(Cl .•• Cn) caused the event which is being explained to happen then it 
can be said that, "according to certain general laws, a set of events of 
the kinds mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event of kind E." 57 
A scientific explanation then consists of three things: (1) A specifi-
cation of the relevant boundary conditions; (2) A specification of all 
relevant general laws; and (3} A specification of the relevant boundary 
conditions and general laws in such a manner that leads naturally to the 
explanation. 
Hexter illustrates Hempel'~ so-called covering law, model in a 
historical setting by looking at the population change in four lands in 
the same region over an identical time period. In countries I, III, and 
IV the population increased but in country II the population decreased. 
In answering the question "Why did the population in country II drop 
sharply while during the same time period the populations of countries 
I, III, and IV increased?" Hexter demonstrates the covering law model 
as follows: 
Boundary conditions. At time t 0 , II was a land (a) densely 
populated, (b) almost wholly agrarian, (c) with an extremely 
primitive transportation network. (d) The population subsisted 
on a diet almost entirely composed of a carbohydrate present 
in plant x, which was raised locally. (e) Other native 
agricultural products were locally consumed in such limited 
quantity that (f) means were lacking for the necessary pro-
cessing of the most important ones. (g) Plant x is susceptible 
to a disease y which (1) suddenly, wholly, and without warning 
destroys the edible nutritive portion very shortly before it 
is ready for harvesting, (2) spreads very rapidly, and (3) 
lingers in the soil and infects plant x in successive years. 
Finally (h) disease y infected plant x in land'II for several 
successive years between t 0 and t 0 plus ten years. 
Covering laws. (a) A plant disease which acts as y does destroy 
the crop x in an area. (b) The almost complete destruction of 
the sole food staple in a densely populated area with a pr1m1-
tive transportation network and no means for processing other 
agricultural products reduces the available food supply in that 
area to a level far below the level of subsistence for the 
local population. (c) .When the available food supply in an area 
is far below the minimum required by the population for sub-
sistence, that population will decline through emigration and/or 
increased susceptig~lity to disease consequent to malnutrition, 
and/or starvation. 
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The statement of the boundary conditions and the covering laws make nee-
essary the statement that the population in country II declined between 
t 0 and t 0 p+us ten years. Therefore, an explanation of the decline in 
population in country II has been established. Since the boundary condi-
tions are not present in countries I, II, and IV, no such statement 
necessarily follows. The countries represented in Hexter's illustration 
are Belgium (I), Ireland (II), England (III), and France (IV). His 
illustration explains one of the results of the Irish Potato Famine. 
On the basis of examples such as the above and other arguments 
concerning the scientific character of explanat~ons and predictions, 
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Hempel concludes that "Historical explanation, too, aims at showing that 
the event in question was not 'a matter of chance,' but was to be 
expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The 
expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational 
scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of general 
59 laws." 
Hempel's reaction to Collingwood and those who hold views similar 
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to Collingwood was so extreme that it provoked counterattacks. 
Rational 
Dray cannot accept the covering law concept of historical explana-
tion because he thinks the theory lacks sensitivity " to the concept 
61 
of explanation historians normally employ." In "The Historical 
Explanation of Actions Reconsidered" Dray stated: 
I want to argue that the trouble, •.• ,is that what historians 
usually mean, in offering an explanation of a human action, 
simply does not coincide conceptually with showing an action's 
performance to have been deducible from other conditions in 
accordance with empirical laws.62 
In countering the covering law concept, Dray proposes a type of 
explanation framework that is similar in many respects to that of 
Collingwood. Dray believes that the conceptual framework upon which 
most explanations in human history rest is a" •.• conceptual connection 
between understanding a man's action and discerning its rationale."63 
Briefly stated, his conceptual foundation is as follows: 
The function of an explanation is to resolve puzzlement of 
some kind._ When a historian sets out to explain a historical 
action, his problem is usually that he does not know what reason 
the agent had for doing it. To achieve understanding, what he 
seeks is information about what the agent believed to be the 
facts of his situation, including the likely results of taking 
various courses of action considered open to him, and what he 
wanted to accomplish: his purposes, goals, or motives. Under-
standing is achieved when the historian can see the reasonable-
ness of a man's doing what his agent did, given the beliefs and 
purposes referred to; his action can then be explained as having 
been an "appropriate" one.64 
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Dray calls this type explanation, which attempts to find a connec-
tion between the beliefs, motives and actions of an individual, rational 
explanation. Dray argues that explanations of this type do not require 
the use of universal laws. Neither do explanations of this type say 
that the action taken by the agent in question would always be taken 
by that agent when the circumstances present on this occasion reoccur. 
Rather, the purpose of explanations of this type is merely" •.• to 
show that what was done was the thing to have done for the reasons given, 
rather than merely the thing that is done on such occasions, perhaps 
in accordance with certain laws (loose or otherwise)."65 Dray provides 
an example of rational explanation in Laws and Explanations in History; 
66 pages 123-126. 
Genetic 
Proponents of the genetic approach to historical explanation argue 
that explanation does not have to take the form of providing the 
sufficient conditions of an event. Gallie, a proponent of the genetic 
approach, bases his argument upon a view expounded by Popper and others, 
II that any causal argument can be regarded as historical insofar as 
it is applied to some particular event; only, when that view emphasizes 
that, theoretically, apy kind of causal argument can serve to explain 
historical events 
Nagel states: 
.•• genetic explanation of a particular event or state of affairs 
C occurring at time t shows C to be the result of a series of 
o~currences whose initial termtis some occurrence or state of 
affairs c0 that existed before C • Accordingly, the explanation 
involv!s refrrence to a series of events c0 , c1 ... ,C., •.. , 
Ck, Ck, Ck , .•• , C • Some of the events may have cBme i~to 
existence more or les§ simultaneously (these are indicated by 
letters with the same subscripts but different superscripts) 
and may have overlapping durations; but most of them have come 
into existence at different times. Moreover, an event is pre-
sumably included for mention in the series only if it is an 
indispensable g§ndition for the occurrence of some later event 
in the series. 
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Both Gallie and Nagel point out that a genetic explanation contains 
some of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the event 
h h f 11 1 f ff . . d. . 69 rat er t an a u camp ement o su 1c1ent con 1t1ons. 
Historical Storytelling 
Historical storytelling is Hexter's response to philosophers who try 
to assimilate history to science. Hexter does not believe that an 
attempt at assimilation is fruitful. He presents the following set of 
propositions about history offering an alternative to the philosophies 
of history generally presented. 
1. Potentially history is a credible, coherent, and patterned 
construal of the record of the past. 
2. Properly conducted historical investigation and properly 
constructed historical discourse usually result not in 
"mere opinion," but in close approximations to the truth 
about their objects of inquiry. 
3. Sometimes the evidence available in the surviving records 
of the past will satisfactorily sustain two or more diver-
gent yet credible conclusions about what went on in the 
past; and although ..• God could eliminate all divergencies, 
historians are not and are unlikely to be omniscient gods, 
so some divergent historical conclusions will be almost 
equally credible. 
4. The rhetoric of history frequently permits two or more 
divergent alternative structures of discourse, and the 
alternatives are sometimes irreducible in principle 
either (a) because they equally maximize the truth values 
that they achieve or (b) because each maximizes sets of 
incommensurate truths values that cannot be maximized 
simultaneously within any single structure of historical 
discourse. 
5. Proposition 4-a should cause neither historians nor any-
one else any discomfort or wonder, since the existence 
of several equally valid solutions to a problem is far 
from being unique to the rhetoric of history. It is 
phenomenon familiar to everyone who got as far as quadratic 
equations in Algebra, which have two equally correct solu-
tions. It will also be familiar to anyone who considers 
the innumerable ways of bringing about chemical reactions 
of which water will be an end-product. In neither the 
algebraic nor the chemical case does the duality or multi-
plicity of correct solutions imply that there are no rules 
or that what counts as a correct solution is merely a matter 
of opinion. What is true of algebra and chemistry is also 
true of the rhetoric of history. 
6. On the other hand proposition 4-b may present considerable 
difficulties since it may imply and be symptomatic of a 
fundamental difference between history and the natural 
sciences rooted in differences between the two aspects of 
reality that are their respective objects--"the past" and 
"nature."70 
In ,The History Primer, Hexter takes a unique approach to attack 
scientific approaches to historical explanation and also develops and 
illustrates historical storytelling. 
Historical storytelling rests upon the seven postulates given on 
pages 6 and 7 of this study. The beginning point for the historical 
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storyteller is an observation point, " ... the place where he takes his 
stand and from which he surveys the record of the past in order to make 
the indispensable decisions on a sound rhetorical strategy for his 
71 
story." A constant awareness of the outcome of the story aids the 
historian as he selects and evaluates actions that had a bearing on the 
event that is being explained. Selection of data for their bearing on 
the pivotal point of the historical study involves judgment, not bias. 
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Major elements of a good historical story include: (1) The story 
is skillfully adapted to its context; (2) The rhetoric used is such 
that the historian creates in the minds of the readers mental images 
representing the meaning the historian seeks to transfer; (3) The story 
is concise; (4) The story is such that the reader can visualize in his 
mind what it was like to be each character in the particular situation 
described; (5) The story is processive in the senses that it, (a) is 
enough to proceed with, and (b) it gives an account of the relevant 
process of change through time that cannot be faulted; (6) The story is 
wholly credible in the particular context; and (7) The language used in 
the story is common to both the writer and the reader. 72 
Specific Methods of Historical Analysis 
Introduction 
Almost any approach to writing history begins with the process of 
external criticism which establishes the authenticity of the documents 
being examined. The historian then uses internal criticism to establish 
the credibility of the statements contained in the documents. The 
credibility of statements by different individuals is a relative matter 
and the truthfulness of any statement carries a certain subjective 
probability. Through the process of corroboration the historian concludes 
which statements he feels are the most credible. These statements 
result in a set of facts which become the basis for his interpretation. 
Chronological Method 
Th~s method simply presents in descri~tive narrative the actions of 
individuals in chronological sequence. While the method has the 
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advantage of being relatively easy to perform, it is of questionable 
value in providing a meaningful explanation of the events that occurred. 
The major weakness is that of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. 
The historian must remember the temporal sequence does not establish that 
a prior even·t caused a subsequent event. The logical, rather than 
temporal, relationship is the important relationship. 
Documentary Method 
In some cases a researcher has access to a set of newly discovered 
or newly published documents. He begins an examination of the documents 
with no problem in mind for which he seeks an explanation and no well 
conceived principles of selection. To see what is contained in the 
documents is the primary objective when the documentary method is used. 
Biographical Method 
In using the biographical method the historian focuses on the ideas 
and actions of the agents involved. The historian must be alert to the 
fact that there is a tendency on his part to overstress the creative 
influence and individual achievements of leading figures. Also, often 
there are differences between what a man thought and intended and what 
his followers, or critics, believe that he thought or intended. The 
historian tries to determine if such differences exist, and if so, make 
them known. 
When examining the ideas and actions of the agents the historian 
must consider the social and cultural developments that may influence 
the agent. Are the agent's actions governed by personal motives or 
socially approved motives? 
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A biographical study of the major individuals involved in a problem 
may help not only in providing an explanation to the problem but may 
also contribute to such areas as: social psychology studies, leadership 
studies, interaction between an individual and groups studies, and 
73 personality studies. 
Introduction 
Methodology Used 
As stated on page 20 of this study, "The objective of the study will 
determine the method used by the researcher," and it is this philosophy 
that determined the method used in this study. The main objective of 
this study is to analyze the events leading to the establishment of the 
CASB in such a way as to provide a credible explanation of the events 
that led Congress to establish the CASB. The documentary method is 
inappropriate since the method involves a search of documents with no 
objectivity in mind. The chronological method will not be used in its 
true form because of the possible occurrence of the post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc fallacy. 
Methodology Used in Chapter III 
As will be seen in Chapters IV, V, and VI, social forces play a 
significant role in the cost accounting standards legislation process. 
Because of this a separate chapter, Chapter III, is devoted to providing 
a background of the social forces that seem relevant to the study. 
Variations of the biographical method and the rational philosophy are 
used in Chapter III to give the reader an awareness of the possible 
intentions and motives of individuals and groups involved in the events 
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of interest. 
Methodology Used in Chapters IV,~. and VI 
Hexter's postulates form the foundation for the methodology used in 
Chapters IV, V, and VI. The author of this study agrees with Hexter 
that the subject matter of history is different from that of the natural 
sciences and also that 11 ••• credibility rather than necessary and 
sufficient causes provides the standard of adequacy of explanation II 
On this basis, the Hempelian and Genetic philosophies are not considered 
appropraite for use in Chapters IV, V, and VI. Instead, the study 
utilizes the historical, storytelling method and in writing the story 
the investigator focuses on a focal point and subfocal points in select-
ing and evaluating actions that had a bearing on the event that is being 
explained. Efforts are made to satisfy the major elements of a good 
historical story as listed on page 45 of this study. The reader will 
notice that element number four is very similar to the Collingwood 
philosophy, so in a sense the Collingwood philosophy is also used in 
Chapters IV, V, and VI. 
Because of the nature of this study, external criticism is of 
secondary importance. Little, if any, question exists concerning the 
authenticity of the documents. Internal criticism is of primary concern 
in this study. Attempts are made to determine if each individual in the 
study was capable of knowing the truth or the facts of the situation of 
which he testified. If he was capable of knowing the truth the questions 
then become: Did he tell the truth? Or did he tell some of the truth? 
Was the testimony·self-serving? In performing the process of internal 
criticism the author gives consideration to Shafer's checklist (see pages 
. ' 
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28 and 29) and to the items enumerated by Gottschalk (see pages 29 and 
30) with an emphasis on establishing credibility of the witnesses. 
In presenting the individuals involved in the proceedings leading 
to the establishment of the CASB, efforts are made to identify the 
competing values of thos~ involved and to determine why certain testi-
mony was more persuasive than other testimony. (As a prelude to the 
analysis there is a chapter in which the backgrounds of the individuals 
playing critical roles in this study are developed.) Interdependencies 
existing between the structure of the situation and the behavior of the 
individual are alluded to and an effort is made to determine if such 
behavior is consistent with long-term tendencies. When appropriate 
and possible an attempt is made to examine both formal and informal 
processes. 
The format of the study follows that of a story which provides a 
processive explanation of the establishment of the CASB. 
Methodology Used in Chapter VII 
Since Chapters III - VI provide an adequate and credible explanation 
of the events leading to the establishment of the CASB, the study could 
logically end after Chapter VI. However, the study goes two steps 
further and in Chapter VII sets forth a set of conclusions and some 
implications of this study for financial accounting. Prior to presenting 
the conclusions an examination using elements of negative criticism is 
made of some of the individuals involved in the study. 
In presenting the implications for financial accounting the 
emphasis changes from trying to provide a credible explanation of past 
actions and events to trying to predict the future. With the change in 
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objectives comes a change iri the philosophy used and in this section of 
the study variations of the concepts of Hempel, Gallie, and Nagel seem 
appropriate. The Hempelian philosophy argues that when something 
happens it is not the result of chance, but to be expected under the 
existing conditions. A variation of the genetic concept of Gallie and 
Nagel might say that an event will occur when some of the necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of the event are present. In the section 
relating to implications for financial accounting the study recommends 
certain actions based upon the occurrence of hypothesized conditions. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented features of various methods of historical 
study and analysis and has developed the methodology to be used in the 
remainder of this study. An awareness of some limitations of historical 
methods, some general features of historical methods, some ideas regard-
ing assessments vs. conclusions, some ideas regarding history vs. natural 
sciences, some specific philosophies of history and of some specific 
methods of historical analysis should cause the uninitiated reader to 
better appreciate the value and complexities of this type research. 
The overriding philosophy in determining the methodology for use in 
the remainder of this study is that the objective of the study will 
determine the method used by the researcher. As noted in the section 
entitled, "Methodology Used," when the objective of a chapter, or within 
a chapter, changes so does the methodology and/or basic philosophy. 
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CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL FORCES RELATING TO THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Chapter II of this study presents some of the features of historical 
research and concludes with a brief description of the methodology 
used in this study. One of the key statements in Chapter II is that in 
determining the causes of human actions of the past the first step is 
not a close scrutiny of the documents but rather an informed understand-
ing of the social forces at work. Only when the historian and his 
readers have an informed understanding of the social forces at work can 
they gain a proper understanding of the historical event. As indicated 
on page 21 of this study, by examining the structure of the situation 
and changes in the structure the investigator sees various interrela-
tionships and gains insight into the possible underlying causes of the 
observed actions or ~vents. 
One of the major elements of a good historical story is that the 
story is such that the reader can visualize in his mind what it was like 
to be each character in the particular situation described. To enhance 
the reader's possibility of visualizing in his own mind what it was like 
to be each character in the particular situations described and to 
enhance the reader's possibility of gaining a proper understanding of 
the events leading to the establishment of the CASE, this chapter pre-
sents the social forces that seem relevant to this study: (1) the 
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military-industrial complex, (2) the background of Admiral Hyman Rickover, 
(3) the background of Senator William Proxmire, and (4) the mood of 
Congress. 
Military-Industrial Complex 
Introduction 
To more fully appreciate the actions of many of the individuals 
involved in the Congressional hearings, Congressional debates, and 
related activities, an examination of the so-called military-industrial 
complex seems in order. Therefore, this section of the study examines 
various aspects of the military-industrial complex. 
Eisenhower's Warning 
On January 17, 1961, in his farewell address to the nation, 
President Eisenhower observed that the United States had been compelled 
to "create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions" and to 
maintain a defense establishment employing 3.5 million persons and 
1 
spending huge sums. In addition he stated: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a 
large arms industry is new in American experience. The total 
influence--economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in 
every city, every state house, every office of the federal 
government. We recognize the imperative need for this develop-
ment. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. 
Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the 
very structure of our society. 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or un-
sought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for 
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our 
liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for 
granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel 
the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military 
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so 
that security and liberty may prosper together. 2 
This was Eisenhower's first public reference to a military-
industrial complex and many people were surprised that he, a military 
man with friend in big business, uttered such a statement. However, 
the statement was consistent with his previous thinking. 
At the height of a particularly aggravating dispute over the 
relative merits of Army and Air Force anti-aircraft weapons, 
he declared that "obviously political and financial considera-
tions" rather than "strict military needs" were influencing 
the weapons debate. And on another occasion, when asked 
whether he would be willing to allocate more money for defense 
if the nation could, as his critics insisted, afford it, he 
replied heatedly, "I would not." Anyone "with any sense," 
he said, knew that if military spending were not restrained, 
the country would become a "garrison state."3 
Everyone did not agree with Eisenhower regarding his warning 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. A former Defense 
Department official said he did not know what Eisenhower was talking 
4 
about. The "Air Force" magazine characterized reaction to the 
President's statement as a "flap" and 
deplored the "small wave of learned essays rehashing all of the 
irresponsible charges and insinuations that have been bandied 
around in Congressional hearings for the past few years." The 
great danger, it concluded, was that "an exercise of misdirected 
caution .•. could menace national security."5 
Eisenhower was not warning against a willful conspiracy by indus-
trial and military leaders, but '~f an almost insidious penetration of 
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our own minds that the only thing the country is engaged in is weaponry 
6 
and missiles--and I'll tell you we just can't afford that." Since 
unanimity of agreement concerning a military-industrial complex was 
apparently to some extent lacking in 1961, the question could be asked: 
Was there any evidence of a military-industrial complex at that time, 
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and for purposes of this study, later? 
Definition ~ Military-Industrial Complex 
Before looking at specific examples of evidences of a military-
industrial complex, a definition of the term "military-industrial 
complex" seems appropriate. Senator Proxmire says that to simply label 
the influence a "military-industrial complex" is to limit the influence 
incorrectly and that the influence is, 
... in fact, a coalition of the military services,. the service 
associations, the Pentagon bureaucracy, the giant aerospace 
industry, trade associations and public relations firms, the 
employees of the weapons makers and the trade unions that 
organize them, a vast proportion of the scientific and engin-
eering talent in the country, universities whose departments 
have become dependent on Pentagon largesse, government-
sponsored and privately owned research organizations, local 
business and civic groups whose communities grow and prosper 
on Pentagon contracts, and the local, state and national 
politicians whose survival hinges on their active 7epresenta-
tion of these forces in their states or districts. 
Jack Raymond, a former correspondent for The New York Times with exten-
sive experience in covering defense affairs from Washington, gives a 
similar definition in a Harvard Business Review article. 8 
Interchange of Military and Industrial Personnel 
One phase of the military-industrial complex subjected to extensive 
investigation is the hiring of retired armed services officers by the 
defense industries. In 1959~ Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman 
of the House Armed Services Special Investigation Subcommittee, ques-
tioned 75 witnesses over 25 days regarding this issue. While the 
hearings produced no real evidence of wrongdoings the following was 
revealed. 
More than 1,400 retired officers in the rank of major or 
higher--including 261 of general or flag rank--were found 
to be employed by the top 100 defense contractors. The 
company employing the largest number (187, including 27 
retired generals and admirals) was General Dynamics Corp., 
headed by former Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, which 
also received the biggest defense orders of any company 
in 1960 • 
•.. No one, ..• , took issue with the statement of Vice 
Adm. H. G. Rickover that the former jobs of retired 
officers often were filled "by people who are their dear 
friends, or even by people whom they have been influential 
in appointing, and naturally they will be listened to."9 
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Witnesses at the hearings maintained that their jobs involved technical, 
managerial, and representation functions but denied that they were in-
valved in the negotiation processes involving military procurements. 
Also, while not taking issue with Rickover's statement, most former 
officers testified that they were ~'has-beens" and without influence over 
their former colleagues. 
The Hebert Committee concluded there were" ... several obvious 
inconsistencies in testimony" and stated: 
The better grade and more expensive influence is a very subtle 
thing when being successfully applied .•.• The "coincidence" 
of contracts and personal contacts with firms represented by 
retired officers and retired civilian officials sometimes 
raises serious doubts as to the complete objectivity of some 
of these decisions.lO 
A watered-down proposal by the subcommittee for a tighter law relating to 
dealings between the Government and retired Government employees passed 
in the House but failed to get out of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 
Senator Paul H. Douglas (D., Illinois) was also concerned with this 
area of the military-industrial complex in 1959. In connection with a 
hearing before the Senate Finance Committee concerning the extension of 
the Renogiation Act, he requested that the Pentagon supply a list of 
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former military officers who worked for the 100 largest military con-
tractors. In 1969, Senator William Proxmire requested from the Secretary 
of Defense a list of retired military officers of the rank of Navy 
captain or Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps colonel and above who 
worked for the 100 largest military contractors. In the past the 
Pentagon had refused reporters., writers, and ordinary citizens access 
to this data. Rather than send Proxmire the names he had requested, 
which the Pentagon had available, the Pentagon requested that the con-
tractors supply the names--which they did. On the basis of the data 
he received from the contractors and from the list obtained by 
Senator Douglas, Senator Proxmire assembled data which form the basis 
for Table I. 
An examination of the table reveals that for each category present-
ed the number of officers employed almost triples between 1959 and 1969. 
Proxmire argues that the" ••• 2,124 high-ranking former officers 
. ..11 
employed by the 100 biggest contractors constitute a maJor bulwark .... 
of the unwarranted influence Eisenhower warned against. Proxmire does 
not argue that a conspiracy exists between the military and industry 
but " that there is a continuing community of interest between the 
military, on the one hand, and the companies who hire ex-officers, on 
12 
the other." He feels this situation is dangerous and can lead to 
unwholesome results. 
In 1966 an Executive Order was issued prohibiting a retired officer 
" ... from 'selling' or negotiating contracts with his former service ••. 
one industry source told CQ (Congressional Quarterly) that 'at least 90 
percent of the retired officers hired for top-level positions by the 
defense contractors ignore that regulation. "'13 
TABLE I 
FACTS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT OF EX-MILITARY 
PERSONNEL BY LARGE CONTRACTORS 
Category 
Number of retired colonels or 
Navy captains or above employed 
by the 100 largest contractors--
88 contractors reporting 
Average Per Company 
Number of high ranking officers 
employed by the ten companies 
with the largest number of former 
officers on their payroll 
Average Per Company 
Forty-three companies on the list 
and reporting facts both years 
employed high-ranking officers 
numbering 
Average Per Company 
1959 
721 
8+ 
372* 
37+ 
588 
13+ 
1969 
2,124 
21+ 
1,065* 
106+ 
1,642 
38+ 
*Represents almost precisely half of the total number of officers 
employed by the 88 contractors reporting. 
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Unlike the unsuccessful Hebert subcommittee proposal, Proxmire, on 
the basis of the disclosures presented above and in Table I was able to 
get an amendment accepted to the Military Procurement Bill of 1969 
requiring" .•. registration with the Secretary of Defense by persons 
transferring from certain positions between the Department of Defense 
and major defense contractors during a three-year period after the 
14 transfer." The roll call vote was 90-0. At the end of 1971, in 
accordance with requirements of Proxmire's amendment, the Secretary of 
Defense reported 
..• that an additional 993 retired or former military officers 
had been signed on by big Pentagon contractors. He also 
revealed ..• that some 108 high-ranking Pentagon civilian 
employees had gone to work for big Pentagon contractors. 
Further, 232 former civilian employees or consultants to de-
fense contractors were hired by the Pentagon at salaries of 
$19,000 or more.l5 
Conflict-of-interest laws enacted in 1962 do prohibit a retired 
regular officer, at all times, from selling to the branch of the military 
service in which he holds a retired status. However, he may sell to 
other branches of the military services after a three-year waiting 
period. Critics of the Pentagon, such as Proxmire, " ... still charge 
that ex-officers can hide behind other titles and engage in indirect 
selling with military friends. 1116 
Role of Congress 
In addition to the interchange of military and industrial personnel, 
another aspect of the military-industrial complex is ·the role played by 
Congress. 
Congressmen not only must be zealous in representing the interests 
of their districts but also must make decisions concerning how and where 
vast sums of money will be spent. There are numerous examples illus-
trating how individual Congressmen are very much involved in the 
military-industrial complex issue. 
In 1959, Representative Ken Hechler (D., West Virginia) told the 
House: 
I am firmly against the kind of logrolling which would sub-
ject our defense program to narrowly sectional or selfish 
pulling and hauling. But I am getting pretty hot under the 
collar about the way my state of West Virginia is short-
changed in Army, Navy, and Air Force installations •••• I 
am going to stand up on my hind legs and roar ~~til West 
Virginia gets the fair treatment she deserves. 
By fiscal year 1963, West Virginia's share of military contracts had 
grown to $162 million from a level of $36 million for fiscal year 1960 
when Representative Hechler made his remarks. For the same 
time period the state's share of military contracts had risen it from 
46th to 26th place in the nation. 18 
In 1960, Representative James L. Whitten (D., Mississippi), a 
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member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said that "you 
can look at some of our key people in key places in Congress and go see 
how many military establishments are in their districts."19 An example 
often cited to illustrate this point is the State of Georgia which at 
one time had both the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Russell, and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 
Representative Carl M. Vinson. Upon hearing the proposal to add a new 
Air Force installation in Georgia, one general is credited with saying 
that "one more base will sink the state." 
President Johnson's remarks at the March 2, 1968, rollout ceremony 
for the C-5A cargo aircraft at the Lockheed aircraft plant in Marietta, 
Georgia, emphasizes th.e role Congressmen play in the military-industrial 
complex. 
"I would have you good folks of Georgia know that there are a 
lot of Marietta, Georgias, scattered throughout our 50 states," 
the President said. " ... All of them would like to have the 
pride that comes from this production •..• But all of them don't 
have the Georgia delegation." Mr. Johnson specifically cited 
the influence of the Armed Services Committee chairmen, 
Senator Russell and former Representative Vinson. 20 
While it is difficult to see any direct correlation or draw any 
specific inferences between the number of key people in key places 
in Congress and the number of military establishments in their 
districts, it is curious that after Representative Vinson retired in 
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1965 and Senator Russell died in January, 1971, Georgia was one of only 
two states to show a decline in the amount of Defense Department payroll 
between fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1972. Georgia also" •.. 
suffered a sharp decline in prime military contract awards over the 
same period."21 In addition, the Department of Defense announced on 
April 21, 1973, that three military establishments located in Georgia 
were scheduled for closing. 
While Congressmen and former military officers appear to play vital 
roles in the military-industrial complex another aspect to consider is 
the part played by defense associations and lobbyists. 
Role of Defense Associations and Lobbyists 
Among the witnesses questioned at the 1959 Hebert hearings were 
representatives of six organizations whose primary function is to pro-
mote" •.• the mutual interests of the armed services and their contrac-
22 tors in national security matters." The organizations represented 
were: the Association of the U. S. Army, the Navy League, the Air Force 
Association, the American Ordnance Association, the Aerospace 
Industries Association, and the National Security Industrial Association. 
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At the time of the Hebert hearing only Aerospace Industries Association 
was registered as a lobbyist. 
In testifying before the committee, representatives of these organi-
zations indicated that these organizations had nothing to do with pro-
curement but rather were primarily concerned with informing and educating. 
In spite of the fact that the representatives of these organizations 
maintained that the organizations they represented were completely 
independent of the military services, the testimony" •.• showed that, 
for the most part, Army, Navy, and Air Force doctrines and weapons 
systems received enthusiastic support in their respective 
23 publications." 
In an article entitled, "Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial 
Complex," Jack Raymond describes the organizations of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force supporters, as being" .•• led by men with strong emotional 
and careerist ties to the services and virtually financed by the defense 
24 
contractors." Raymond further states that these organizations are 
.•. composed of active, reserve, and retired members of the 
Armed Forces, and of defense contractors, community leaders, 
and other supporters. These organizations are financed by 
membership fees, payments for contractors' exhibits at annual 
conventions .... They are regarded as the civilian "arm" or 
"spokesmen" of their respective services, and their officers 
maintain close contact with the active civilian and military 
leaders of the services.25 
Role of Military Services 
Closely related to the defense associations and the lobbyists are 
the military services themselves. They actively carry out lobbying 
activities and public relations programs. Not only do the combined 
services seek larger appropriations but they are constantly in competi-
tion with each other for a share of the defense budget. 
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Techniques used to make Congress, industry, and the public aware of 
the virtues of particular military programs include guided tours of 
installations, television programs, and seminars. The services are 
particularly concerned about their relationship with Congress--especially 
with members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. 
When a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee 
complained of rumors that a Marine Corps installation might 
be removed from his district, the commandant came in person 
to assure him that no change would be made "so long as I am 
in the job."26 
In addition to such activities as those described above the Mil-
itary Services maintain legislative liaison offices in the Capitol. 
Representatives of the military services inform and solicit the interest 
of members of Congress concerning respective military programs. In 
fiscal year 1967 the legislative liaison offices of the Pentagon and the 
three uniformed services were appropriated a total of $3,810,458 to 
handle Congressional inquiries and push legislative programs. By com-
parison, among private groups required to report their lobby spending, 
the biggest spender, the United Federation of Postal Clerks, reported 
27 lobby expenses of $277,524 for calendar year 1967. 
The following gives the reader some idea of the extent of influence 
a lobbyist for the military can have. 
A former Government official with experience in lobbying for 
the Pentagon's program told CQ that Pentagon lobbyists "have 
Congress organized like a Marine Corps landing." He said the 
legislative liaison personnel had the list of Members broken 
up alphabetically and that when their pressures effort failed 
or the issue was "extremely crucial," top Pentagon officials 
or a general or admiral moved in. Currently employed as a 
lobbyist for private ~ndustry, the onetime official told CQ he 
had "50 times the influence when I was lobbying for the 
Government than I have now."28 
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Role of Defense Contractors 
The final aspect of the military-industrial complex examined in 
this study is the role of defense contractors. In addition to employing 
former military personnel and maintaining memberships in defense 
associations, many defense contractors make other attempts to establish 
and maintain good personal relationships with the military establishment. 
The two following examples illustrate how a well cultivated working 
relationship between contractor and a military service branch can affect 
the procurement process. 
Upon learning that the Navy had decided to eliminate a proposal on 
a new weapon system, the contractor went to the admiral in charge and 
persuaded him to permit all bidders additional time to submit additional 
data. The well-informed contractor still failed in his effort to prevent 
29 the elimination of the proposal. 
Another contractor was more successful in his dealings with the 
Air Force. In competition between Company A and Company B the Air Force 
decided to award a new missile contract to Company A. This prompted 
Company B's president to visit the Secretary and persuade him to ini-
tiate a comprehensive review of the decision. The review resulted in 
the contract's going to Company B. 30 
Conclusion 
Few responsible individuals deny the existence, to some degree, of 
a military-industrial complex. The basis for disagreement is wheth~r 
31 
such a situation adversely affects the country. It is sometimes 
argued that the military-industry complex is no different from any 
other close relationships that exist between other industries and 
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related Government agencies. This statement has some relevance if one 
ignores the fact that defense spending accounts for about half of the 
federal budget. Seemingly, the military-industrial complex takes on 
vast proportions and it would probably be well to remember the following 
statement of Eisenhower: 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our 
liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing 
for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can 
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military 
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so 
that security and liberty may prosper together.32 
Background of Admiral Hyman Rickover 
Introduction 
Numerous articles imply that Admiral Hyman Rickover is responsible 
for the establishment of the CASB. Gary F. Bulmash, in his unpublished 
dissertation, says: "The most prominent individual standing out as a 
proponent of such standards (cost accounting standards) is,of course, 
33 Admiral Hyman Rickover." To properly analyze the role played by 
Rickover in the establishment of the CASB, an understanding of his 
character and philosophy is helpful. This section presents necessary 
background data about Rickover considered essential for such an under-
standing. 
Born in Makowa, Russian Poland in 1900, Hyman George Rickover moved 
with his family to New York City in 1904. A short time later the 
Rickovers moved to Chicago where Hyman grew up. Though a dedicated and 
hardworking student, his marks suffered in high school because he worked 
about eight hours a day as a delivery boy and later as a Western Union 
messenger. 
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Rickover attended Annapolis, not because of his interest in the 
N b b . . f 34 avy ut ecause tu1t1on was ree. At Annapolis, Rickover faced 
unpleasantries, obviously only the beginning of what followed throughout 
his life. Being Jewish no doubt contributed to his problems, but 
" Rickover's temperament also caused some of his troubles. Rebel-
lious, secluded, intellectual, determined to make high marks, he did not 
35 fit the conformism of the Academy." Robert Wallace says Rickover was 
not well liked. "He was a grind and a rebel but already so hard 
intellectually that he was untroubled by the stigma that attaches to 
such individuals. As might be imagined, Rickover developed no gluey 
sentimental Navy spirit, although he has a deep sense of obligation to 
the Navy for his education."36 At the Navy's expense, Rickover did two 
years of graduate study at Columbia University earning a master's 
degree in electrical engineering. 
Early Naval Experience 
Rickover's advancement in the Navy was slow. His only seagoing 
command was the minesweeper Finch. Throughout his early career Rickover 
developed a reputation of being hardworking, sharp-tongued, and non-
social. Getting things done and making many enemies seemed to go hand-
in-hand with Rickover. 
While on the battleship Nevada as a lieutenant j.g., he and 
his men installed a 500-unit battle telephone system. When 
on the submarine S-48, he redesigned its defective motors. 
He fought against waste and slipshod ways. The~e activities 
earned him commendation, but they won few friends and no 
preferment.37 
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World War II 
With the arrival of World War II, Rickover's reputation of being a 
hard worker and of being able to get things done worked in his favor. 
As head of the Electrical Section of the Bureau of Ships, Rickover 
incessantly worked preparing ships for battle. He" ... spurred his men 
38 to exhaustion, •.• , drove contractors into rages." He wrestled 
... like a Laocoon with the serpents of red tape. By the end 
of the war he had made naval electric gear far safer and more 
reliable and had earned a reputation as a man who could accom-
plish a job. But he had also earned a reputation for making 
enemies in large round numbers. It was the latter that 
weighed most heavily in peacetime, and again his future seemed 
dim. 39 
Oak Ridge 
In 1946 the Bureau of Ships was looking for a captain to send to 
Oak Ridge to study atomic energy. Rickover, of all the qualified 
captains, was the only one to apply for the position. It was at Oak 
Ridge that Rickover first envisioned a Navy powered by nuclear propul-
sian. He felt that a nuclear powered submarine was the logical starting 
place. His views were not shared with his superiors and eventually 
upon being recalled from Oak Ridge he was assigned so-called advisory 
duties and given an office in an abandoned ladies' room in the Navy 
Building. 
Nautilus 
Rickover ran into closed doors going through regular Navy channels 
concerning his ideas for a nuclear-powered submarine. He then tried to 
interest the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), but to no avail. It was 
at this point, in 1947, that Rickover most vividly displayed his 
philosophy and methods of getting things done. Rickover states: 
A military organization is set up to do routine, not 
imaginative work •••. If anyone comes along with a new 
idea, the people in the organization naturally tend to 
make him conform. The first thing a man has to do is make 
up his mind that he is going to get his head chopped off 
ultimately. If he has that feeling, perhaps he can accom-
plish something.40 
Based on this philosophy, Rickover bypassed several levels of the 
Naval hierarchy and went directly to a former submariner, Admiral 
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Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations. Nimitz saw the possibilities 
and benefits of Rickover's proposal and initiated the paperwork that 
created the Navy's Nuclear Power Division in the Bureau of Ships, of 
which Rickover was made chief. Rickover then went to work on the AEC 
and in 1949 the Reactor Development Division of the AEC was created. 
Rickover convinced the head of the newly created Division to include 
therein a Naval Reactors Branch. Unsurprisingly, Rickover was named 
head of the Naval Reactors Branch. 
These manueverings enabled Rickover to bypass "red-tape." " 
Rickover, wearing his captain's hat, would write letters to be opened by 
Rickover, wearing his civilian hat. Whatever Rickover wanted, Rickover 
got. It was a rare example of the kind of cooperation that can be 
established when military and civilian branches of government have a 
41 genuine mutual interest." By cutting "red-tape" and by keeping con-
stant pressure on everyone involved in development and production, the 
first nuclear submarine was launch,ed in June, 1952. Rickover was 
awarded the Legion of Merit for what Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball 
called "the most important piece of development work in the history of 
42 
the Navy." 
72 
Promotion 
On the very next day a Naval selection board passed over Rickover 
for promotion to rear admiral. This was the second time Rickover had 
been passed over and it was customary for such an officer to be scheduled 
for retirement. No matter how many enemies Rickover has made he has also 
made some friends and one such group consists of members of Congress. 
Upon hearing of the attempt of the Navy to get rid of Rickover, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee reacted in such a way that a special 
selection board was convened that promoted Rickover to rear admiral. 
Snubbed 
In August, 1958, at a special reception, Commander William Anderson, 
who was the skipper of the "Nautilus" on its subpolar voyage, received 
a medal at the White House. Conspicuous by his absence was Rickover. 
He had not been invited. Being snubbed was not an uncommon experience 
for Rickover but this action upset several Congressmen. In addition to 
demanding, and receiving, an apology for Rickover they pushed a proposal 
through Congress that resulted in awarding Rickover a special $2,500 
gold medal" •.. in honor of his achievements in successfully directing 
the development and construction of the world's first nuclear-powered 
ships and the first large-scale nuclear-power reactor ••. devoted 
1 i 1 d i f 1 ' . ,.43 exc us ve y to pro uct on,o e ectr1c1ty. 
Also, in August, 1958, it again was rumored that the Navy was going 
to try to ease Rickover out. Congress again applied certain pressures 
and in time Rickover was promoted to Vice-Admiral. 
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Views 
Introduction 
Perhaps the best way to develop a basic understanding of Rickover, 
in addition to the above, is to give several statements made by others 
concerning him. 
Congressmen 
Representative Holifield: " ••• I have a great deal of confidence 
in the man who is in charge of this particular program, Admiral Hyman 
Rickover ... I do not believe there is a man in existence that has the 
composite knowledge which is embodied in Admiral Rickover 
Representative McCormack: II He (Rickover) made an outstanding 
witness and made a profound impression •.• very dedicated man, an 
unusual gentleman, frank ••. a rugged individualist 
persuasiveness sincerity ••• dedicated mind 
a great leader 
.. 45 
These statements, made in 1958, are representative not only of 
Rickover's rapport with Congress then but also throughout his career. 
Proxmire, in 1970, said of Rickover: "Among the most persistent and 
able critics of the Pentagon is one of its own .•.• Admiral Hyman 
Rickover is a doer as well as a critic."46 
Contractors 
Regarding the manner in which Rickover shortened the time necessary 
to develop and build the first nuclear submarine, an executive of one 
of the companies involved said: "He stuck his neck out a mile It 
took more ability and sheer courage than I've ever seen in 37 years in 
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i d h N 1147 n ustry or t e avy. "When the Secretary of the Navy asked how so 
many radically new jobs had been completed in so short a time, Westing-
house executives told him, 'Rickover made us do it.' rr 48 
An official of a big industrial concern once said: "Now, don't 
misunderstand me. I don't dislike Rickover. I hate him."49 
Atomic Energy Commission 
An angry AEC official said of Rickover: "He is not just an ordi~ 
50 
nary empire builder •.• He's a complete autocrat." Gordon Dean, when 
chairman of the AEC, said that Rickover's "energy, drive and technical 
competence" had made the "Nautilus" project possible. 51 
The Press 
In 1954, Electrical World described Rickover as one who believed 
results are in direct proportion to efforts expended and one who had an 
insatiable need to work. "In the same way, he drives his contractors 
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and subcontractors." Ronald Schiller, in 1953, called "'Rick' ... a 
battler who doesn't quit when he knows he's right."53 In addition to 
calling Rickover an exasperating admiral, Robert Wallace says: 
Rickover is just about the prickliest personality in 
Washington today. Like the original Davy Crockett, 
he is "clear meat-'ax disposition all the way through." 
... He is perhaps the most unpopular admira1 in the 
Navy, and there are a number of influential civilians 
who do not care for him either.54 
Time, in January 1954, said: 
Rickover has little tolerance for mediocrity, none for stu-
pidity. "If a man is dumb," says a Chicago f end, "Rickover 
thinks he ought to be dead." Rickover did not conceal his 
opinions, and many of the officers he regarded as dumb had 
grown into admirals, cruising the Pentagon. They had not for-
gotten or forgiven. One of his opponents remarked ..• "We 
thought we had him fixed, but now he's out of contro1."55 
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Bryce Nelson describes Rickover as" ..• a sharp-tongued 'maverick' 
who shows little hestitation (sic) about publicly discussing issues out-
side his field of professional competence. He undoubtedly qualifies as 
the most outspoken witness from the Defense Department payroll to appear 
b f h . 1 . "56 e ore t e congress1ona comm1ttees. 
Witness 
Rickover has been a frequent witness before Congressional committees 
covering a wide range of subject matter. His opinion is highly valued by 
many Congressmen. In the 1950's, Rickover testified before committees 
concerning what he considered to be deficiencies in the U. S. educational 
system. He has written two books concerning U. S. education--Education 
and Freedom and American Education, ! National Failure. His testimony, 
speeches, and books have not endeared him to professional educators. 
In the 1960's and 1970's Rickover was a frequent witness before 
various Congressional committees investigating policies of the Pentagon, 
defense spending, and nuclear submarines. Robert Wallace's description 
of Rickover's ability to deal with Congress is as true now as it was 
when he gave this description in 1958 . 
.•. Rickover is a superb politician. He has an acute under-
standing of the congressional mind and of the pressure upon it. 
He is summoned frequently to the Capitol to testify on the state 
of his program, on appropriations or on some other subject', and 
invariably he creates a favorable impression. He rarely pre-
sents the customary prepared statement. Instead he merely awaits 
questions and answers them with startling candor. "Haven't you 
prepared for this hearing?" a congressman once asked him. 
"Certainly," said Rickover. "I shaved and put on a clean shirt:." 
"You can't fool a congressman for long," Rickover says. "Sooner 
or later he will find out whether you're telling the truth. If 
you are, he'll help you. If not, you get the meat ax." 
Rickover has always given Congress a straight, if sometimes 
horrifying answer. As a result he enjoys enormous prestige in 
the Capitol. 57 
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Summary 
Rickover was one of the first to give Congress the idea of uniform 
accounting standards. Elmer Staats credits Rickover with providing the 
impetus for bringing about the legislation that eventually led to the 
establishment of the CASB. 58 
Rickover is seen as a hardworker, a person who can get things done, 
a person who has a tendency to make enemies, an officer who is not liked 
by his superiors in the Navy, an individualist, a maverick, but most 
importantly for this study, a person whose opinion in various areas is 
sought and respected by members of Congress. 
Throughout his Naval career, Rickover has fought against waste and 
has been highly concerned with national security. 
Background of Senator William Proxmire 
Introduction 
In addition to having an awareness of the military-industrial 
complex and Admiral Rickover, a knowledge of the background and philoso-
phy of William Proxmire is helpful in gaining a proper understanding of 
how the CASB came into being. Proxmire played a role in the establish-
ment of the CASB and this section of the study presents an evolutionary 
view of the Senator from Wisconsin that serves as a basis for putting 
his role in the proper perspective. 
Education 
William Proxmire was born the son of an M.D. in Lake Forest, 
Illinois, in 1915. Even though his father was a ~onservative Republican, 
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he sent him to the best eastern schools. While attending high school 
in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, his classmates voted him the "biggest grind," 
the "most energetic," and the "biggest sponger." From high school, 
Proxmire went to Yale where he received a B. A. degree with a major in 
English in 1938. Proxmire received two degrees from Harvard--a Master 
of Business Administration in 1940, cum laude, and a Master of Public 
Administration in 1949. According to Banking, "At Harvard he completed 
11 h i f Ph D d . d" . "59 a t e requ rements or a • . egree except1ng a 1ssertat1on. 
Business and Military Experience 
After receiving his MBA, Proxmire worked for a brief period of 
time as a clerk for J. P. Morgan and Co. in New York. In 1941 he 
enlisted in the Army as a private and was discharged as a first 
lieutenant in 1945. After receiving his MPA degree from Harvard and 
upon moving to Wisconsin, Proxmire became an investigative reporter in 
Madison for The Capital Times. Because of a disagreement with the 
editor, this job only lasted seven months. From 1953 through 1957 
Proxmire was part owner and president of Artcraft Press, Waterloo, 
Wisconsin. 
Political Career 
Proxmire, The Planner 
According to John Herbers, at the time a correspondent in the 
Washington bureau of The Times, Promire's move to Wisconsin was well 
thought out. Herbers says that after receiving the MPA degree from 
Harvard, Proxmire had a keen interest in entering into politics and 
made a diligent study to determine where it would be best for a person 
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with his liberal background to locate. On the basis of his study, 
Proxmire narrowed his choices to California, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. 
Wisconsin was the ultimate choice because the Democratic party, though 
small and ineffective in the past, was beginning to show signs of life 
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and growth. 
Proxmire, The State Legislator 
In Uncle Sam--The Last of the Bigtime Spenders, Proxmire himself 
gives insight into his philosophy for getting things done. 
Unlike most elected officials, I was anything but a natural 
people's choice. My constituents could not possible consider 
me as one of them. From the beginning I was an outsider, an 
interloper. I carpetbagged into Wisconsin with about every 
political liability in the book. I had no degree from the 
University of Wisconsin. I had one from Yale and two from 
Harvard, all of which were political liabilities. My last 
employment had been not just on Wall Street, but with J. P. 
Morgan and Company. How do you like that for a "liberal 
Democrat!" 
So I needed some identification. 
I wanted to win election under these circumstances. I was 
desperate. I just had to get elected. How do I identify? 
Well, there's only one thing left: go out and make friends. 
Here's how I did it. 
I picked out the state legislature as my first goal. For six 
months I went personally--no friends, no relatives--to house 
after house in that assembly district of about ten thousand 
families. I talked and especially I listened. We won the 
election. And much more important, I learned something about 
what the people of eastern Dane County wanted, needed, hated 
and loved.6l 
Proxmire not only won his first attempt at an elected office in 1950 but 
in doing so he defeated a six-term incumbent in the Democratic primary 
and later defeated ~he Republican candidate by a 2-1 margin. 
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Proxmire, The Loser 
Proxmire was not as successful in his attempts to gain the governor-
ship of Wisconsin. In 1952 he was defeated by 400,000 votes by Walter 
Kohler, a Republican. Kohler again defeated Proxmire in 1954 by 35,000 
votes. In his third attempt to become governor of Wisconsin, Proxmire 
lost to Vernon Thomson by 59,000 votes. 
Proxmire, The Winner 
In his races for governor, Proxmire was labeled as a carpetbagger 
and described by one newspaper as a "cold-blooded calculator who ... 
picked Wisconsin for his oyster and is driven by an overweening personal 
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ambition for title and power." 
After losing three consecutive races many observers felt Proxmire's 
political career was over. "Like Harold Stassen, he became the butt of 
jokes about the perennial loser."63 
A special election was held in 1957 to fill the Senate seat 
vacated as the result of the death of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In a 
statewide campaign against Republican Walter Kohler, Proxmire capitalized 
on his earlier defeats by saying: 
My opponent does not know what it is to lose. I do. And I'll 
welcome the support of voters who do too. I'll take the losers 
I'll take the debtors •.. I'll take the Milwaukee Braves ••. 64 
The next Senator from Wisconsin should be one who knows defeat. 
By getting 56.4 percent of the votes, Proxmire became the first Democratic 
Senator from Wisconsin in 25 years. 
In an interview immediately following the special election, he was 
asked to describe his policies. Among other things he said: 
Nevertheless, I prefer very greatly not to fit in any cate-
gory, and that's been more or less my political philosophy. 
I've tried to be independent and make my own decisions with-
out regard to any specific doctrine or anything of the kind, 
but on the basis of what I felt was in the best interest of 
the people of Wisconsin.65 
Although Proxmire refused to label himself in the interview in 1957 
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most observers viewed him at that time as being a liberal. Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report said: "Proxmire came to the Senate as an out-
spoken liberal ..•. " 66 
Proxmire, The Spender 
During his first year, Proxmire" ••• almost set a record for 
speeches on the Senate floor (a reported 450 pages in the Congressional 
d) .. 67 Recor .••• He also developed a reputation of being a big spender. 
Representative John Byrnes, a Wisconsin Republican, after adding up the 
costs of new programs proposed by Proxmire in his first year and putting 
a price tag of $23 billion on them labeled Proxmire, "Billion-Dollar 
Bill." Even though President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon 
singled him out in 1958 campaign speeches as being a big spender, 
Proxmire won reelection rather handily. 
Proxmire, The Battler 
Early in his Senate career, Proxmire associated with other 
Senators who were considered to be mavericks--Wayne Morse,-Paul Douglas, 
and Joseph Clark. After only 18 months in the Senate, on February 23, 
1959, Proxmire made a speech in which he charged that Majority Leader 
Johnson had autocratic control of the Senate. It was said that the 
Senate heard two addresses that day: Washington's Farewell Address 
(read annually on Washington's birthday) and Proxmire's Farewell Address. 
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"Arthur Krock noted that for disregarding ian ancient and fixed Senate 
taboo,' Proxmire was left 'along on the burning deck' by other liberals 
and soon 'retired with scars but none of the trophies of battle.'"68 
Although some Senators privately expressed to him their agreement 
with him, none did so publicly. Proxmire refused to yield to the 
disciplinary actions of the Senate and for " the next few years 
swung wildly at gnats and camels alike 
Proxmire narrowly won reelection to the Senate in 1964 and he said 
that an article by Pageant cost him 200,000 votes. In what was pur-
ported to be a poll of members of Congress and Capital reporters, 
Pageant found Proxmire to be the fourth worst Senator. Since 1964, 
Proxmire has been more selective in his targets for criticism. 
Proxmire, The New Image 
Until 1967, it was unclear whether Proxmire was a spender or an 
economizer. In 1967, Proxmire became chairman of the Joint Economic 
Committee (the chairmanship alternates each year between the Senate and 
the House) and he got his own subcommittee on economy in Government. 
Since that time, he has used the subcommittee to investigate various 
areas of Government spending--especially defense spending. 
Proxmire, The Maverick 
Since his attack on Senate Majority Leader Johnson, Proxmire has 
been known as a maverick. In 1970, William Connelly stated, "Certainly 
two presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, have called Proxmire 
a maverick. They found that neither friendship nor party loyalty would 
keep the Wisconsin senator in line."7° Connelly also states: 
If he is a maverick, he is a popular one •.•• His reputation 
as a maverick, may be overstated. The Democratic leadership; 
for example, is usually confident of getting Proxmire's vote 
on social legislation and on important party issues. "He votes 
on the low side for appropriations for a program," says one 
man, "but he always votes for the program. We consider him a 
liberal."71 
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Even though considered a liberal by many, Proxmire displays a conserva-
tive streak through amendments. to reduce appropriations and to eliminate 
entire programs. 
Proxmire, The Loner 
Dun's Review, in April, 1967, described Proxmire as a loner to watc~ 
Dun's stated that businessmen would have to reckon with an outspoken 
Senator who was unafraid to slash spending on "sacred cows"--cuts that 
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other Senators refused to contemplate, much less advocate. As will be 
seen later in this study, Dun's prediction was correct. 
As a member of the Senate, Proxmire has never been a member of the 
Senate "Establishment" or "Club." He is not known for making deals and 
promises with other Senators in exchange for votes on particular programs. 
Rather, Proxmire uses the power of argument and well timed press releases 
to accomplish his goals. Even though not a member of the "Senate Club" 
he has earned the respect of members of the "Club." "'He's hardworking 
and hard-hitting,' says Senator John Stennis (D-Mississippi), whose 
Armed Services Committee has had to make some unaccustomed cuts in the 
defense budget over the past two years in response to Proxmire's 
exposure of military spending habits."73 
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Proxmire, The Watchdog 
It is in the area of military spending that Proxmire has gained the 
reputation of being a watchdog. Through the Subcommittee on Economy in 
Government, Proxmire has led numerous investigations into defense 
spending, waste, inefficiency, and the military-industrial complex. As a 
result, weapons programs have been slowed down and sometimes stopped. 
Also, laws have been enacted concerning defense costs and the employing 
of former military officers by defense contractors. 
Proxmire, The Persistent 
In addition to being known as a maverick, loner, and watchdog over 
government spending, Proxmire has a reputation for being persistent. He 
is generally given credit for stopping Government support of the commer-
cial SST aircraft. His battle, consisting of hearings, debates, and 
news releases extended over more than a ten year period. 
Business Week, in May, 1970, described Proxmire as " ... Congress' 
. i . f 1" b . . 1174 most pers~stent nvest~gator o mi ~tary uy~ng pract~ces ...• In a 
letter to the editor, May 2, 1971, Betty Kaye Taylor gave the following 
testimony to the persistence of Proxmire: 
On Jan. 11, 1967, Senator Proxmire served notice that he 
would remind the Senate daily of its failure to approve U.S. 
ratification of several U. N. human rights treaties, notably 
the Genocide Convgntion. Since making that pledge he has 
spoken 5,520 times. And now, after 20 years of delay, the 
Foreign Relations Committee voted recently to sent the 
Genocide Treaty to the Senate for consent to ratify. 
"More obd~Sate, more obstinate, more stubborn"--yes! And 
right on! 
Another facet of his persistence is exemplified by his voting record in 
the Senate. "Being diligent is nothing new to Mr. Proxmire. He has not 
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missed a roll-call vote on the Senate floor since April, 1966. Earlier 
this year (1975) he became the first person in the history of the Senate 
to cast 4,000 straight roll-call votes." 76 
Proxmire, The Informed 
In recent years, Proxmire has gained the reputation of being well 
informed concerning matters of interest to him. In 1967, Bernard L. 
Boutin, then head of the Small Business Administration, said: "But no 
one does his homework any better than Bill Proxmire ..•. I consider 
Senator Proxmire one of the finest members of the Senate, a very hard 
worker, very well informed, and extremely patient in studying a problem 
and getting all the facts." 77 "In Washington, Proxmire seems totally 
programmed. No wasted motion or energy is permitted that would deflect 
from the Senator's duties. ; .• he is always prepared, and has always 
h k .. 78 done is homewor •... In 1975, in hearings concerning a loan to 
New York City, one Senate observer said of Proxmire: "He was a fount of 
. f i d . n 79 1n ormat on an very very pat1ent ••.• 
Proxmire, The Author 
In addition to fulfilling his Senatorial duties and jogging five to 
ten miles daily, Proxmire has authored several books. The two most 
relevant to this study are: Report From Wasteland, which deals with cost 
overruns and military waste, and Uncle Sam--The Last of the Bigtime 
Spenders, which contains a chapter on military spending. 
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Summary 
Proxmire is seen as a critic of waste and inefficiency in Govern-
ment--especially in the area of defense spending; a Senator that is 
persistent and hardworking; a Senator who uses well-timed press releases 
to accomplish his goals; a Senator that has earned the resp.ect of the 
"Senate Club," although not a member; a Senator who has the ability to 
identify with seemly obscure issues that later come into prominence; and, 
a well informed and effective legislator. 
Mood of Congress in General 
Introduction 
Congress, in 1970, passed a law establishing the CASB. The 
Congressional hearings, reports, and debates that relate specifically 
.to that law did not take place in a vacuum and an awareness of the mood 
of Congress toward military spending before and during the time of these 
' proceedings is of paramount importance in arriving at a proper under-
standing of the actions of Congress. 
This section of the study is based upon articles found primarily 
in Business Week, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and The New 
York Times over the period 1964 through August, 1970. The section is 
basically a chronological presentation of actions of Congressmen and 
Congressional committees as they relate to Government defense spending 
and the cost of defense contracts. 
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Prelude 
In his book, Report From Wasteland, Senator Proxmire indicates 
that in the past the attitude of the American public toward defense 
matters has been highly ambivalent. This attitude results in a national 
security policy that has been highly variable. After dismantling the 
military machine after World War II, the U. S.,faced with the threat 
from the Soviet Union, moved rapidly to build its defenses. During this 
phase of rapid buildup, almost everyone, including Congress, took an 
uncritical view of defense spending and there was an absence of or lack 
of adequate controls on military spending. On several occasions, 
Congress gave the·military services larger appropriations than they 
requested. It seemed that nothing was too good for the military and, 
in a sense, the military was given a blank check. 80 
Congressional Concern 
1967 
As early as 1964 Proxmire offered amendments, to no avail, to 
delete millions of dollars from 4efense procurement bills. In April, 
' ! • ' 
1967, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Rickover 
criticized the Pentagon's cost policies. In this testimony, Rickover's 
primary concern was not excessive costs or profits but the extant cost-
effectiveness policies wh~ch he believed were unrealistic. 
In May, 1967, Business Week reported that a subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Comm:ittee was conducting hearings to probe the 
practice of "buying in"--the deliberate biqding at a known loss with the 
expectation of recouping the loss by raising the price on subsequent 
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orders. The subcommittee focused its attention on an Army contract with 
Hughes Tool Company's Aircraft Division and Business Week stated: II 
members (of the committee) have indicated their concern over the question 
whether loss bidding undermines fair competition."81 In July, 1967, 
the subcommittee, after finishing its ten-month investigation, concluded 
that buying-in had occurred and recommended that another production 
source be found. The subcommittee also charged that the original award-
ing of the contract was "'suspect' because of 'close personal relation-
hi I b i H h d A ff. . 1 " 82 s p etween var ous ug es an rmy o 1c1a s •••• 
Also, in July, 1967, the Joint Economic Committee released a 
report criticizing the procurement policies of the Defense Department. 
In particular, the committee criticized the Defense Department for 
failing to make sufficient use of competitive bidding in letting con-
tracts. In addition, in negotiated contracts, the Defense Department 
was permitting itself to be overcharged by failing to get accurate cost 
data from contractors, as required by law. 
In the latter part of 1967, the General Accounting Office (GAO) told 
Congress that the contracting policies in existence were ineffective 
in determining when violations of the truth-in-negotiating law had been 
violated. The GAO recommended a comparison of actual costs with esti-
mated costs on noncompetitive, fixed-price contracts. On the basis of 
the GAO report, bills were introduced in both the House and the Senate 
which would require post-award audits on the books of companies having 
noncompetitive, fixed-price contracts. Though the bills were not acted 
upon, enough pressure was generated to cause the Pentagon to initiate 
the proposed change in policy. 
At about the same time, Representative Pike criticized the 
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Pentagon's buying practices relating to small contracts. As a result 
of pressures created by Pike, the Pentagon revised its procurement 
policies relating to small contracts in an attempt to reduce overcharges. 
1968 
Senator Proxmire released the names of 23 defense contractors, 
in January, 1968, charging them with the improper use of Defense Depart-
ment equipment. On the basis of a GAO investigation requested by a 
subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, Proxrnire asserted that 
the 23 aerospace and electronic firms named were among thousands that 
were using Defense Department equipment for private commercial purposes 
without paying for its use--or at least not fully paying for its use. 
In addition to raising the issue of a military-industrial complex, 
Proxrnire claimed such practices resulted in waste and inefficiency 
in Government. 
In April, 1968, the Senate-House Economic Subcommittee pointed out 
a trend away from competitive bidding for defense contracts and claimed 
defense contractors were subsidized through the use of Government-owned 
equipment at low charges or no charges at all. 
Karl G. Harr, president of the Aerospace Industries Association, 
in a statement defended contractor's use of Government-owned 
equipment. He said that is insures the availability of neces-
sary production and also resulted in substantial savings to the 
Government through lower prices. He argued that prices were 
lower because producers did not need to include in their sales 
prices depreciation, taxes and insurance on Government equip-
ment.83 
Appearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Rickover charged that the lack of uniform standards for letting 
contracts and the lack of uniform accounting standards were costing the 
Federal Government millions of dollars each year. He also raised the 
84 issue of the military-industrial complex. 
Representative Wright Patman said, in April, 1968, that there was 
"mounting evidence that defense procurement agencies are permitting 
85 defense industries to take advantage of the Federal Government." 
According to Business Week, April 27, 1968, "an unusual wave of 
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reaction against the magnitude of defense spending may be building in 
86 Congress." Business Week pointed out that the Senate, in a rare move, 
overrode an action by the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding 
cuts in defense spending. Committee had cut 3 percent from research 
and development but the Senate cut an additional 3 percent from research 
d d 1 d d d . v· 87 an eve opment an procurement not nee e 1n 1etnam. 
May, 1968, was an active month for critics of defense procurement 
policies. Senator Stennis called for an inquiry into the cost of the 
M-16 rifle and Senator McGovern claimed the Government was paying too 
much for the M-16 and thereby wasting taxpayers money. Rickover, 
appearing before a House Committee, testified that "the Navy was paying 
about $400,000 more each year ••. for work at two laboratories owned by 
the Atomic Energy Commission than the Atomic Energy Commission would pay 
for equivalent work."88 Rickover testified he had unsuccessfully 
challenged the arrangement for three years. Also, in May, 1968, 
Senator McGovern, Senator Stennis, and Representative !chord questioned 
the awarding of the M-16 rifle contracts to companies that had not given 
the lowest bids. 
Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
which was investigating military procurement policies in June, 1968, 
Murray W. Weidenbaum, an economics professor at Washington University in 
St. Louis told the committtee "that defense contractors made higher 
profits on Government contracts than companies doing similar work in 
89 private industry." 
The issue is whether the biggest federal buyer (the Pentagon) 
is fostering enough competition. The Pentagon spends $40-
billion a year on procurement but awards almost half its prime 
contracts to only 25 companies. 
The subcommittee worries about the "lock-in" effect of mili-
tary buying--a company doing research and development on a 
major weapons system gets-such a leg up that it almost auto-
matically wins the production contract as well.90 
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In June, 1968, the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report described 
actions concerning the Renogiation Board--the Government agency that 
serves as a watchdog against war profiteering. As early as 1966, 
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez made speeches in the House in favor of 
the Board. In 1967, the Cleveland Plain Dealer took up the fight to 
save the Board and expose war profiteering. Some of the most powerful 
business lobbies had opposed the Board and thought they had done a good 
enough job that the law authorizing the Board would not be extended. 
"As it developed, however, the lobbyists found themselves out-flanked 
by a surprising goundswell of counterprevailing pressures--directed 
mainly at key members of the Ways and Means Committee."91 The Board 
emerged with a three-year extension which was a new record. 
In addition to campaigning strongly for the extension for the life 
of the Renegotiation Board, Gonzalez, in July, 1968, was trying to con-
vince House members to establish a special committee to investigate war 
profiteering relating to Vietnam. 
The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report said on June 28, 1968, 
that: "Defense experts both in and outside the Government have (said) 
•.• that huge cuts can be made in the defense budget while retaining or 
even improving the current level of the nation's defense."92 According 
to the article, both Pentagon and industry sources indicated $10.8 
billion of "fat" could be cut out of the defense budget. 
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The New York Times, on July 16, 1968, reported that in testifying 
before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, Rickover attacked the 
Defense Department and industry. On September 30, 1968, ~· News and 
World Report carried excerpts of Rickover's testimony before the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in which he criticized 
the Pentagon for, what he considered to be, unrealistic cost-effectiveness 
studies. 
On September 20, 1968, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report stated 
that under Defense Secretary Clark's signature a 24-page rebuttal of the 
$10.8 billion in "fat," reported in June, 1968, was distributed to key 
Congressional leaders. 
The Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government, chaired by 
Senator Proxmire, held hearings November 11-14, 1968, on defense contrac-
tors profits and other aspects of military procurement. On November 15, 
1968, the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Military Operations, 
on the basis of questionable contract awardings, instructed the Navy and 
Army to promote competitive bidding on defense contracts. 
1969 
In the first week of January, 1969, the Pentagon, for the first 
time, made public data on profits of companies that work for it. The 
profit figures they released indicated that profits on most negotiated 
contracts had not improved in the previous five years. Proxmire and 
other critics immediately challenged the figures. 
John M. McGee, A. E. Fitzgerald, and the C-SA defense cargo plane 
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were very much in the news in the latter part of 1968 and in 1969. 
McGee, a civilian fuel inspector, received reprimands and a loss in pay 
because he reported lax inspection procedures by his superior. The GAO 
reported that the lax inspection procedures led to indeterminable losses 
of fuel. 
Fitzgerald, deputy for management systems in the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, told the Subcommittee on Economy 
in Government that Proxmire's estimate of a $2 billion overrun on the 
C-SA program was about right. 
Among reasons for the overruns, Fitzgerald suggested an initial 
underestimation of costs, "inadequate controls" over the pro-
gram and "corporate strategy" by the contractor, the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation. Under this "strategy," Fitzgerald 
indicated, Lockheed might have deliberately set its estimate 
low on the first 58 aircraft with the intention of "more than" 
offsetting its losses by charging a higher price for9§he 
follow-on production run of another 62 of the craft. 
Shortly after Fitzgerald's testimony, the Civil Service removed his 
tenure as a Civil Service Employee. In hearings before the Joint 
Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government in January, 1969, 
Proxmire made public a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force, 
from the Secretary's administrative assistant listing three ways to 
relieve Fitzgerald of his duties. The committee also heard from wit-
nesses concerning the cost of the C-SA. 
The Air Force, on January 16, 1969, announced that it intended to 
buy additional C-5A planes. Under the contract, the additional planes 
would be priced in such a way as to reflect the costs of the original 
order. Since the costs of the original order had exceeded the estimate, 
Proxmire branded the arrangement as" ••• an invitation for the contrac-
tor to make its original estimates low and to show a substantial over-
"94 run. 
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Business Week reported February 15, 1969,: "Congressional concern 
is mounting over rising military costs. Debate centers on the Sentinel 
b h . u s d f . . d . 1195 system, ut t e ent1re . . e ense comm1tment 1s un er scrut1ny. 
John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
labeled a key member of the defense establishment by Business Week, 
expressed concern over the increasing costs of nuclear submarines. 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said Congress was going to "'put a 
microscope' on the $81.5 billion defense budget."96 Republican Senator 
Jacob Javits said there is a "real determination in Congress •.. that the 
military budget is never again going to be treated as a sacred cow." 97 
The concern of Congress was in part a concern over cost overruns 
and in part a reflection of concern expressed by citizen protest groups 
against the antiballistic missile (ABM) system. 
Senator Proxmire, on March 23, 1968, released the results of a 
study showing that over 2,000 former high-ranking military officers were 
employed by the top 100 defense contractors. Proxmire expressed concern 
over such a situatton. 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report succinctly states the atmos-
phere in early 1969 surrounding military programs and policies as 
follows. 
United States defense programs and policies in early 1969 have 
become the target of rare Congressional and public skepticism 
and hostility. Defense plans have been questioned in a flurry 
of Congressional investigations, criticized by individual Mem-
bers of Congress, the public and the press and attacked with 
unusual boldness py disarmament and· peace pressure groups. ' 
The unrest has had some effect ... subjecting the military 
budget and programs to close inspection.98 
On April 5, 1969, Business Week editorialized about "The Pentagon's 
Costly Mistakes~" In addition to pointing out errors in weapons 
development and procurement Business Week stated: 
••. there is little doubt that at the root of the inability of 
government to check the development of many unsound weapons 
systems is what the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower called 
"the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, of the· 
military-industrial complex." In his farewell address, 
Eisenhower said, "We must never let the weight of this combi-
nation endanger our liberties or democratic processes." 
Eight years ago, Eisenhower's warning of the dangers inherent 
in a "disastrous rise of power" in the military and the huge 
defense contractors seemed somewhat alarmist. Today the 
Eisenhower words have the ring of prophecy.99 
Testifying before the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the 
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House Committee on Government Operations, Gordon Rule, a senior procure-
ment officer for the Navy, " .•. charged (on May 6, 1969) there was 
serious waste and inefficiency in defense spending because of a relation-
ship between industry and military and high-ranking Defense Department 
officials."100 The basic item of discussion at these hearings was the 
increasing costs of the C-SA. 
Proxrnire released a 31-page report in the latter part of May, 1969, 
which summarized the findings of the Joint Subcommittee on Government 
Economy. Included in the findings were: unnecessary cost overruns, 
hidden profits, the absence of competition, numerous change orders, and 
use of government-owned equipment that amounted to being subsidies to 
the contractors. In addition the report recommended that the GAO make 
a study of defense profits. 
On June 3, 1969, the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on 
Government Economy began an eight-day hearing on the defense budget. 
The same day the Senate Armed Services Committee began hearings on the 
rising costs of the C-SA. 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report states: 
Congressional concern about Defense spending took another form 
June 2, when an ad-hoc Committee of 45 Congressmen (9 Senators 
and 36 Representatives) released a 61-page report charging 
Congress had abrogated its responsibility for the monitoring 
of the military-industrial complex.lOl 
The ad hoc committee recommended that Congress become a more viable 
force and acquire greater control over the military-industrial complex. 
In addition, bills introduced in late May, 1969, by Representative 
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Podell, requiring the public reporting of cost overruns, and Senator 
McGovern and 15 other Democratic Senators, requiring a temporary tax on 
war-year profits, were gaining momentum in early June, 1969.102 
"Will U. S. Shrink Its Global Role?" an article appearing in the 
June 7, 1969, issue of Business Week contains several statements that 
reflect the attitude of Congress at that time. 
Two titans (Armed Services Committee Chairman Rivers and 
Appropriations Committee Chairman Mahon) of the "defense 
establishment" squared off in the House of Representatives 
a few weeks ago and treated their colleagues to a rare 
sight: a public shouting match over the military budget . 
•.. as recently as a year ago such a confrontation was un-
thinkable. The change reflects how Congress is reacting to 
the new mood of the country. 
Congress is digging into the defense budget more critically. 
Escalating costs of existing programs will be scritinized 
more closely • 
... Members of Congress find that being four-square for defense 
is no longer necessarily the "safest" position .... Taxpayers 
are becoming more vocal about their tax burdens .... l03 
On June 10, 1969, in the midst of growing concern for defense 
spending, the Defense Department announced that it cancelled the Air 
Force's $3 billion Manned Orbiting Laboratory military space program 
after spending $1.3 billion on the program. A short time earlier the 
Pentagon cancelled a production contract for Cheyenne helicopters. 
William Beecher reported on July '1, 1969, that the President had 
established a panel to do a year-long review of the managing, research, 
buying, and decision-making of the Pentagon. He also reported: 
One evidence of the shifting attitude in Congress on defense 
spending came in a report from Congressional sources that the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, long a proponent of a power-
ful defense establishment, had recently voted to slash 
$1,050,000,000 fro~ the Pentagon's request for research and 
development funds.104 
In addition, Business Week reported the unusual sharp division in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee as evidence by the narrow 10-7 vote by 
/which the committee approved the Safeguard anti-missile program. 
"Normally, the committee is a bastion of nearly unanimous support for 
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new weapons systems." · 
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After 29 days of debate, the Senate, on August 6, 1968, by one-vote 
margins supported President Nixon's highly controversial Safeguard anti-
missile program. Senator Schweiker pushed through a bipartisan amend-
ment to a $20 billion appropriation bill calling for GAO reviews and 
reports to Congress on defense contracts. The amendment, which passed 
by a 47 to 46 vote, was one of many amendments, pending at the time, 
aimed at eliminating, cutting back, and restricting Defense Department 
spending and activities. 
At a news conference on August 21, 1969, Secretary of Defense 
Laird announced reductions of more than $1 billion in military spending 
for fiscal 1970. He indicated this was the first step in what would 
eventually be a $3 billion reduction in spending. 
During the first week of September, 1969, the Senate renewed its 
debate over the 20 billion dollar military procurement bill. Proxrnire's 
proposal to limit production of the C-5A cargo plane was defeated 
64-23. By a roll call vote of 90-0 the Senate adopted a proposal, 
initiated by Proxmire, requiring the registration with the Secretary of 
Defense of persons transferring between Government and defense contrac-
tors for the three-year period following the transfer. 
The Senate passed the $20 billion defense procurement bill on 
September 18, 1969, after two months of controversy and d·ebate. The 
1969 debate was the second longest debate in the Senate since 1945 and 
it was the longest debate on any military procurement bill. Among the 
many amendments attached to the bill was an authorization for a study 
of defense contractor profits on contracts that were awarded on a non-
competitive basis. The vote on the amendment was 85-0. 
The House, after only three days of sometimes bitter debate, 
passed a $21.3 billion defense procurement bill. The House not only 
restored some of the cuts made by the Senate but also added about 
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$1 billion for shipbuilding. In Senate-House conference the bill was 
finally compromised at $20.7 billion and some of the Senate amendments 
were deleted. Two amendments that were not deleted, but changed 
slightly, were the ones requiring defense-industry employee reports and 
a contractor profits study. 
On November 17 and 18, 1969, the Joint Economic Subcommittee on 
Economy in Government conducted hearings to investigate the dismissal 
of A. Ernest Fitzgerald. He claimed his dismissal resulted from 
previous testimony before Congress concerning C-5A cost overruns. The 
Air Force Secretary testified that Fitzgerald's position had been 
eliminated as an economy move. 
Proxmire released a statement reported in The New York Times on 
December 1, 1969, stating that a GAO study found profits of up to 
1,403 percent in a plant doing Air Force work. The average profit 
above cost was 245 percent. Proxmire said: "The taxpayer is being 
bilked in small-purchase contracts like those the GAO has investigated 
here to the tune of millions of dollars."106 
Also in the first week of December, 1969, the Defense Department, 
in accordance with a new quarterly reporting system required by Senator 
Stennis, reported nearly $20 billion in cost overruns on 35 major 
defense programs. Senator Stennis said he would not condone overruns 
due to poor or inadequate management of fiscal control and Senator 
Proxmire said the figures were outdated and the overruns were perhaps as 
much as $4 billion more. The Pentagon said the overruns should not be 
equated with waste and that they were well within the control of the 
107 Administration and Congress. 
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John Finney reported on December 4, 1969, that the House Apprpria-
tions Committee cut the Pentagon budget by $5.3 billion--the biggest 
reduction since the post-Korea Period. Finney stated: "At the same 
time, the committee, which is normally a defender of the Pentagon, was 
highly critical of the 'cost overruns' and 'goldplating' that it said 
108 had developed in procurement of new weapons." 
The New York Times carried the following news item on 
December 11, 1969. 
A memorandum of November 26 by David Packard, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, asked senior defense officials to consider using 
the term "cost growth" and gave nine definitions to replace 
the term that has been closely associated with many embarrass-
ments for the Defense Department in recent years.l09 
In addition to other restrictions placed on defense spending in 
1969, the House Appropriations Committee 
In reporting the fiscal 1970 defense appropriations ••• took 
another step to restrict Pentagon spending by providing that 
appropriations for most major procurements be available for 
only three fiscal years and that appropriations for research 
by available for a two-year period. In the past they were 
generally available until spent, giving the Pentagon greater 
flexibility and the Congress less control in spending.llO 
The Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government 
recommended a $10 billion cut in defense spending on December 23, 1969, 
as it continued its hearings on defense contract overruns. 
January, 1970, saw more trouble for the C-SA cargo plane. A 
cracked wing in one of the aircraft prompted immediate reaction in 
Congress. Senator Stennis ordered a study concerning the structural 
soundness of the aircraft and Representative Moorhead urged the 
Secretary of Defense to initiate a study to determine if more money 
should be devoted to the program. 
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On January 27, 1970, The New York Times in-an editorial, "Security 
for Whom," called for reform in the military procurement area. 
The relationship between the weapons manufacturers and the mili-
tary establishment has been, as some critics have charged, an 
unhealthily cozy one. The military may dream up the need for 
a weapon and then the manufacturer tools up to supply the need--
at a profit. Or the manufacturer may dream up the idea for a 
weapon, suggest the need to the military and then tool up to 
supply it--at a profit. This mutually beneficial, backscratching 
arrangement excludes any effective check on the arms race.lll 
On March 31, 1970, the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee on 
Production and Stabilization began hearings on a bill to extend for two 
years the Defense Production Act. Included in the bill was an amendment 
to establish uniform cost accounting standards on negotiated defense 
contracts. 
Controversy over the financial problems of Lockheed and the cost of 
the C-5A continued throughout the first quarter of 1970 and Congress 
continued to show concern over the cost overruns. In June, 1970, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became involved in the issue 
of cost overruns. As a result of the C-5A's $2 billion overrun and the 
financial problems facing Lockheed, the commission announced" ... it 
will begin an inquiry into whether defense companies with escalating 
contract costs have been giving stockholders adequate notice of their 
financial difficulties."112 
In June, 1970, Business Week observed a significant erosion of 
support for Pentagon programs within the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
This is evidenced by a recommended $1.4 billion reduction in military 
buying plans. Business Week characterized the House Armed Services 
Committee as a rubber-stamp for the military but pointed out that the 
full Senate was able to force the full House into compromise on 
.1. di . 113 m1 1tary spen ng 1ssues. 
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The Defense Production Act, with an amendment attached creating a 
commission to establish uniform cost accounting standards for defense 
and space contractors, passed the Senate by a roll call vote of 69-1 
on July 9, 1970. 
The Senate began debating the controversial antiballistic missile 
(ABM) system and military procurement policies on July 24, 1970. The 
debate continued until September 1, 1970, when the Senate passed a 
$19.2 billion defense procurement bill. During that time (on July 31, 
1970) the House by a 257-19 roll call vote passed a version of the 
Defense Production Act with an amendment to establish a commission to 
design uniform accounting guides for defense contractors. Also, on 
August 13, 1970, by a vote of 216-153 in the House and a voice vote by 
the Senate, Congress approved a conference report on the Defense 
Production Act bill. Included in the bill was an amendment authorizing 
the establishment of what is now known as the Cost Accounting Standards 
Board. 
Summary 
Prior to 1967 Congress as a whole showed little concern for defense 
spending. Beginning in 1967, various committees of Congress started 
holding hearings concerning defense spending and related matters. In 
1968 and 1969 more and more Congressmen, Congressional committees, and 
citizen-protest groups were expressing concern over defense spending, 
profits of defense contractors, and related matters. Even members of 
the Armed Services Committees were questioning the cost overruns on 
defense contracts. In 1969 the Senate engaged in the longest debate 
on any military procurement bill. In the period from 1967 through 
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August, 1970, the following committees, as presented in this study, were 
investigating some aspect of defense spending: Housed Armed Services, 
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services, Joint Economic Committee, 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, House Ways and Means, 
House Appropriations Subcommittee, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government, House Government 
Operations Subcommittee on Military Operations, Senate Armed Services, 
and an ad hoc committee composed of Senators and Representatives. 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report succinctly states the mood 
of Congress as follows. 
By the end of 1969, the mood had turned so completely against 
massive defense spending that the Administration and Congress 
were both moving to rein in military spending not only in the 
current year but in future years.ll4 
Summary 
Introduction 
To correctly understand the ev~nts leading to the establishment 
of the CASB, an awareness of the social forces present at the time of 
its creation is indispensable. This chapter has presented the social 
forces that seem relevant to this study: (1) the military-industrial 
complex, (2) the background of Admiral Hyman Rickover, (3) the back-
ground of Senator William Proxmire, and (4) the mood of Congress. 
Military-Industrial Complex 
As described on page 58 of this study, the military-industrial 
complex is a coalition of numerous groups and individuals which, among 
other things, on occassion actively seeks to influence the outcome 
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of business transactions and of certain legislation that may effect 
members of the coalition either directly or indirectly. This chapter 
identifies some aspects of the coalition and the methods used by 
various members of the coalition to exert their influence. The aspects 
identified in this chapter are: (1) Interchange of Military and 
Industrial Personnel, (2) Role of Congress, (3) Role of Defense 
Associations and Lobbyists, (4) Role of Military Services, and (5) Role 
of Defense Contractors. An awareness of these aspects of the military-
industrial complex and the methods used by various members of the 
coalition to exert their influence should cause the reader to be alert 
and enable him to identify and place in proper perspective these 
influences as they appear in Chapters IV, V, and VI. 
Background of Admiral Hyman Rickover 
In Chapters IV and VI, it will become clear that Admiral Rickover 
played an important role in bringing about the establishment of the CASB. 
To enable the reader to visualize in his mind what it was like to be 
Rickover and to more fully appreciate the role he played in the cost 
accounting standards legislation it seems appropriate to be aware of his 
Naval experience, his experience with industry, his philosophy, and the 
attitudes of others toward him. 
Known in high school days as a hard worker, Rickover has done 
nothing since to change this aspect of his reputation. Early in his 
Naval career, in addition to being known as a hard worker, Rickover 
developed a reputation as an individual who could get things done and 
make many enemies at the same time. Not only did Rickover get things 
done but in many cases he did it in much less time than others thought 
possible. 
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On occasion Rickover has bypassed several layers of the Naval 
hierarchy and as a result created many enemies in the Defense Department. 
He has also been a persistent critic of the Pentagon. In addition to 
his enemies in the Pentagon, Rickover is not well liked by many 
contractors. Of special importance to this study is one place where 
he has few, if any, enemies--the U. S. Congress. This is evidenced by 
the pressures Congress has applied in the past to insure that Rickover 
remains on active duty and also by his frequent appearances before 
Congressional committees to testify on various subjects. As indicated 
on page 73 of this study and at various points throughout Chapters IV 
and VI, many Congressmen have a great deal of confidence in Rickover 
and his opinions. 
Background of Senator William Proxmire 
In chapters IV and VI, it will be seen that Proxmire played an 
active role in bringing about the establishment of the CASB. To 
properly understand the extent of his influence, it seems appropriate 
to be aware of his growth in the Senate, his philosophy, and the 
attitudes of others toward him. 
Voted the "biggest grind" in his high school, Proxmire has become 
a grinding critic of waste and inefficiency in Govern~ent--especially 
in the area of defense spending. In 1970, Connelly said: "Proxmire 
has emerged in the past 2 years as an important figure in the growing 
public debate over national priorities .... he has searched for waste 
in the federal budget and has criticized many of the choices this 
h d . . bl" d. "115 country as rna e 1n 1ts pu 1c spen 1ng. 
He has changed from a rather indiscriminate attacker of people and 
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issues to a disciplined and effective legislator. Herbers said in 1971 
that Proxrnire" ... has shown a genius for associating himself with 
seemingly obscure issues which later came into prominence--the SST, 
116 burgeoning military costs and consumer protection, among others." 
Although an outsider, with respect to the Senate Club Proxmire 
has managed to win some major battles by being persistent and well 
informed. In addition, he has used the press to good advantage to 
gain the support of public opinion. In Senate debate concerning the 
funding of the SST, Proxmire attempted to get certain assurances before 
a certain vote. At one point Senator John Stennis said: "But the idea 
of the Senator's saying that unless we give those assurances, he will 
d h bl 1 k d ,.117 do so and so sounds to the press an tote pu ic i e uress .... 
Concerning the same issue, Senator Mike Mansfield said: "May I say 
that no one has been more determined, moreobdiviate, more obstinate, 
bb h h d . · · ·h d s f w· · "118 more stu orn t an t e 1st1ngu1s e enator rom 1scons1n. 
In the past, Proxmire has said that he is ambitious and would like 
to be President but that he does not think that he ever will be. 
He once told an aide, in a rare confidence, that his ultimate 
ambition always had been to be a United States Senator and 
that this was what made him run so hard. If he is going to 
be a Senator, it is his nature, his need, to be the best and 
most influential Senator, in his own way. 
Charles Ferris, the able counsel of the Senate Democratic 
Policy Committee, believes that Proxmire, whom he admires, 
is trying to fill the role performed for so long by Wayne 
Morse, who was defeated in 1968. Nothing could be done in 
the Senate, Ferris said, without the "Morse factor" being 
taken into account. 'Morse, because of his stamina, knowl-
edge and determination, could, acting alone, block, delay, 
alter or enhance almost any Senate action. 
Proxmire is not yet in Morse's league, but, Ferris says, he 
.may be getting there.ll9 
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The Mood of Congress 
If one merely reads the Congressional hearings, debates, and reports 
that deal directly with the cost accounting standards legislation, the 
prevailing mood of Congress may not be readily apparent and as a result 
the actions taken by Congress may seem unclear. The mood of Congress is 
perhaps the most important aspect of consideration surrounding the cost 
accounting standards legislation and a constant awareness of this mood 
as the story unfolds in Chapters IV, V, and VI is essential to a proper 
understanding of the actions of Congress. 
As this Chapter has pointed out, in the period from 1967 through 
August, 1970, many Congressional committees were investigating various 
aspects of defense spending and by the end of 1969 Congress was display-
ing a negative and questionning attitude toward defense spending. The 
press was carrying many articles regarding defense spending and citizen 
protest groups were active. In addition the following Congressmen. as 
identified in this study, expressed publicly some concern regarding 
defense spending and related matters: Proxmire, Pike, Patman, Gonzalez, 
Stennis, Mansfield, Javits, Schweiker, Moorhead, and Mahon. 
IIi 1969 the Senate engaged in the longest debate on any military 
procurement bill. Seemingly, beginning in 1967 and going forward in 
time, Congress was growing more and more concerned about defense spend-
ing and related matters and it is in this light that the cost accounting 
standards legislation should be viewed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS, LEGISLATIVE 
ACTIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE REPORTS PRIOR 
TO THE GAO FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Introduction 
Hexter states that "The exploration of truth values in historical 
discourse requires the examination of large historical texts and contexts 
and not just minute fragments wrenched out of context."1 Chapter III, to 
some extent, provides a basis for the broad approach Hexter alludes to 
by presenting the social forces that seem relevant to this study and that 
also help put the cost accounting legislation into the proper context. 
Within the context describ~d in Chapter III, the study now presents three 
chapters that review and analyze the Congressional inquiries relating to 
the establishment of the CASB and the feasibility study directed by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO). Chapter IV reviews the relevant events 
that preceded the GAO feasibility study, Chapter V reviews some of the 
salient features of the GAO feasibility study and Chapter VI reviews the 
cost accounting legislat1ve activities that followed the GAO feasibility 
study. Figure 1 on page 113 diagrams the path of the CASB legislation. 
Chapters IV, V, and VI review the events that can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, with the establishment of the CASB to give a 
credible account of what did happen. No attempt is made to identify 
necessary and/or sufficient causes but rather an attempt is made to 
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provide an adequate explanation of the events and circumstances leading 
to the establishment of the CASB. 
In reading Chapters IV, V, and VI, the reader should seek answers 
to the following questions: (1) Was the witness qualified to testify on 
the subject? (2) Did the witness give reliable testimony? (3) Was the 
witness self-seeking? (4) Was the behavior of the witness consistent 
with long-term behavior? and (5) Was the testimony of the witness 
persuasive? 
Chapter IV reviews the House hearings of 1968 as they relate to 
cost accounting standards legislation, the Congressional hearings of 
earlier years as these earlier hearings referred to in the 1968 hearings, 
House qction on H.R. 17268, the 1968 Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency Hearings, Senate Report No. 91-1322, and the Senate debate on 
the cost accounting standards legislation. The black-bordered area of 
Figure 2 on page 115 shows the parts of the CASB legislative processes 
covered in Chapter IV. 
House Hearings of 1968 and Earlier Years 
Purpose of 1968 House Committee on Banking 
and Currency Hearings 
On Wednesday, April 10, 1968, the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency began a two-day hearing on H. R. 15683, a bill to renew the 
Defense Production Act of 1950. 
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The basic authorities found in the Defense Production Act are 
the establishment of a priorities and allocations program 
to see that essential production and related activities of 
vital defense materials and services are provided by industry; 
the operation of a program of financing; where necessary, pro-
ductive capacity for producing needed defense materials and 
services; the carrying out of a program for stockpiling vital 
natural resources for use in a national emergency; and the 
development of an executive reserve made up of business, pro-
fessional, labor, and other leaders to provide for the 
additional execu2ive manpower to operate mobilization programs 
in an emergency. 
Since the act comes up for renewal every two years the testimony 
given on April 10 was considered routine because the five witnesses 
116 
presented reasons for extending the Defense Production Act of 1950 for 
two more years. 
The only witness on Thursday, April 11, 1968, was Admiral Rickover. 
Although a frequent witness before Armed Services Committees, Appropria-
tion Committees, and Joint Atomic Energy Committees, this was the first 
time Rickover had been a witness at a House Banking and Currency Commit-
tee hearing and one might wonder why Rickover was present. 
One of the basic reasons is given by Representative William A. 
Barrett (D., Pennsylvania). In his introduction of Rickover, Barrett 
makes reference to Rickover's prior testimony before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on March 16, 1967, when Rickover told the 
Joint Committee that he had initiated action under the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950 to bring pressures upon certain companies to make 
needed defense equipment. Barrett said the House Committee was interest-
ed in Rickover's experiences and his opinion concerning the effectiveness 
of the Defense Production Act. 
Barrett mentioned Rickover's prior testimony before various other 
Congressional committees about Government contracting pro~edures, 
increasing costs, and undue profits. Barrett said the committee was 
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interested in hearing Rickover's views about these matters. 
Although Barrett's introduction of Rickover supposedly explains the 
presence of Rickover before the committee, data collected by Gary F. 
Bulmash in an interview with a staff member of Representative Wright 
Patman (D., Texas), then Chairman of the House Committee on Banking 
and Currency, seems to contradict the ideas in the introduction. 
Generally, in Congress, the chairman of a committee determines who can 
testify before his committee, Bulmash makes the following statement 
concerning Rickover's presence at the Hearings: 
During discussions with Admiral Rickover prior to the testi-
mony, Mr. Patman had been briefed about the Admiral's intended 
remarks concerning lack of cost accounting standards for 
Government contracts. Mr. Patman, an individual who is recep-
tive to new ideas and (alleged) approaches to problems, agreed 
with the Admiral's assertions and, therefore, permitted his 
testimony. 3 
Testimony of Rickover at 1968 House Banking 
and Currency Committee Hearings 
Rickover's opening statement before the House Committee on Banking 
and Currency, gives a clue to his philosophy of Government contracting. 
A~ you know, my training is in engineering. I have never 
raised contracting issues out of simple academic interest. 
I have had to get into the details of Government contracting 
in connection with my work, and I have run into some basic 
problems which I would like to discuss with you. 
I have been made painfully aware of these issues in the 
course of my technical duties, because they affect my abil-
ity to do my job and they require that I spend far more 
time than I should on contractual rather than on technical 
matters. Technical difficulties are far overshadowed by legal 
and procedural blockages. 
I have spent thou~ands of hours attempting to protect 
the Government from claims by contractors and to obtain 
responsible performance by .contractors, but I have been 
hamper~d rather than helped by Government procurement regula-
tions. 
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Rickover also noted that the" ..• Department of Defense has done little 
to correct the fundamental deficiencies in the contracting issues which 
I have raised in testimony before the Congress over the past several 
years."5 
Previous Testimony Before House Appropriation 
Committees 
An examination of Congressional records shows that Rickover's first 
appearance as a witness on defense contracting was before a House 
Committee on Appropriations May 23, 1963. At that hearing Rickover 
said basic changes shauld be made in Government contracting to reduce 
Government costs. Rickover offered the following minimum controls for 
negotiated fixed-price contracts: 
..• the Government should be provided with the contractor's 
cost estimating data, the contractor's accounting system 
should be approved by the Government, and finally the con- 6 
tractor must divulge all profits included in his bid price. 
On March 6, 1964, Rickover again appeared before a House Committee 
on Appropriations and among other topics discussed defense contracting 
procedures. In addition to restating the three minimum controls cited 
in 1963, Rickover questioned the size of the profits on defense 
contracts and the lack of true competition in the area of,Government 
contracting. 
Appearing before a House Committee on Appropriations May 12, 1965, 
Rickover again asked for a revamping of Government contracting procedures 
--especially in the area of negotiated fixed-price contracts for complex 
defense equipment. At this hearing Rickover suggested the idea of 
establishing accounting standards for negotiated contract work for the 
Government. 
What I have been trying to explain is that in negotiating, con-
tracting, analyzing, and understanding a company's cost data is 
the most fundamental problem facing the Government in attempting 
to reduce costs ••.• 
The existing Government criteria for evaluating a contractor's 
accounting system are quite broad and general, and as such 
allow considerable judgment and discretion on the part of the 
Government accountant who must rule on the acceptability of a 
contractor's accounting system. I think you will agree that 
the Government audit groups are understaffed and poorly equipped 
to cope with this complex variety of accounting systems and the 
highly trained and well-paid industry accounting staffs. The 
way for the Government to protect itself in this area is to re-
quire ~ law or regulation that the Government develop more 
specific accounting standards and require contractors to meet 
these standards if they do negotiated contract work for the 
Government. '<emphasis added) 
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When asked how much could be saved by instituting his recommendations, 
Rickover replied that he did not know exactly but he believed the 
savings would be substantial in dollars and in effort. 
Rickover summarized his recommendations to the House Committee 
regarding negotiated contracts as follows: 
I recommend that Congress require that Government procurement 
regulations be revised to specify minimum acceptable accounting 
standards for all negotiated contracts of substantial dollar 
value, not just cost~type contracts and incentive contracts. 
I also recommend that contractors have a Government-approved 
accounting system which will reflect actual costs for individual 
contracts as a prerequisite for award of any negotiated con-
tract. Contractors should also be required to base their 
certified price proposals for negotiated contracts on such a 
Government-approved accounting system. 
Further, I recommend that certified contractor cost and pr1c1ng 
information be obtained and utilized by the Government in the 
evaluation of procurements of a substantial amount which are 8 
not being awarded on a competitive, formally advertised basis. 
In introducing Admiral Rickover at a House Committee on Appropria-
tions Hearing May 11, 1966, Representative Mahon (D.' Texas) said: 
"We have been having our problems in the field of Government contracting. 
You have talked to us Orl1 previous occasions about contracting procedures. 
We would like to have your latest thinking on that subject. ,9 In 
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responding to thisremark, Rickover told the committee how two Govern-
ment agencies we:ce paying different rates for the same services at the 
same location because of differences in the way the respective contracts 
were drawn up. This example served as a lead-in for Rickover's 
comments regarding accounting standards. 
The problems I have encountered because two Government agencies 
do not agree on how general and administrative expenses at 
Government-owned contractor-operated plants should be treated, 
point out how much wheelspinning and extra effort the Govern-
ment spends each year simply because it does not have uniform 
accounting standards. l consider the lack of such standards 
~ be the most serious deficiency in Government procurement 
today.~(emphasis added) 
In addition, Rickover made essentially the same recommendations relating 
to defense contracting that he previously made in 1965 to the House 
Committee on Appropriations. 
In his appearance before a House Appropriations Committee May 1, 
1967, Rickover restated his feelings about Government procurement 
policies and procedures and repeated his opinion that" ... the lack of 
uniform standards for accounting is the most significant issue in 
Government contracting today."11 He also observed: "The Department of 
Defense has done nothing to correct the fundamental contracting issues 
which I have raised, not only last year but for the past several years, 
in testimony before this comrnittee."12 
This brief review of Rickover's testimony before House Appropria-
tions Committees for the period 1963-1967 indicates the continuing 
interest of Rickover in defense contracting and his apparent lack of 
success in bringing about any significant changes on accounting stan-
dards for Government contracts. These statements also imply that 
because of five years of concern and frequent discussions of problems 
about Government contracting,_Rickover had become, to some degree, an 
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authority on Government contracting, and was so recognized by various 
members of Congress. It is within this setting that a closer examina-
tion of Rickover's testimony before the House Banking and Currency 
Committee of 1968 continues. 
Continuation of Rickover's Testimony Before 
the 1968 House Banking and Currency 
Committee Hearings 
In laying the foundation for his appeal for uniform standards of 
accounting, Rickover presented evidence which he argued showed that 
companies made higher profits on defense contracts than on commercial 
contracts. Following the presentation and discussion of profit figures, 
Rickover stated: 
It should be clearly understood that under existing procurement 
rules it is not possible to tell just how much it costs to manu-
facture equipment or just how much profit a company actually 
makes without spending months reconstructing the supplier's 
books. Large additional profits can easily be hidden just by 
the way overhead is charged, how component parts are priced, or 
how intracompany profits are handled. The company may report 
as cost what actually is profit. 
In one case Navy and General Accounting Office auditors conducted 
an extensive number of audits to determine one supplier's actual 
cost in making equipment for the Government. These audits and 
evaluations lasted nearly a year. Altogether there were seven 
reports containingll differing estimates or evaluations of the 
supplier's costs, in addition to the estimates made by the 
supplier himself. 
These various reports showed estimates of the supplier's costs 
differing by as much as 50 percent. Thus, profit statistics 
are meaningless unless measured in accordance with a uniform 
standard. However, there are no uniform standards of accounting 
for costs under defense contracts. There are some criteria for 
cost-type contracts in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation 
and in the Federal Procurement Regulation. However, these regu-
lations provide that these standards are merely a guide for nego-
tiated fixed-price-type contracts, which constitute the major 
portion of the defense contracts. Even the criteria for cost-
type contracts permit widely varying accounting systems and 
treatment of costs by contractors. 
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Under fixed price contracts, a contractor has virtually unlimited 
flexibility in deciding how he will keep his books and how he 
will assign costs among a number of individual contracts. Gener-
ally he is required only to maintain an accounting system conform-
ing to the vague standard of generally accepted accounting 
principles for tax purposes or for reporting to stockholders. 
Not even the accountants agree £~ what constitutes generally 
accepted accounting procedures. 
Rickover followed this statement with quotes from Forbes Magazine and 
the Wall Street Journal criticizing the accounting profession for a 
lack of accounting standards. He further observed that the accounting 
profession, industry, and the executive branch of Government were either 
unwilling or unable to establish effective accounting standards and 
therefore the task fell upon Congress. 
In response to Representative Griffin's (D., Mississippi) question 
about the amount of savings that would result if Congress accepted 
Rickover's recommendations and enacted a law requiring uniform accounting 
standards, Rickover said he could only guess but 11 ••• it is realistic 
to assume that uniform accounting standards could save a minimum of 5 to 
10 percent on costs. I believe the saving could easily be $2 billion 
,14 
a year •••• 
The transcript of the hearings of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee gives no indication that Rickover was any more successful in 
getting this committee to accept his recommendation for uniform accounting 
standards than he had been in his testimony before House Appropriation 
Committees. 
Inconsistency inRickover's Testimonies 
An apparent inconsistency in some of Rickover's testimonies is noted 
at this point. On March 16, 1967, in testimony before the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, Rickover said the Navy was having trouble getting 
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General Electric and Westinghouse to accept orders for turbine genera-
tors. When asked why these companies refused to bid on the turbine 
generators, Rickover gave three reasons: 
I believe the reason is that there is considerable commercial 
business available and they would rather do commercial work 
for three reasons: (1) there may be more profi_!: in commercial 
work; (2) they don't have to expend much design effort for 
most commercial work; and (3) they are not watched as carefully 
in the construction of commercial work as I watch them. The~ 
want to do business with the Government on their own terms. 1 
(emphasis added) 
In testifying before the 1968 House Banking and Currency Committee, 
Rickover said that 
Work for the military is usually far more difficult than 
civilian work. Industry would much prefer to do civilian 
work because they do not have to expend as much design and 
engineering effort on commerci.al work. They are usually 
not watched as carefully in the manufacture of commercial 
equipment as for military equipment and may make more 
profit on it.l6 (emphasis added) 
A few minutes later in his testimony Rickover presented evidence which 
he argued showed that companies made higher profits on defense contracts 
than on commercial contracts. Among the evidence Rickover cited was the 
results of a study by Dr. Weidenbaum of Washington University at 
St. Louis. Rickover stated that Weidenbaum concluded that" ... 'the gap 
between Defense and non-Defense profit has indeed widened over the past 
decade--in favor of Defense business.'"17 
If this inconsistency was observed by any of the Congressmen, it 
was not in the transcript of the hearing. 
Testimony of Rickover at ~ 1968 House 
Committee on Appropriations 
Appearing before a House Committee on Appropriations May 1, 1968, 
Rickover continued his campaign against what he considered to be high 
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profits on defense contracts. He repeated his recommendation for the 
establishment of uniform accounting standards. Much of his testimony 
was similar to that given to the 1968 House Banking and Currency 
Committee and some of his testimony was similar to that given to the 
House Committee on Appropriations in previous years. 
House Action on H. R. 17268 
On May 15, 1968, Representative Patman introduced and referred to 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency H. R. 17268, a bill to amend 
the Defense Production Act of 1950. Also, Patman submitted Report No. 
90-1455, which accompanied H. R. 17268, for printing and reference to 
the Clerk of the House of Representatives on May 23, 1968. In addition 
to extending the Defense Production Act of 1950 for two years, the 
committee version of the bill also amended the act 
... by requiring the Comptroller General to develop and recom-
mend within 1 year uniform standards of accounting for all 
negotiated prime contract and subcontract defense procurements 
in excess of $100,000 so that production costs and profits by 
individual order can be determined.l8 
Report No. 90-1455 indicated that the testimony of Rickover before the 
House Banking and Currency Committee had been a factor in arriving at 
the amendment. The report stated: 
It was brought to your committee's attention in testimony 
by Adm. Hyman Rickover, U. S. Navy, and through the work 
of other congressional committees, that serious problems 
in connection with military procurement under the Defense 
Production Act have been encountered in recent years . 
... Therefore, serious doubt was cast on the effectiveness 
of section 707 of the Defense Production Act to accomplish 
the purpose for which it was enacted. 
Because of the apparent ineffectiveness of this provision, 
your committee felt that the General Accounting Office should 
be required to develop and recommend uniform accounting 
standards ••.• 19 
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Also contained in Report No. 90-1455 were the additional views of 
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D., Texas) who expressed disappoint-
ment because the committee did not approve the bill as introduced, 
"which would have actually instituted uniform accounting standards."20 
The full House of Representatives considered H. R. 17268 on 
June 4, 1968. In introducing the bill to the House, Representative 
Quillen (R., Tennessee) incorrectly stated on three occasions that the 
bill required the Comptroller General to set up or develop " ... a 
f . f . d "21 ( h . dd d) system o un1 orm account1ng proce ures .•. . emp as1s a e 
In the House debate, Representative W. E. Brock (R., Tennessee) 
stated that the reason the committee did not pass the bill as originally 
introduced--that is, require the General Accounting Office (GAO) to 
institute uniform standards within one year--was because 
We did not feel it was proper at this particular time to 
institute the requirements of uniform standards since 
they would be faced with the problem of formulating such 
uniform standards within a very short period of time. How-
ever, within a year the committee will hold hearings to 
establish such legislation as may be necessary.22 
In leading the debate against the committee version of the uniform 
accounting standards legislation, Representative Gubser (R., California) 
and Representative Mize (R., Kansas) raised the following points. 
Gubser. First of all, I seriously question this is properly 
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Banking and 
Currency •... I believe (this) properly belongs within the 
jurisdiction of the Hardy subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services. 
Gubser. Second, I believe to impose uniform accounting 
procedures upon i~dustry is based upon an assumption that all 
defens~ contractors are profiteers and crooks and suilty of 
gouging the Government., This just is not true. 
---- ---- ----
Mize. I am fearful that if we start moving toward the 
establishment of uniform accounting procedures for 
Government contractors, or any contractor, for that 
matter, you are going to find that you may be increasing 
the cost of materials purchased by the Defense Department 
rather than lowering them • 
... you are going to find you may be having a fewer number 
of manufacturers interested in even working with the 
Government on negotiated contracts if you insist upon 
uniform accounting procedures. 
Gubser. Neither the Department of Defense nor the 
General Accounting Office has ever said a word about the 
inadequacy of accounting procedures • 
.•. it is impractical to impose uniform accounting pro-
cedures because the accountants of this Nation themselves 
have been asked to come up with uniform accounting nro-
cedure~3 They, the experts, have agreed that they cannot 
agree. (emphasis added) 
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Representative Gonzalez lead the debate for the committee amendment 
requiring the Comptroller General to develop and recommend uniform 
standards of accounting. Even though favoring a stronger bill, Gonzalez 
responded to arguments of Gubser and others with the following comment. 
Obviously he [Gubser] has not read not only Admiral Rickover's 
testimony, but the testimony of the Joint Economic Committee, 
the Subcommittees on Appropriations that cover the procurement 
processes, and a host of other committees that have discovered 
unconscionable profiteering at this time . 
••. There is no question that there is profiteering going on. 
I believe we owe it to ourselves to confront it. Since when 
is it a burden to develop a system of accountability that would 
give us an accurate figure as to profits and as to costs, so 
that the taxpayer can gauge whether or not he is getting service 
rendered, production rendered ~or the cost that he is paying.24 
After passage of the committee amendment requiring the development 
and recommendation of uniform standards of accounting within one year, 
by the GAO, Representative Gonzalez offered an amendment that would 
require the Comptroller General to develop uniform accounting standards 
and promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation thereof 
within one year after the passage of the act. In arguing for the 
Gonzalez amendment, Representative Vanik (D., Ohio) stated: 
It seems to me that it would be no great burden on our 
defense producers to comply with uniform methods of 
accounting which could be developed by the GAO in coopera-
tion with the Bureau of the Budget. This is the only way 
in which the real cost of military hardware and material 
can be determined. Uniform accounting procedures prepared 
by the GAO could also be brought into conformity with the 
tax reporting procedures established by the Internal 
Revenue Service and utilized by the Renegotiation Board. 25 
(emphasis added) 
The primary argument offered against the Gonzalez amendment was 
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presented by Representatives Brock (R., Tennessee), Cabell (D., Texas), 
and Gubser (R., California) in which these Congressmen stated that 
giving the GAO the power contained in the amendment would sidetrack the 
legislative process and result in an abdication of responsibility by 
Congress. The Gonzalez amendment failed to pass in the House. On 
June 6, 1968, the bill, as it passed the House, was referred to the 
Senate. 
1968 Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency Hearings 
Introduction 
In an executive session of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency on June 11, 1968, Senator Proxmire introduced an amendment to 
the Senate version of the bill to extend the Defense Production Act. 
The amendmeqt would have required the Comptroller ~eneral to develop 
uniform accounting standards for certain negotiated defense contracts. 
Also, in those c;ases where the Comptroller General estimated that the·· 
potential benefits exceeded the expected costs of using such standards, 
he was to issue rules and regulations implement~ng such standards. 
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Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and Logistics), in a letter dated June 17, 1968, recommended that 
favorable consideration be withheld from these amendments until appro-
priate committees of Congress had investigated the impact of the 
amendments. Morris pointed out that the House debate of June 4, 1968, 
demonstrated a lack of agreement on the definition of the term 
"standard" and Morris stated that some Congressmen used the term to 
refer to a system of rules and procedures while other Congressmen 
used the term to refer to principles or a guide to action. (This 
researcher is unsure whether the Congressmen understood the terms they 
were using or the basic proposition they acted upon.) 
Morris stated: 
In our view, it would be neither feasible nor desirable to 
prescribe a standard accounting system for defense contrac-
tors. Accounting systems must be designed for the environ-
ment in which they operate, and they differ with the way a 
company is organized, with the preferences of its management, 
with the production processes, and with a number of other 
factors. Few, if any, informed persons would support the 
idea of having the Government prescribe a "system." 
There is a need for "standards" in the sense of principles. 26 
Morris further stated that such principles already existed in the form 
of Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and that while improve-
ment is always possible " no study as proposed could conceivably 
lead to 'standards from which an accurate showing of production, profits, 
and cost by individual order can be determined. 1 " 27 
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings on 
June 18, 1968, to discuss Proxmire's amendment and the amendment to 
H. R. 17268. Senator Proxmire opened the hearings by saying that his 
amendment was in part based on the testimony of Rickover before the 
House Committee in April, 1968. In his opening remarks, Proxmire 
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pointed out the flexibility of application of accounting systems and 
the difficulty the Government had in determining costs and profits. 
Testimony of Representative Gubser 
The first witness before the Senate Committee was Representative 
Charles Gubser, at that time the ranking minority member of the House 
f d S . 1 I . . 28 Committee o Arme Services on pec1a nvest1gat1ons. He opposed uni-
form accounting procedures saying they were impractical, expensive, un-
necessary, and an added harassment to business. Gubser argued that the 
Renegotiation Act and the Truth in Negotiations Act provided adequate 
protection to the Government and that the addition of uniform accounting 
procedures would represent an harassment which would force small and 
medium-sized businesses out of the military research and development c 
field. Gubser expressed concern that this would tend to shrink" ... the 
base of expertise which is available to the national defense." 29 
Testimony of Frank H. Weitzel 
Frank H. Weitzel, Assistant Comptroller General of the United 
States, and spokesman for the GAO, was the second witness before the 
Senate Committee. He questioned the specific meaning of the term 
"uniform accounting standards" and suggested the need for a proper 
d f . i i . d . f c . 1 . 30 e 1n t on 1n or er to prevent contravent1on o ongress1ona 1ntent. 
Weitzel assumed the objective of the bill was the attainment of compara-
bility of costs and profits of defense contractors. He pointed out that 
a contractor's accounting system is designed to satisfy the needs of the 
contractor; needs vary and therefore systems vary. Weitzel suggested 
that the accounting profession had unsuccessfully dealt with the 
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problem of attaining comparability of accounting results for many years. 
He also stated that the requirement of" .•• a uniform accounting 
31 
standard" might be burdensome to manufacturers doing a small amount of 
defense contract work and these manufacturers might elect to cease 
their government operations. 
Weitzel indicated that the GAO thought the study" ••• should not 
be made solely by the Comptroller General •.• but by a group more 
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representative of all engaged in Federal procurement." In addition, 
Weitzel recommended a study period of eighteen months rather than one 
year. 
While agreeing that there were probably benefits and advantages 
that could be obtained if uniform accounting standards were adopted, 
Weitzel questioned whether the advantages would outweight the disadvan-
tages. Senator Proxmire reminded Weitzel that the Proxmire amendment 
would require that the potential benefits of uniform accounting stan-
dards outweigh the expected costs, otherwise the standard would not be 
implemented. Weitzel further stated: 
I would like to say that while you and we disagree as to some 
of the details, we certainly are in agreement with you as to 
your objective which we recognize and respect. We feel, though, 
that because of the long history of study of this problem by the 
accounting profession itself, the recent revision of the armed 
services procurement regulation cost principles, which was an 
effort to achieve attainable consistency in cost reimbursement 
contracts, and to provide guidelines for negotiating fixed-
price contracts, and that the study made in 1965 came up with 
the finding that diversity is the rule, we are somewhat doubtful 
that further costly stu~~ and effort would be worth the results 
that could be achieved. (emphasis added) 
Testimony of Leonard Savoie 
Leonard Savoie, the third committee witness, then executive vice 
president of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
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(AICPA) stated that the AICPA opposed the section of the bill calling 
f 'f . d d 34 or un1 orm account1ng stan ar s. Like Weitzel, Savoie indicated that 
the term "uniform accounting standards" is without definition and also 
stated: " .•• I do not know what it means." 35 Savoie inferred that the 
term could refer to a uniform accounting system and presented the 
following arguments against the imposition of uniform accounting 
standards. 
One of the primary arguments in support of the uniform accounting 
standards given in the House debate on H. R. 17268 was that they would 
eliminate or help to eliminate war profiteering. Savoie did not agree 
with this argument. Proponents argued that the use of uniform accounting 
standards would permit a fair determination of costs and profits. Savoie 
remarked that fair presentation is not dependent upon uniform systems 
and that conceivably a contractor might make excess profits through the 
use of uniform systems. Further, 
Excessive profits can be prevented through competitive bidding, 
contract negotiations, cost estimating procedures, audits by 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency~ and the review of their work 
by the General Accounting Office.~6 
Savoie also stated that difficulties might be encountered in trying to 
prescribe a uniform system that would meet the needs of all companies, 
companies mtght be required to keep another set of accounting records, 
and some companies might discontinue government operations and thereby 
reduce competition in the area of defense contracting. Moreover, an 
effort to correct deficiencies in the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulations might be more productive than attempting to develop uniform 
accounting standards. 
j 
Savoie made the following remarks in a letter to Chairman Patman. 
The American Institute of CPAs, through its Accounting Princi-
ples Board, has for several years been engaged in a major pro-
gram to improve generally accepted accounting principles and 
bring about greater.comparability of accounting practices among 
business corporations. The elimination of alternative account-
ing practices is a main goal, but there are few who believe 
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it is either possible or desirable to obtain completely uniform 
accounting principles. This program has involved a major contri-
bution of time and effort by the accounting profession and it has 
attracted the support and advice of responsible segments of 
business and government. We believe that very significant 
accomplishments have been made; yet more remains to be done. 
The development of uniform cost accounting principles is an even 
more difficult task--and with greater dangers of inequities--
than the development of uniform principles for general 
accounting purposes.37 
Testimony of ~ ~ Seidman 
J. S. Seidman was the one witness who gave testimony in support of 
38 
uniform accounting standards. Seidman argued that flexibility in the 
application of accounting principles made it difficult to compare costs 
and profits of two or more companies and also referred to the various 
cost allocation methods available to contractors. In disagreeing with 
previous witnesses, Seidman argued that the establishment of uniform 
accounting standards was possible and that the Government should take 
the lead in such .an endeavor. Seidman recommended that the bill be 
changed to read "fair" instead of "accurate" production costs, the 
Comptroller General be given two years instead of one year to do the 
job, and that the development of standards be a continuing process 
rather than a one-shot affair. 
Testimony of Howard Wright 
The next witness, Howard Wright, chairman, division of accounting, 
University of Maryland, stated that he too did not know the meaning of 
39 the term "uniform accounting standards." Wright, the author of 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------
-------------------------
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part 2, section XV, ASPR, argued that no legislation was needed in the 
area of uniform accounting standards and maintained that part 2, section 
XV, ASPR, represented "an excellent statement of cost accounting prin-
ciples applicable to Government contracting."40 and that the conceptual 
soundness of part 2, section XV had never been seriously questioned. 
Testimony of Norman W. Holland 
As spokesman for the National Society of Public Accountants, an 
organization representing 50,000 independent practicing public account-
41 
ants, Norman W. Holland stated that his organization opposed the 
Senate amendment" ... which would have the standards put into effect 
as soon as they are adopted by GAo."42 His organization favored the 
House amendment because his organization thought the House amendment 
would provide more opportunities for input by professional accounting 
societies and other interested groups. Holland further stated that his 
organization had no particular objection to the GAO's conducting the 
study and referring their findings to Congress. 
Testimony of Joseph ~ Bacsik 
Joseph G. Bacsik, vice president and controller, Ling-Temco-Vought, 
Inc., appeared before the committee on behalf of the Aerospace Industries 
Association (AIA) for which he was vice chairman, finance, of the pro-
d f . . 43 curement an 1nance comm~ttee. Bacsik, like some previous witnesses, 
said that the term "uniform accounting standards" was undefined and 
could refer, among other things, to systems or principles. He argued 
that uniform accounting systems for the def,ense industry were highly 
impractical, if not impossible. He also maintained that such a system 
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would restrict the ability of defense contractors to manage their 
business effectively and efficiently, thereby making them less responsive 
to the needs of the military services. He also argued that such a 
system would increase the administrative costs of contractors and in turn 
result in an increase in the prices charged the Government and such a 
system might require defense contractors to keep another set of account-
ing records. 
In concluding his statement, Bacsik said: 
In summary, the AlA endorses the extension of the Defense 
Production Act. However, because of the complexity of the 
questions involved and the potential harmful impact on de-
fense contracting that the establishment of "uniform 
accounting standards" may have, we respectfully urge that 
any legislation extending the act exclude such provisions. 
Should Congress deem it advisable to study the feasibility 
of uniform accounting guidelines for determining the 
allowability of costs incurred under negotiated Government 
contracts, or of a uniform accounting system, we respect-
fully suggest that such a study, or studies, be conducted 
by a Commission similar to that proposed in the pending 
legislation previously mentioned, or a Commission which 
would include members from the Government, business and 
professional bodies concerned with this subject.44 
Senator Proxmire responded to Bacsik's entire statement by saying: 
"We certainly don't intend to impose a rigid and uniform system. We 
talk about standards and principles ..•. "45 The following exchange also 
took place between Proxmire and Bacsik. 
Senator Proxmire. Suppose you took the House bill and 
amended it by requiring cooperation with industry. Would 
that be satisfactory? With 'a provision that consultation 
be required with the defense industry? 
Mr. Bacsik. 46 It would be more in line with what we seek. 
Testimony of George D. Butler 
George Butler, president, Electra-Midland Corporation, accompanied 
by Joseph Chambers, vice president, Motorola Aerospace Center; 
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Carl Quackenbush, assistant controller, Motorola Aerospace Center; 
J. Russell Downey, resident partner of Peat, Marwick, Mitcheli & Co., 
and William H. Moore, staff vice president, Electronic Industries 
Association represented the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) at 
the Senate hearings. In addition to an oral statement given by Butler, 
47 
written statements were given by Quackenbush and Chambers. 
Butler began his testimony by indicating that of the 300 member 
firms of EIA, the association had been unable to find a single member 
company which supports the proposed imposition of uniform accounting 
standards. (Researchers Note: Butler did not say how the determination 
was made. A later statement by Butler causes one to be curious about 
this claim. Butler said: "Even now the prospect of its [H.R. 17268] 
adoption has not been reported in the commercial press and is not widely 
understood by businessmen. ,,48) Butler argued that the proposed imposi-
tion of uniform accounting standards was a bad idea and unnecessary in 
the sense that: 
•.. the armed services procurement regulation of the Department 
of Defense, the requirements of the professional accountants, 
and the requirements of the renegotiation board triply guarantee 
the validity, appropriateness, and accuracy of financial state-
ments for defense contractors.49 
In arguing against Rickover's claim of excessive profits on defense 
contracts and the possible savings of billions of dollars through the 
imposition of uniform accounting standards, Butler presented a set of 
~~ 
profit figures and indicated a misconception prevailed because of a 
failure to properly understand the purpose for which certain profit 
figures were developed. Butler claimed that when the figures were 
properly understood there were no excessive profits or increasing profits 
and therefore no need to legislate uniform accounting standards. In a 
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later exchange between Proxrnire and Butler, Proxmire pointed out that 
the committee was now aware of four sets of profit figures, all suppos-
edly related, and all being different. Proxmire surmised this in itself 
was a valid argument for needing uniform accounting standards. Butler 
did not agree. 
Butler also stated that uniform accounting standards: would 
"deprive management of good accounting,"50 drive small firms away from 
defense contracting, and have an adverse affect on defense programs. 
Testimony of James N. Donovan 
Representing the Western Electronic Manufacturers Association 
(WEMA), James N. Donovan requested that Congress reject the proposal 
d . 51 calling for uniform accounting stan ards. Donovan stated that WEMA 
primarily was composed of small-to-medium-sized companies and there was 
concern among them that the requirement of uniform accounting standards 
might adversely affect such companies because of the supposed high cost 
of implementation and, it might cause them to discontinue doing business 
with the Government. Donovan concluded his prepared statement with 
these remarks: 
Imposition of uniform accounting standards, we deeply believe, 
will do more than any other single thing to bring about the 
creation of a defense industry bound hand and foot to the 
government. It will surely narrow competition to a select 
few. Those companies manufacturing essentially commercial 
products will be eliminated as suppliers, thereby denying 
the government the full creativity of the nation's indus-
trial resources. We do not wish that. We do not believe 52 
Congress wishes that. We urge you to reject the proposal. 
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Testimony £f Ira ~ Landis 
Ira M. Landis, director of technical committee activities for the 
Financial Executives Institute (FEI), said the FEI took serious objec-. 
tion to the provision in the pending bills which would require the 
53 Comptroller General to develop uniform accounting standards. Landis 
argued that uniform accounting standards would cause companies to either 
keep an additional set of books or to get out of Government contract 
work. He also indicated that Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 
the work of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, GAO audits, and activi-
ties of the accounting principles board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants made the establishment of uniform account-
ing standards unnecessary. 
At one point Landis said: 
We therefore believe that the promulgation of a uniform account-
ing system would not be in the best interests of the American 
free-enterprise system and is contrary to the basic philosophy 
that the American entrepreneur should be permitted certain 
freedoms bearing on the internal management of his business--
especially the freedom to develop and establish the most 
effective management-control system for his particular type 
of business and in accordance with his own management philoso-
phy, innovation, ·and ingenuity. 
Because business- conditions are so varied, and managerial 
judgment plays such an important role in business success, it 
is not reasonable to suggest that statutory rules can be con-
structed to anticipate all situations.54 
Testimony of Charles W. Stewart 
Charles W. Stewart, representing the Machinery and Allied Products 
Institute, was the last witness to appear before the Senate committee, 
and he expressed the opinion that his organization felt the hasty 
adoption of uniform accounting standards would tend to approach 
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legislative irresponsibility. 55 Pointing out that the subject of 
Government contracts was being considered by 10 to 15 Congressional 
committees, Stewart said he did not" ... see how the Congress can act 
intelligently in the area."56 (Researcher's Note: This statement tends 
to indicate the widespread concern about Government procurement within 
Congress as discussed in Chapter III of this study.) In both his oral 
and written testimony, Stewart presented counterarguments to the claims 
of Rickover and other supporters of uniform accounting standards. 
Stewart also charged that statements of Rickover and Proxmire 
included errors in conception that created an atmosphere not conducive 
to an objective study. In addition, Stewart said: 
But more importantly than that, in my judgment, we don't need 
a study for this reason: We don't need a study because there 
is a constant study go{ng on in the area which is really the 
heart of what is addressed in these hearings; namely, cost 
principles, procedures, techniques, the whole basket of pro-
curement. This is constantly going on not only within the 
procurement agencies but also within the General Accounting 
Office, whose representative you heard from this morning, in 
terms of whether a particular cost principle should be tight-
ened or changed, whether there should be a new one, whether 
there should be more emphasis on incentive-type contracting, 
whether, as you have mentioned, the advertised area is being 
appropriately protected, and so on.57 
At least thirty-eight letters from representatives of industry, 
representatives of industry associations, and other interested parties 
were included in the appendix to the Senate hearings. Without exception, 
all letters expressed opposition to the imposition of uniform accounting 
standards. Of the eleven witnesses giving oral testimony before the 
committee, only one directly and specifically supported the Proxmire 
amendment. In verbal exchanges with-Proxmire, some of the other wit-
nesses indicated they could agree to the House version of the bill. ' 
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Senate Report No. 91-1322 
On June 25, 1968, Proxmire submitted to the Senate a report on 
H. R. 17268 in which the Senate committee had deleted the provision 
authorizing the GAO to develop uniform accounting standards for certain 
defense contracts. In addition to the individual views of Proxmire, the 
report contained supplemental views of Republican Senators Bennett, 
Tower, Hickenlooper, Brooke, and Percy. 
The Republican Senators said they felt the House amendment was 
" ••• proposed on the basis of misinformation."58 The Senators 
questioned Rickover's speculation concerning a $2 billion savings, they 
stated that the profit figures that had been presented were misunder-
stood, they stated that there were already adequate protective devices 
against profiteering--profiteering which they did not think existed, and, 
these senators said that the studies in process made an additional study 
unnecessary. In their concluding remarks the Senators asserted: 
•.• we wish to point out that we do not in any sense condone 
defense profiteering. If a case were made that such a prob-
lem >existed, we would be the first to demand corrective 
action. On the basis of the facts, we are forced to conclude, 
however, that the present Federal regulatory and auditing 
machinery is sufficient to handle any problems that may 
exist or develop. We, therefore, are strongly opposed to any 
amendment requiring a study with the intent of establishing 
uniform accounting standards because we are convinced that 
such a study would be no more than a rehash of previous and 
presently ongoing studies, could present no new bases on 
which to establish standards, and that if uniform standards 
were set up, they would represent nothing but an harassment 
of business and would increase the cost of defense procure-
ment.59 
Proxmire observed that during the Senate committee hearings many 
witnesses objec~ed to his amendment that would have required the GAO to 
develop and implement uniform accounting standards without requiring 
further Congressional action. Proxmire remarked that: 
Although the hearings demonstrated the complexity of the 
problem, it is difficult to understand why there should 
be serious objection to GAO merely investigating the 
feasibility of uniform accounting standards. Nonetheless, 
it was not possible to obtain agreement on the committee 
for even a feasibility study.60 
In concluding his statement Proxmire said: 
Defense procurement now stands at $45 billion a year. In 
view of the great stakes involved and the sacrifices that 
are being made in the war effort, it is incumbent upon those 
of us in Government to hold defense costs to the absolute 
minimum. The committee has received competent and responsi-
ble testimony that uniform accounting standards could sub-
stantially lighten the burden on the American taxpayer. 
Whether this is so can only be determined by a careful study. 
To refuse to authorize such a study is an abdication of our 
responsibility.61 
1968 Senate Debate 
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H. R. 17268, as amended, was presented to the Senate for considera-
tion on June 26, 1968. After being introduced on the Senate floor, 
Senator Proxmire introduced the following amendment: 
The Comptroller General, in cooperation with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, shall 
undertake a study to determine the feasibility of applying 
uniform cost accounting standards to be used in all negotiated 
prime contract and subcontract defense procurements of $100,000 
or more. In carrying out such study the Comptroller General 
shall consult with representatives of the accounting profession 
and with representatives of that segment of American industry 
which is actively engaged in defense contracting. The results 
of such study shall be reported to the Committees on Banking 
and Currency and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
and House of Representatives at the earliest practicable date, 
but in no event later than eighteen months after the date of 
enactment of this section. 62 
Most of the time spent in discussing the bill was used in debating the 
need for such a study. Principal spokesmen against the amendment were 
Wallace F. Bennett (R., Utah), Charles H. Percy (R., Illinois) and 
Paul J. Fannin (R., Arizona). 
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Bennett argued that in testifying before the Senate committee the 
GAO indicated it was able to arrive at cost and profit figures under 
existing conditions despite differing accounting methods and systems. 63 
Bennett also claimed that uniform cost accounting standards would impose 
an undue hardship on smaller firms and force them to keep two sets of 
books. 
Percy indicated he was unaware of any profiteering and that competi-
tion, various existing regulations, and audits by different agencies 
provided sufficient control over defense contractors. In addition, he 
said that after checking with the GAO (on the day of this debate) it 
was his understanding that the GAO "did not feel that such a study is 
64 
necessary." 
Fannin stated that the 
idea of preparing and implementing uniform accounting standards 
applicable to all defense contractors over $100,000 seems absurd 
to anyone who understands the nature and purposes of accounting 
systems . 
••• To require a uniform set of accounting standards applic-
able to all of these situations would deprive each individual 
industrial manager of the flexibility necessary to utilize 
specific ~§counting systems best suited to the business he is 
managing. 
Proxrnire, in leading the fight for his amendment, stated: 
The importance of uniform cost accounting standards lies in 
the fact that upwards of 85 percent of Defense procurement is 
negotiated procurement. Under a negotiated bid situation, 
the estimate of a contractor's cost plays an important role 
in the establishment of the price. The cost of any specific 
order can only be measured by the application of cost 
accounting principles. The essential function of cost 
accounting is to allocate direct and overhead costs to indi-
vidual orders. Thus, the cost accounting principles followed 
can og~iously have a large impact in determining contractor 
cost. 
Proxrnire was supported by JosephS. Clark (D., Pennsylvania) and 
Spessard L. Holland (D., Florida). Proxrnire, pointing out that 
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conflicting views surfaced in the Senate hearings, questioned what harm 
could come from such a study as he was proposing so that the facts could 
be determined. 
In observing that the House of Representatives had included a 
proposal regarding uniform accounting standards in the bill passed by 
the House and that Rickover, "who has been right a lot more than he has 
been wrong," supported such a proposal, Clark thought it curious" ... to 
note the almost universal objection •.• of our friends on the other side 
I 
f h . 1 h ld b h "ld . 1167 o t e a1s e tow at wou seem to e a rater m1 suggest1on ..•• 
Clark expressed wonder that such a survey could cause so much excitement. 
Holland argued that he did not know what the outcome of such a 
study would be but that he thought that the GAO was better qualified to 
make the study than any Senate committee staff. Holland also made an 
observation relating to excess profits. 
The fact that we have renegotiation laws and renegotiation 
settlements and the fact that we have to set up excess profits 
laws indicates that this is a subject matter in which excess 
profits have been made at times.68 
Proxmire's amendment passed 57-32. Of the Republicans voting on 
the amendment, seven voted for and twenty-nine against. Of the 
Democrats who voted, fifty voted for and three voted against the 
amendment. 
The House concurred with the Senate amendments on June 27, 1968, 
and H. R. 17268 was signed by the Speaker of the House, the President 
pro tempore of the Senate, and the President of the United States on 
July 1, 1968. 
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Summary 
Admiral Rickover, a frequent witness before Congressional committees, 
told the 1968 House Committee on Banking and Currency that he believed 
the Government could save $2 billion a year if Congress would enact a 
law requiring uniform accounting standards. On the basis of Rickover's 
testimony and the work of other Congressional committees, the 1968 
House Committee on Banking and Currency amended the Defense Production 
Act of 1950 to require the General Accounting Office to develop and 
recommend uniform accounting standards. The committee amendment passed 
the House on June 4, 1968. 
Senator Proxmire, in an executive session of the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency on June 11, 1968, introduced an amendment to the 
Senate version of the bill to extend the Defense Production Act of 1950. 
The amendment would have required the Comptroller General to develop 
uniform accounting standards for certain negotiated defense contracts. 
Also, in those cases where the Comptroller General estimated that the 
potential benefits exceeded the expected costs of using such standards, 
he was to issue rules and regulations implementing such standards. 
On June 18, 1968, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held 
hearings to discuss Proxmire's amendment and the amendment on H. R. 
17268. Of the eleven witnesses appearing before the committee, only one 
gave testimony in support of uniform accounting standards legislation. 
Proxmire's amendment failed to get out of committee and on 
June 26, 1968, he introduced an amendment requiring a feasibility study 
by the Comptroller General. T~e amendment passed the Senate by almost 
a two to one margin and the House concurred. 
The next chapter reviews some of the important aspects of the 
GAO feasibility study. 
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CHAPTER V 
GAO FEASIBILITY STUDY AND THE 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT 
Introduction 
Public Law 90-370 required the Comptroller General, the head of the 
GAO, in cooperation with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and 
the Secretary of Defense, to make a study of the feasibility of applying 
uniform cost accounting standards to all negotiated defense prime 
contracts and subcontracts of $100,000 or more. The law also required 
the Comptroller General to consult with representatives of industry and 
the accounting profession in carrying out his charge. The black-bordered 
area of Figure 3 on page 150 shows the point at which the feasibility 
study occurred in the CASB legislative process. 
In conducting the feasibility study the Comptroller General 
requested that various studies be done and that reports be submitted to 
him. This chapter reviews the highlights of some of the studies that 
provided data for the Comptroller General's report to Congress and also 
presents the basic findings and conclusions of the Comptroller General's 
report. The seventeen reports that are reviewed are: (1) "Troublesome 
Areas in Applying the Cost Principles of ASPR Section XV," (2) "Review 
of ASBCA (Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals) and Federal Court 
Decisions Involving Accounting Matters," (3) "A History of Principles 
for Determining Cost of Performing Government Military Contracts,~' 
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(4) "Feasibility of Applying Uniform Cost Accounting Standards to 
Defense Procurements," (5) "Accounting Principles and Practices in 
Other Countries," (6) "Industry Views Regarding Major ASPR Revisions 
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and Feasibility Study of UCAS," (7) "Historical Development of Accounting 
Principles," (8) "Historical Development of Procurement Methods," (9) 
"Survey of the Adequacy of Contractor's Records," (10) "Survey of 
Procurement Cost Principles of Selected Federal Agencies," (11) "Analysis 
of Cost Principles and Procedures Prescribed by the Renegotiation Board 
and the Armed Services Procurement Regulation," (12) "Analysis of 
Responses on the Suitability of Using Section XV of the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulation in Developing Uniform Cost-Accounting Standards," 
(13) "Evaluation of Responses from Government Entities to Part III of 
Questionnaire," (14) "Evaluation of Responses from General Accounting 
Office Regional Managers to Parts III and IV of Questionnaire," (15) 
"Examples of Contractors' Deviations from Consistent Practices or 
Differing Accounting Treatments as Cited in DCAA Audit Reports 
(Supplement)," (16) "Flexibility of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles," and (17) "An Evaluation of Auditor and Contracting Officer 
Responses to United States General Accounting Office Questionnaire Used 
in the Study of the Feasibility of Adopting Uniform Cost-Accounting 
Standards." The full title of each of the 17 reports, with the excep-
tions of numbers 13 and 17 above, also includes the following: "Report 
to the Comptroller General of the United States, Study of Feasibility 
of Adopting Uniform Cost-Accounting Standards, (Public Law 90-370)." 
Each report states that it is a "Report to the Comptroller General of 
the United States" and that it relates to the study of the feasibility 
of adopting uniform cost-accounting standards. 
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Before reviewing the 17 reports to the Comptroller General this 
study presents the basic definitions of three terms and then briefly 
describes the GAO Questionnaire. Highlights of the Comptroller General's 
Report to Congress follow the review of the 17 reports to the Comptroller 
General. Included in the highlights are the findings and conclusions 
of the GAO study, the major conclusions of the GAO questionnaire survey, 
and the conclusions of William J. Vatter's report which was a part of 
the GAO study. 
Basic Definitions 
Early in the life of the feasibility study the Comptroller General 
saw the need for developing some working definitions of three terms--
"cost accounting standards," "uniform," and "feasible." In an 
August 27, 1968, memorandum of the Office of the Special Assistant to 
the Comptroller General of the United States the above terms are defined 
as follows: 
The Meaning of the Term Cost Accounting Standards. In the 
light of the legislative history, the term "cost accounting 
standards," as used in this study, will embrace cost prin-
ciples, cost standards, and general rules of procedures and 
the criteria for their usage. "Cost principles," as the 
term is conceiv'ed by some, suggests self-evident truths and 
axioms which have a degree of universality and permanence 
and which underlie or are fundamental to the derivation of 
cost standards. "Cost standards," as the term is used by 
some, relates to assertions which guide or point toward 
accounting procedures or applicable governing rules. Cost 
standards are not the same as standardized or uniform cost 
accounting which suggests prescribed procedures from which 
there is limited freedom to depart. Since the legislative 
history suggested Section XV of ASPR as a possible satis-
factory starting point and Section XV includes many general 
rules of procedures, the term "cost accounting standards" 
is considered to include all three concepts; namely, 
principles, standards, and general rules of procedure. 
Further, "cost accounting standards" are inseparable from and 
impinge upon generally accepted accounting principles of which 
they are a part. Although there are generally accepted 
accounting principles which do not bear upon cost accounting 
principles; all cost accounting principles have their roots 
in generally accepted accounting principles. 
The Meaning of the Term Uniform. The term "uniform" in the 
phrase "uniform cost accounting standards" should also be 
defined in terms of the legislative history. For the purpose 
of this study, "cost accounting standards" shall be deemed to 
be uniform where stated with the goal of achieving compara-
bility and consistency of significant cost data in similar 
circumstances and with due regard to the attainment of reason-
able fairness to all parties concerned in such circumstances. 
[The Meaning of the Term Feasibility.] Feasibility will be 
judged in terms of the capability of the standards to provide 
valid cost data generally acceptable and fair to all parties 
in an expeditious and economical manner. Thus, to be feasible 
the standards must be workable not merely having a quality of 
being possible without any consideration of the short and 
long range implicati~ns, both from the viewpoint of the public 
and private sectors. 
GAO Questionnaire 
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As a part of the feasibility study the GAO designed a questionnaire 
for the following purposes: 
1. To test, for both present and possible future usefulness, 
a four-way cost classification model which, if feasible, 
might provide sounder bases for associating given costs 
with specific contracts or other cost objectives. 
2. To obtain certain kinds of information about cost 
accounting practices now in use. 
3. To invite respondents to volunteer information regarding 
criteria which they now apply in their cost accounting 
practices which might provide a basis for the develop-
ment of cost accounting standards. 
4. To obtain from respondents their opinions of a number of 
suggested cost accounting standards as an indication of 
the specificity with which cost accounting standards 
might be formulated. 
5. To seek opinions from respondents about the feasibility 
of using advance agreements on accounting standards to 
be applied in Government contracts. 
6. To obtain respondents' opinions regarding the accepta-
bility of Armed Services Procurement Regulation Section 
XV, as a starting point for developing uniform cost 
accounting standards. 2 
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On the basis of a Department of Defense listing of negotiated prime 
contracts awarded in fiscal year 1968, the GAO sent copies of the 
questionn~ire to all contractors receiving contract awards in excess of 
$10 million and to an average of 12 percent of all contractors receiving 
awards between $100,000 and $10 million. The GAO also sent copies of 
the questionnaire to such organizations as the Financial Executives 
Institute, the Council of Defense and Space Industries, the Strategic 
Industries Association, and the Machinery and Allied Products In~titute. 
Because of an indicated strong interest in the questionnaire, the 
Comptroller General adopted the policy of sending a questionnaire to 
anyone who requested one, whether they had experience in Government 
contracting or not. The GAO mailed 2,153 questionnaires to companies 
and units in the private sector. In addition, the GAO mailed 284 
questionnaires to Department of Defense personnel and also sent 
questionnaires to GAO regional offices and other Government entities. 3 
The responses from the companies and units in the private sector 
and the responses of the Department of Defense personnel were kept 
confidential and reviewed and analyzed by Robert K. Mautz and David L. 
Smith with K. Fred Skousen participating in the review and analysis of 
the private sector responses. 
Equipped with the basic definitions and an awareness of the content, 
purposes, and coverage of the GAO questionnaire, this study now briefly 
reviews 17 reports submitted to the Comptroller General that were a part 
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of the GAO feasibility study. This chapter concludes with a review of 
the Comptroller General's report to Congress. 
Troublesome Areas in Applying the Cost 
Principles of ASPR Section XV 
In a September, 1968, report entitled, "Troublesome Areas in 
Applying the Cost Principles of ASPR Section XV," the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA) of the Defense Department reported that: "Despite 
the time limitation (8 working days), DCAA Regions and field audit 
4 
offices have responded enthusiastically to a request ... " for comments 
on three areas--" ... (i) draft UCAS [Uniform Cost Accounting Standards] 
Study Objectives and Definitions, (ii) identification of the strength 
and weaknesses of the cost principles contained in ASPR Section XV, and 
5 (iii) ideas relative to the conduct of the UCAS feasibility study." 
Eighty-six responses resulted from the request and the responses were 
classified into 421 individual comments. The comments varied but were 
heavily concentrated in the areas of: 
(i) Allocation, (ii) Current Expensing versus Deferral, (iii) 
Depreciation, (iv) Direct versus Indirect, and (v) IR&R/B&P 
[Independent Research and Development/Bidding and Proposal] 
Economic Planning. The large number of comments on the study 
objectives and definitions and ideas relative to the conduct 
of the Study, however, were somewhat unexpected and are 
indicative of the thought-provoking nature of these matters 
and of the interest of DCAA personnel in the Study. 6 
Review of ASBCA (Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals) and Federal Court 
Decisions Involving Accounting 
Matters 
Mr. B. B. Lynn, Deputy Director of the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency and a member of the Uniform Cost Accounting Standards (UCAS) 
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Steering Committee, succinctly summarized a May, 1969, report of the 
DCAA entitled, "Review of ASBCA and Federal Court Decisions Involving 
Accounting Matters," in the "Foreward" to the report. The report 
represents the findings of a study involving a review of decisions by 
ASBCA and the Federal Courts" ... on disputes between the United States 
Government and commercial contractors involving cost accounting matter&"7 
Lynn stated that even though differences of viewpoints existed be-
tween the decisions of the Federal courts and the ASBCA and also 
differences of viewpoints within each body existed, the analysis of 
both bodies of many cases over a ten year period revealed the following 
salient factors and patterns: 
1. Recognition of the absence of an authoritative code of 
definitive accounting principles, and 
2. Resulting requirements to decide accounting disputes 
through other means, including reliance on: contractual, 
regulatory or statutory provisions; intent of parties to 
the contract; equity; weight of expert testimony; and 
other ad hoc considerations.8 
Lynn further commented: 
It is significant to note that the disputes on cost accounting 
matters which reach judicial or quasi-judicial levels represent 
an infinitesimal portion of the controversies in this area. 
The overwhelming number of differences are settled between the 
parties to the contract through persuasion or negotiation. In 
the absence of an authoritative code of uniform cost accounting 
standards, these settlements are frequently limited in their 
applicability to the matter immediately at hand and lack con-
tinuing commitment or precedence. Accordingly, similar contro-
versies have recurred periodically in the past and, under 9 
existing circumstances, are likely to continue in the future. 
A History of Principles for Determining 
Costs of Performing Government 
Military Contracts 
In "A History of Principles for Determining Costs of Performing 
.. 
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Government Military Contracts," prepared in May, 1969, the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency presents a history of published principles for 
determining costs under defense contracts from 1916 through 1969. Con-
tained in the report is a "Chronology of Significant Events in the 
History of Principles for Determining Costs of Performing Government 
10 Military Contracts." Included in the conclusion of the study is the 
following statement that relates closely to the feasibility study. 
The applicability of cost principles to negotiated fixed-price 
contracts still remains ~most controversial area. The current 
ASPR XV, unchanged in this regard since its publication in 1959, 
states that the principles should be used as a "guide" in pricing 
fixed-price contracts when costs are a factor in the negotiations. 
The language in ,the Regulation is suseeptible, and has been 
subjected, to varying interpretations. Some Defense personnel 
use ASPR XV cost principles in pricing all negotiated contracts 
without distinction; many others are less consistent. Most 
contractors, of course, strongly resist the application of the 
cost principles to fixed-price contracts. The Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has consistently ruled that 
the application of the cost principles to fixed-price contracts 
is neither automatic nor mandatory and will recognize them only 
upon evidence that both parties agreed to their use when the 
contract was initially negotiated.ll (emphasis added) 
Feasibility of Applying Uniform Cost 
Accounting Standards to Defense 
Procurements 
An ad hoc committee. of the Federal Government Accountants 
I 
Associatoun (FGAA), consisting of a representative from the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administr~tion; the General Services Administra-
. 'i - ' 
tion; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Interstate 
Commerce Commission; and the. Defens,e Contract Audit Agency; issued a 
report in July, 1969, expressing ).~the committee's views concerning the 
feasibility of applying uniform cost accounting standards to defense 
procurements. 
On the basis of the committee's review and collective experience 
the committee concluded" •.. that a more definitive set of uniform 
cost accounting standards than now contained in the FPR (Federal Pro-
curement Regulations) or ASPR is required to assure that proposals 
i d f d . i . . .. 12 rece ve rom respon 1ng sources are cons stent account1ng-w1se. 
In arriving at this 'conclusion, the ad hoc committee pointed out that 
the Government's needs are substantially different from the needs of 
others interested in the operations and condition of the corporation 
and therefore 
.•• it must also follow that any set of uniform cost standards 
to be adopted should not be regarded as an extension of general-
ly accepted accounting principles but rather as a set of 
separately prescribed standards directed primarily toward 
satisfying the Government cost data in connection with its 
defense material procurement activities. 13 
The ad hoc committee concluded its report with five proposed 
recommendations, the first of which was: 
The committee believes uniform cost accounting standards 
for defense contracts are feasible and should be definitively 
formulated to provide the Goverment with greater assurance 
than cost data received from responding bidders and contrac-
tors are comparable and reflect real operating differences 
rathe: tha~4 the use of different accounting principles and 
pract1ces. 
Early in the ad hoc committee report the committee stated that its 
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basis for determining feasibility would rest upon a September 18, 1968, 
memorandum from the Office of the Special Assistant to the Comptroller 
General. 
In essence, the statement proposes that the feasibility of 
adopting uniform cost accounting standards should be judged 
on a twofold basis; namely, (1) the capability of the stan-
dards to provide generally acceptable and valid cost data, 
and (2) their contribution toward enhancing the comparability, 
reliability and consistency of the cost data used -for nego-
tiating procurement contracts.lS 
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The other recommendations of the ad hoc committee dealt with its views 
of establishing a permanent Uniform Cost Accounting Standards Board, 
the powers it should have, and the responsibilities of contractors to 
the Board. 
Accounting Principles and Practices 
in Other Countries 
As a part of the feasibility study the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency performed a limited literature survey of accounting principles 
and practices in other countries to attempt to determine the relevancy 
of such principles and practices to the feasibility of establishing 
uniform cost accounting standards. The report emphasized the accounting 
for inventory and fixed assets in the countries of the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and Japan. Even 
though the report provides a capsule view of the accounting practices in 
these countries with respect to inventories and fixed assets, B. B. Lynn 
stated in the foreward to the report that " our review suggested that 
accounting in other countries does not appear to have a direct relevancy 
to the feasibility study •••• "16 
I 
Industry Views Regarding Major ASPR Revisions 
and Feasibility Study of UCAS 
As a follow-up to the report entitled, "A History of Principles 
for Determining Costs of Performing Government Military Contracts," 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency reviewed industry comments, maintained 
as part of the DCAA Technical Data Bank, " ••. directed primarily to 
the original Section XV of ASPR and Revision SO to ASPR, which represent 
two of the major changes to the contract cost principles over the past 
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17 two decades." The DCAA also compared these comments with some stated 
reactions to the feasibility study of uniform cost accounting standards. 
After giving numerous examples of consistent opposition by industry to 
major revisions to the Defense Department cost principles proposed by 
the Government, the DCAA report observed: 
.•• regardless of the nature and scope of the revisions proposed, 
industry for the past two decades has consistently cited the 
same reasons for opposing such revisions. For example, in the 
testimonies and statements presented during the Senate hearings, 
industry stated that UCAS would (i) destroy the free enterprise 
system, (ii) drive out contractors from the defense program, 
(iii) result in maintaining two sets of books, (iv) further 
reduce profits, (v) increase the overall costs of defense pro-
curement, etc. It is interesting to note that industry had 
cited similar reasons in opposing both the original ASPR XV 
and Revision 50.18 
The report concluded with the following statement: 
During the past two decades, industry has opposed most major 
revisions to the DoD cost principles proposed by the Govern-
ment. In some cases, the opposition is reflexive; in others, 
the opposition is predictable. Industry has withdrawn from 
earlier strong stands against certain revisions where sub-
sequent events indicate that its apprehension has been ground-
less. In an attampt (sic) to prevent newer, additional pro-
posals from being adopted, industry sometimes explicitly or 
implicitly endorses proposals which it had previous succeeded 
in rejecting in whole or in part. In some cases industry has 
praised the previously-adopted proposals as if it had never 
opposed them. In the respect, industry indicated its pre-
ference for the Green Book and T. D. 5000 over the original 
ASPR XV, when the latter was proposed, and for the original 
ASPR XV over Revision 50. As recent developments indicate, 
apprehensions concerning Public Law 90-370 have caused some 
industry representatives to even champion the entire ASPR 
Secion (sic) XV, despite their persistent opposition to this 
regulation over the past two decades. 19 
Historical Development of Accounting Principles 
In October, 1969, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) submitted a report entitled, "Historical Develop-
ment of Accounting Principles," to the Office of the Comtroller General. 
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The report traced the development of accounting principles from the 
1920's through 1969. An integral part of the report dealt with the 
step-by-step development of an opinion of the Accounting Principles 
Board. 
Historicp.l Development of Procurement Methods 
In response to a request by the Special Assistant to the Comptroller 
General, the Department of Defense, Installations and Logistics prepared 
a 47-page report summarizing the historical development of procurement 
methods. 
Chapter 137 of Title 10, United States Code, which amended and 
codified the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, requires 
DOD contracts for property or services to be formally advertised, 
except under 17 specific situations where negotiation may be 
used. 20 
About one-half of the report is devoted to a detailed background and to 
the development of each of the 17 situations. Other topics covered in 
the report include the advantages and limitations of formal advertising, 
the mechanics of formal advertising, criteria for effective use of 
formal advertising, effective procurement when formal advertising 
criteria cannot be met, DOD procurement regulation, contracting officers, 
qualified and eligible sources of supply, types of contracts, and the 
i . f 21 pr c1ng o government contracts. 
Survey of the Adequacy of Contractors' Records 
In November, 1969, the Special Assistant to the Comptroller General 
reported to the Comptroller General the results of a survey of 45 
contractors regarding the adequacy of contractors' records in four 
specific areas: adequacy for the calculation of cost of performance; 
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adequacy for identifying costs by contract, line item, and change order; 
adequacy for yielding the information required for pricing reviews; and 
d f . d . h f 22 a equacy or compar1ng propose costs w1t per ormance costs. In the 
cover letter to the report, the special assistant summarized the findings 
as follows: 
At the 45 contractors surveyed, basic supporting documentation 
generally was available for accounting transactions. Diffi-
culties were noted in the manner in which some contractors 
summarized data from source documents. In some cases, exten-
sive reconstruction of contract costs would be needed. 
Difficulties would be encountered in calculating overall cost 
of performance at 10 of the 45 contractors surveyed, as 
follows: 
Annual 
Sales 
Volume 
Over $50 million 
$15 to $50 million 
Under $15 million 
Total 
The reason for the 
tors, although not 
that, in the cases 
closely associated 
cated cost control 
Contractors Records Considered 
Reviewed Adequate Inadequate 
18 18 
14 11 3 
13 6 7 
45 35 10 
difference between large and small contrac-
developed during the survey, seemed to be 
of smaller contractors, management was more 
with operations and the need for a sophisti-
or reporting system was reduced. 
The principal difficulties encountered stem from the fact that 
many contractors' accounting systems did not always yield costs 
by contract, line item, and/or change order. 
Comparisons of proposed and incurred costs could not be made 
readily at 20 (45 percent) of the contractors surveyed. In 
some cases, summary data related to cost of performance were 
not available. At others, there was a commingling of basic 
contract costs and change order costs. These difficulties 
were noted mainly with smaller contractors and smaller con-
tracts. 
Pricing reviews could not be performed effectively at several 
relatively small contractors~ since time would have to be taken 
to reconstruct cost information from basic documentation.23 
At one point in the discussion of the calculation of cost of 
performance, the report states: 
However, from our survey it appears that the basic problem 
is not whether records are available by which a contractor's 
interpretation of cost of performance can be evaluated but 
~ whether the various cost treatments employed ~ contrac-
tors will permit uniform and meaningful determinations.24 
(emphasis added) 
Survey of Procurement Cost Principles of Selected 
Federal Agencies 
In a 57-page report, the Special Assistant to the Comptroller 
General fully discussed the results of a survey of procurement cost 
principles of selected Federal agencies. The report points out that 
there were significant differences between different Federal procure-
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ment regulations and also in the application of the regulations. In a 
three-page cover letter to the report, the special assistant summarized 
the report under nine areas. Although all areas in some way relate to 
the feasibility study, a portion of item number eight seems 
especially germane. 
The majority of the civil agencies surveyed indicated they 
encountered difficulties with the FPR or ASPR cost principles. 
Most of the difficulties involve either the allocation or the 
determination of costs. The types of costs mentioned include 
costs for independent research and development, advertising, 
bidding, compen~ation for personal services, depreciation, 
pensions, general and administrative expenses, training, and 
certain indirect costs.25 
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Analysis of Cost Principles and Procedures 
Prescribed by the Renegotiation Board 
and the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation 
As a part of the uniform cost accounting standards feasibility 
study the Special Assistant to the Comptroller General made a survey of 
the accounting procedures and principles prescribed by the Renegotiation 
Board and compared the Renegotiation Board's accounting procedures and 
principles to those required by the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions. The major finding of the survey is succinctly stated in the 
cover letter to the report as follows: 
The report points out that costs allocable to a contrac-
tor's renegotiable business are to be determined in accord-
ance with the method of accounting employed by the contractor 
in determining net income for Federal income tax purposes or 
with such other method as the Board and the contractor may 
agree upon. Thus a cost properly disallowed under the pro-
vision on allowability in the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation will nevertheless be recognized for renegotiation 
purposes if such cost is a proper Federal income tax 
deduction.26 
Analysis of Responses on the Suitability of Using 
Section XV of the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation in Developing Uniform Cost-
Accounting Standards 
In a 95-page report, the Detroit Regional Office of the U. S. 
General Accounting Office presented the results of a questionnaire in 
which the opinions of profes~ional organizations, trade associations, 
'/ 
industry, and Government agencies were sought regarding the use of 
Section XV of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations in developing 
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uniform cost accounting standards. 
In the cover letter to the report, the Special Assistant to the 
Comptroller General noted that in spite of some widely divergent views 
revealed in response to the questionnaire, in total the replies 
II indicate that section XV of ASPR offers at least a starting 
point for developing uniform standards."27 
Included in the report was a 49-page appendix containing a review 
submitted by the AICPA Committee on National Defense. Some of the con-
elusions of the review are as follows. 
Section 15 is basically integrated with generally accepted 
accounting principles and cost accounting used by industry . 
•.• Elements of Section 15 which have co~t accounting signifi-
cance are set forth in its coverage of allocability, generally 
accepted accounting principles and selected costs. Section 15 
contains a good statement of allocability concepts which have 
general applicability; it also contains some allocation rules. 
In practice, there are wide differences among contractors in 
how these concepts and rules are applied. 
Section 15 seems to offer a number of suitable cost 
accounting concepts for use in developing uniform cost account-
ing standards. Finding such good starting points and proceed-
ing with care, research and testing offer the best chance of 
success in developing a good set of cost accounting standards. 
If the cost accounting elements of Section 15 were to become 
the core of uniform cost accounting standards, it is possible 
that specific guidelines could be developed which would p2~vide 
guidance beyond generally accepted accounting principles. 
Alan Peterson, one of the twelve members of the AICPA Committee on 
National Defense, dissented to the report of the committee. In a letter 
to Mr. Leonard Savoie, executive vice president of the AICPA, Peterson 
stated his reasons for dissenting. 
I believe that a realistic review of ASPR XV would disclose 
that it is not suitable as a "starting point" for uniform 
accounting standards for defense contracts. First, ASPR XV 
is a pricing rule book rather than a document on cost account-
ing; secon~ASPR XV is obsolete and defective even as pricing 
rules; and third, ASPR XV does not contain a good statement of 
accounting principles. 
Thus, I do not believe Section XV of ASPR is a good 
"starting point" for suitable cost accounting concepts nor 
that Section XV should become the "core". of uniform cost 
accounting standards for defense contracts.29 
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In addition, Peterson listed four assertions or observations made in the 
committee report to which he objected and he also stated that he felt 
a fresh start on the development of new cost accounting standards should 
be made based upon a clearly defined set of objectives of uniform 
standards. 
In addition to the correspondence from the AICPA committee, the 
Detroit Regional Office report also contained letters and in some cases 
reports from the following organizations expressing their positions on 
the question of using ASPR XV as the starting point for developing 
uniform cost accounting standards: the National Association of Enrolled 
Tax Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, the Council of 
Defense and Space Industry Associations, the Machinery and Allied 
Products Institute, the Associated General Contractors of America, and 
the Strategic Industries Association. 
The report indicated that the views of industry and Government 
representatives were often directly opposite with respect to implementing 
guidelines contained in ASPR. "Generally, industry believed existing 
ASPR guidelines needed to be more flexible, whereas Government 
representatives believed that they should be more rigid."30 
Evaluation of Responses from Government 
Entities to Part III of Questionnaire 
The San Francisco Regional Office of the U. S. General Accounting 
Office prepared a 74-page report representing that office's evaluation 
of responses from Government_ entities to Part III of the GAO 
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:_questionnaire. "Part III of the questionnaire •.. presents concepts 
! 
which bear on the nature of cost-acc'ounting standards and the overall 
feasibility of establishing-and applying unifonn cost-accounting; 
- 31 
standards." The GAO sent the questionnaire to three groups of 
I -
Government entities: Government departments and agencies, members of 
the Interagency Regulatory Accountants Committee, and Procurement Office 
and Audit Office representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. Ninety percent of the Government departments and 
agencies, 64 percent of the members of the Interagency Regulatory 
Accountants Committee, and 100 percent of the NASA Procurement and Audit 
Offices that were sent questionnaires responded. 
The basic conclusion of the San Francisco Regional Office is stated 
as follows: 
The statistical tabulations of responses to the questionnaire 
and the respondents' narrative comments indicate that it is 
feasible to establish unifonn cost-accounting standards, 
similar to those presented in part III of the questionnaire, 
to be used in all negotiated prime contract and subcontract 
defense procurements of $100,000 or more. 
About 63 percent of the combined responses made by the 
Government departments and agencies, Interagency Regulatory 
Accountants Committee, and NASA Procurement and Audit Offices 
categorized the eight proposed standards in questions 20 
through 27 as "about right." The remainder of the responses 
cited the proposed standards as being either "too restrictive" 
(17 percent) or "too flexible" (20 percent). Overall responses 
to question 28 and 29, which proposed that cost-accounting 
standards applicable to Government contracts be essentially the 
same as those for commercial purposes and that advance agree-
ments be negotiated covering cost-accounting standards a 
contractor agrees to follow, were strongly in the "yes" cate-
gory at 89 percent and 70 percent, respectively.32 
The San Francisco Regional Office also stated that from " • • . the 
comments and recommendations, the need for emphasizing consistency in 
the application of cost-accounting standards was clearly evident."33 
\ ' 
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Evaluation of Responses from General Accounting 
Office Regional Managers to Parts III and IV 
of Questionnaire 
The GAO sent copies of the questionnaire to the 16 regional offices 
of the General Accounting Office with the request that each office 
present its position on Parts III and IV of the questionnaire. The con-
tents of part III of the questionnaire were described on pages 166 and 
167 of this study. "In part IV of the questionnaire the regional 
offices were asked to evaluate the applicability and adequacy of speci-
fied paragraphs in section XV of ASPR as bases for uniform cost-
34 
accounting standards." 
The Defense Division of the U. S. General Accounting Office evalu-
ated the responses of the regional offices and prepared a 57-page 
report summarizing their evaluation. With regard to part III of the 
questionnaire, the Defense Division reported: 
Although the responses showed significant differences of 
opinion on practically every proposed standard, only two 
of the eight propositions were rejected by a majority of 
the offices and none was rejected unanimously. A clear 
majority of the offices endorsed the proposed standards 
in questions 20 (depreciation), 22 (maintenance), 23 
(support for cost data), 24 (allocation bases for oojec-
tively traceable and ascribable costs), and 27 (accumu-
lation and allocation of indirect costs). The offices 
split evenly on the proposed standard in question 26 on 
the adequacy of cost-accounting records and rejected the 
standards in question 21 on direct labor charges, and in 
question 25 on the allocation bases for generally allo-
cable costs.35 
Even though there was a diversity of opinion on nearly all the 
questions, the Defense Division concluded that three things would be 
necessary to ensure wide acceptance by GAO regions of uniform cost 
accounting standards. 
First, the regional offices draw a very fine dividing line 
between a standard and a procedure or method. An acceptable 
cost-accounting standard would have to be stated broadly 
enough so as to recognize the great variety of conditions and 
circumstances existent in industry and would have to encompass 
within it procedures and methods designed to meet these circum-
stances, yet, on the other hand, it would have to be specific 
enough to serve as a meaningful guide and to promote uniformity 
and comparability of accounting results. 
Second, an acceptable standard would have to be brief but 
not at a sacrifice in clarity. 
Finally, an acceptable cost-accounting standard would have 
to confine itself to providing guidance on acceptable practices 
without attempting to def~ge the role of the Government auditor 
vis-a-vis the contractor. 
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In response to the question as to whether cost accounting standards 
for Government contracts should be essentially the same as those appro-
priate for commercial purposes, the regional offices with few qualifica-
tions responded in the affirmative. There was a lack of agreement among 
respondents to the question of whether advance agreements between the 
Government and contractor would be desirable. 37 
In evaluating the responses to part IV of the questionnaire, the 
Defense Division indicated that before some of the paragraphs of section 
XV of ASPR would be accepted as a satisfactory guideline for cost-
accounting practice, revisions would be necessary to make the paragraphs 
if . d b. . . 38 more spec 1c an to remove am 1gu1t1es. The responses provided in-
conclusive evidence with regard to the extent of revision other 
specified paragraphs of section XV would need in order to create a 
i f . d d 39 sat s actory cost-account1ng stan ar . 
Examples of Contractors' Deviations from 
Consistent Practices or Differing 
Accounting Treatments as Cited 
in DCAA Audit Reports 
(Supplement) 
In July, 1969, the Defense Contract Audit Agency submitted a 
report entitled, "Examples of Contractors' Deviations from Consistent 
Practices or Differing Accounting Treatments as Cited in DCM Audit 
Reports," in which the DCAA cited some 50 cases of specific problems 
regarding 
(i) allocation of indirect costs (other than corporate office 
expenses), (ii) classification of costs as between direct and 
indirect, and (iii) election of whether costs should be capi-
talized or charged to expense.40 
The Comptroller General requested that the DCAA supplement the July, 
1969, report with a study concerning corporate office expenses and 
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other expenses and costs. The results of the second study were reported 
in December, 1969. 
The objective of the study was" •.. to further illustrate the 
types of contract auditing and negotiation problems that are likely to 
continue in the absence of an authoritative code of uniform cost 
41 
accounting standards." The DCAA selected 27 diversified companies to 
illustrate problems of allocating corporate office expense and 35 
audit reports issued by DCAA during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 to 
illustrate allocation problems relating to other expenses and costs. 
The report of the DCAA on the results of the survey included 
several examples of the diversity of allocation methods used by various 
companies. In the conclusion to the report, DCAA stated: 
The significance of the amounts allocated to Government con-
tracts (e.g. $200 million annually by 27 companies) and the 
extremely wide diversity of practices strongly indicate the 
need for the establishment of specific criteria and guidance 
concerning the allocation of corporate office expenses. The 
fact that no two companies used identical allocation methods 
points up two things: (i) there are divergent views partly 
because, as discussed previously, the subject of corporate 
office expense allocation has been accorded very little atten-
tion by academicians and authorities of the profession, and 
(ii) the establishment of criteria and guidance for this type 
of costs would be a very difficult (but not an impossible) 
task. 
As further indicated by the examples in Part II of this report, 
an authoritative code of uniform cost accounting standards is 
also needed in other areas of contract costing. To reiterate, 
these include but are not limited to: allocation of other 
indirect costs, classification of costs as between direct and 
indirect, and election of whether costs should be capitalized 
or charged to expense.42 
Flexibility of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles 
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"In September, 1969, the GAO issued and requested comments on its 
draft report entitled, 'Study of the Feasibility of Applying Uniform 
Cost Accounting Standards to Negotiated Prime Contracts and Subcontracts 
43 
of $100,000 or More."' The draft report concluded that uniform cost 
accounting standards were feasible. Many industry associations dis-
agreed with the GAO conclusion, criticized the report for " down-
grading, or at least failing to recognize the usefulness of existing 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs) to accomplish the 
i d b . . 1144 d i d h t . f th requ re o Ject1ves, an quest one t e representa 1veness o e 
illustrations contained in the ~uly, 1969, report of "Contractors' 
Deviations from Consistent Practices or Differing Accounting Treatment-
of Costs." 
To answer the criticism, ·in addition to the report reviewed in the 
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previous section, the Defense Contract Audit Agency selected and review-
ed 18 articles on the flexibility of generally accepted accounting 
principles in well-known accounting and business periodicals. On the 
basis of the review the DCAA concluded: 
The articles in professional and business publications ••. 
indicate the following consensus: (i) accounting practices for 
similar circumstances are diverse among companies and even 
interperiod consistency is not always adhered to, mainly 
because of the extreme flexibility permitted by GAAPs; (ii) 
such practices are not uncommon and have a significant impact 
on the results of operations of the companies involved; (iii) 
authorities attribute these practices to such factors as 
managements' propensity to manipulate reported income, the 
companies' desire to 'follow the leader' to stay competitive, 
a means to fend off take-overs, etc; and (iv) a number of 45 
authorities are also concerned about the existing conditions. 
The report pointed out that even though the articles reviewed dealt 
wi 1th financial accounting there are implications for cost accounting 
and· contract costing. 
An Evaluation of Auditor and Contracting Officer 
Responses to United States General Accounting 
Office Questionnaire 
In February, 1970, Robert K. Mautz and David L. Smith transmitted 
a report to the Comptroller General containing an evaluation of auditor 
and contracting officer responses to Parts III and IV of the GAO 
questionnaire. In addition to presenting some of the narrative responses 
of the parties, the report.contained tables presenting a comparison of 
Government personnel responses: to contracting \lnits' responses with 
respect to part III of the questionnaire and a detailed tabular analysis 
of the responses to part IV of the questionpaire. 
In the cover letter to the report, Mautz succinctly stated the 
conclusions of this part of the study. 
Conclusions drawn from study of the categorical responses by 
these government employees and also from their narrative answers 
to certain questions support the conclusions drawn from study 
of the questionnaires returned by the representatives of con-
tracting units reported elsewhere. There is a significant 
difference, however. The government employees whose answers 
to the questionnaire are summarized in this report are generally 
more favorably inclined toward the establishment of cost 
accounting standards for contract purposes than were the re-
sponding representatives of contracting units. Likewise, they 
tend to favor a stricter wording of standards than did the re-
presentatives of contracting units.46 
Report on the Feasibility of Applying Uniform 
Cost-Accounting Standards to Negotiated 
Defense Contracts 
On the basis of the above 17 reports and other inputs, the 
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Comptroller General prepared and sent to the House Committee on Banking 
and Currency a "Report on the Feasibility of Applying Uniform Cost-
Accounting Standards to Negotiated Defense Contracts" in January, 1970. 
In explaining why the study was made, the report states that in 
Congressional debate ..• 
views were expressed that uniform cost-accounting standards 
are necessary mainly because of substantially increased costs 
of procurement and difficulties in contract administration. 
In a negotiated bid situation the estimate of a contractor's 
cost plays an important role in the establishment of the price. 
The cost of any specific order can only be measured by the 
application of cost accounting principles • 
•.• the view was expressed that the essential function of 
cost accounting is to allocate direct and overhead costs to 
individual orders. Thus, the cost-accounting principles 
followed have a large impact on the determination of contrac-
tor costs.47 
The findings and conclusions of the 558 page report of the 
Comptroller General were stated as follows: 
"General cost principles and procedures" for use in negotiated 
Defense contracts are contained in Section XV of the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). However, the effec-
tiveness of section XV is impaired because: 
--It makes frequent references to generally accepted account-
ing principles and/or regulations of the Internal Revenue 
Service, neither of which was intended to serve contract 
costing purposes. 
--It lacks specific criteria for the use of alternative 
accounting principles and indirect cost allocation methods. 
--It is of limited applicability, since it is mandatory for 
only cost-reimbursement type contracts. 
Uniform cost-accounting standards could provide a common 
framework for estimating prospective cost or for the deter-
mination of the actual cost of a contract. They could pro-
vide the guidance, support, and coordination required for 
better understood estimates and subsequent reports of actual 
costs. 
It is feasible to establish and apply cost-accounting standards 
to provide a grea~er degree of uniformity and consistency 
in cost accounting as a basis for negotiating and administering 
procurement contracts. 
However, under all the wide variety of circumstances involved 
in Government contracting, it is not feasible to establish and 
apply cost-accounting standards in such detail as would be 
necessary to ensure a uniform application of precisely pre-
scribed methods of computing costs for each of the different 
kinds of cost. 
Cost-accounting standards should not be limited to Defense 
cost-type contracts. They should apply to negotiated pro-
curement co~tracts and subcontracts, both cost-type and fixed 
price. They should be madev, applicable Government-wide. 
Cumulative benefits from the establishment of cost-accounting 
standards should outweigh the cost of implementation. 
·New machinery should be established for the development of 
cost-accounting standards. The objective should be to adopt at 
an early date the standards of disclosure and consistency and 
to strive for the elimination of unnecessary alternative cost-
accounting practices. 
Contractors should be req~ired to maintain records of contract 
performance costs in conformity with cost-accounting standards 
and any approved practices set forth in a disclosure agreement 
or be required to maintain the data from which such information 
could be readily provided.48 ' 
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Three hundred sixty pages of the Comptroller General's report is a 
reproduction of a report prepared for the Comptroller General by Mautz, 
Skousen, and Smith in which they evaluate responses to the GAO 
questionnaire. The major conclusions from the GAO questionnaire survey 
were: 
1. It is feasible to develop and establish an authoritative 
set of propositions, general in nature yet definitive in 
providing for the accumulation and reporting of costs of 
contracts or other cost objectives. 
2. Considerable difficulty must be anticipated in stating 
such a set of propositions so that they are meaningful 
to the variety of contractors who will be affected by 
them, so that they are applicable with reasonable equity 
in the variety of circumstances in which contracts are 
performed, and so that their imposition upon contractors 
does not reduc~ the availability of necessary products 
and services to the Government. 
3. Such a set of propositions can make a significant contri-
bution to contract cost determination and reporting. 
Certain aspects of cost determination, however, are not 
susceptible to control by accounting practices alone and 
require the cooperation of those responsible for contract 
negotiation4 contract administration, and cost accounting 
activities. 9 
Eighty pages of the Comptroller General's report is a reproduction 
of a research report prepared by William J. Vatter in which he" ... 
reviewed the field of cost analysis from the viewpoint of standards--
50 
not procedures or rules." Vatter concluded that the feasibility of 
applying uniform cost accounting standards to be used in defense con-
tracts depends 
.•• upon what conceptual structure is accepted as the rationale 
of cost determination--not only with respect to contracts and 
reimbursements, but also as~ to managerial needs, generally. 
Without such a conceptual $tructure, the establishment of rules 
and procedures becomes disbrganized and confused; unless the· 
underlying concepts and criteria are defined, methods are 
mere rituals; unless there is a framework to relate ideas and 
to test their consistency, there is little chance for agreement 
on what should be done or how it may best be accomplished.51 
Vatter pointed out that his report did not argue for or against 
feasibility but for integrity and validity in the underlying ideas. 
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In addition to the reports of Vatter and Mautz, Skousen, and Smith, 
the Comptroller General's Report contains other appendices on: basic 
legislation, definitions, and scope of feasibility study; existing 
"contract cost principles and procedures" in the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulation; problem areas in the assignment of Government 
contract costs; and a summary of significant comments on the earlier 
draft report on the study of the feasibility of adopting uniform cost-
accounting standards. The report, exclusive of the appendices, con-
tained 23 pages divided into four chapters: Introduction, Cost-
Accounting Standards Potential Benefits and Limitations, Major Cost 
Accounting Problem Areas, and Conclusion and Recommendations. 52 
This review of the House and Senate activities of 1968 and the 
salient features of the GAO feasibility study, along with the awareness 
of the social forces present, provide an adequate background for a review 
of the Senate and House activities of 1970. 
Summary 
The Comptroller General, in response to the requirements of Public 
Law 90-370, made a study of the feasibility of applying uniform cost 
accounting standards to all negotiated defense prime contracts and sub-
contracts of $100,000 or more. , The Comptroller General used the talents 
of members of Governm~nt; industry, academia, and the accounting 
profession in doing the study~ 
One of the tools used in the study was a questionnaire that was 
sent to 2,153 companies and units in the private sector. The major 
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conclusions of the questionnaire survey were stated on page 175 of 
this study. In addition to the ques~ionnaire survey, the Comptroller 
General received reports from various individuals, groups of individuals, 
and agencies of the Federal Government. 
On the basis of his study, the Comptroller General prepared and 
sent to the House Committee on Banking and Currency a "Report on the 
Feasibility of Applying Uniform Cost-Accounting Standards to Negotiated 
Defense Contracts." Among other things the report concluded that: 
It is feasible to establish and apply cost accounting standards 
to provide a greater degree of uniformity and consistency in 
cost accounting as a basis for negotiating and administering 
procurement contracts.53 
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CHAPTER VI 
COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS LEGISLATIVE 
ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE GAO STUDY 
Introduction 
Congress, in 1970, again faced the issue of what to do about 
uniform cost accounting standards for defense procurement contracts. 
In addition to previous testimony, Congress now had to consider the 
findings and conclusions of the Comptroller General's report. During 
1970, hearings were held on the question of uniform cost accounting 
standards. The hearings were followed by Congressional reports and 
debates. Chapter VI reviews the hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Production and Stabilization of the Committee on Banking 
and Currency, Senate Report 91-890, the hearings before the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, the Senate action on S. 3302, the 
Report of the House Committee on Banking and Currency - Report No. 
91-1330, the Joint Resolution, the House Debate on H. R. 17880, the 
Conference Report, and the final actions on S. 3302. The black-bordered 
area of Figure 4 on page 183 shows the parts of the CASB legislative 
processes covered in Chapter VI. 
The reader is reminded to se·ek answers to the questions stated on 
page 114 of this study to attempt to determine the credibility and 
persuasiveness of the witnesses. 
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Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Production and Stabilization of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency 
Introduction 
On December 23, 1969, Senator Proxmire introduced S. 3302 to the 
Senate which among other things amended section 718 of the Defense 
Production Act by requiring the GAO to promulgate uniform cost accounting 
standards within 18 months of enactment of the legislation. 1 ' Senator 
Mondale, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Production and Stabili-
zation of the Banking and Currency Committee, announced on March 20, 
1970, that the subcommittee would hold hearings on March 31, April 1 and 
2, 1970, regarding the implementation of uniform cost accounting stan-
dards for defense procurement contracts. In addition, Mondale submitted, 
for the record, two alternative proposals prepared by the GAO which 
implement the recommendations contained in the GAO report and stated 
that the GAO proposals would also be considered at the hearings. 2 
On March 31 and April 1 and 2, 1970, the Senate Subcommittee on 
Production and Stabilization of the Committee on Banking and Currency 
held hearings on~ Bill to Amend the Defense Production Act of 1950, and 
For Other Purposes. The primary purpose of the hearings was 11 to 
consider uniform cost accounting standards including S. 3302 and 
legislative proposals submitted by the General Accounting Office."3 
Testimony of Senator Proxmire 
Senator Proxmire, introduced by Senator Mondale as the chief 
sponsor of the uniform cost accounting concept, was the first witness to 
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appear before the committee. Proxmire indicated that S. 3302 would give 
the Comptroller General the authority to establish uniform cost account-
ing standards for negotiated defense contracts and this in turn would 
help to alleviate one of the most serious shortcomings in defense pro-
curement. Pointing out that Congress had passed a wide variety of 
consumer protection bills, Proxmire lamented the fact that the Depart-
ment of Defense had no reliable means of measuring the true cost of 
defense work. 
Senator Proxmire alluded to the various studies that had been pro-
duced about defense profits, many of them reaching opposite conclusions, 
and pointed out that no one actually knows the amount of defense profits. 
He claimed that under existing conditions it would be possible for 
defense contractors to pad their cost estimates and thereby hide profits. 
Proxmire also claimed that, under existing conditions, .contractors were 
able to subsidize their commercial operations by charging independent 
research and development expenses to Government contracts by way of 
overhead. 
While admitting that uniform cost accounting standards would not 
solve all defense procurement problems, Proxmire stated he felt uniform 
cost accounting standards would be a step in the right direction. 4 
Testimony ££ Elmer B. Staats 
Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, was the 
second witness before the commit,:tee. Staats focused his remarks on the 
GAO report and legislative proposals regarding the_development of uni-
form cost accounting standards. In his opening remarks Staats stated 
that the Department of Defense, a large segment of the accounting 
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profession, and many industrial organizations agreed that cost accounting 
standards were both feasible and needed. Much of Staat's testimony was 
merely a restatement of the first 23 pages of the written report he 
had already made to Congress concerning the feasibility of establishing 
cost accounting standards. However, Staats did express the views of the 
GAO regarding Senate bill 3302 and the two alternative bills. 
Staats, while agreeing with the objective of S. 3302, expressed the 
view that 
.•. the issuance of cost-accounting standards without prov1s1on 
for modification, interpretation, broad application, and enforce-
ment will not be fully responsive to the objective of attaining 
a greater degree of uniformity and consistency in cost account-
ing.S 
He observed that the GAO considered the issuance of cost accounting 
standards to be a continuing process and therefore there was a need for 
a continuing Board. 
In discussing Alternative No. 1 to S. 3302, Staats explained that 
the Comptroller General would have the responsibility of promulgating 
cost-accounting standards and would be assisted by an advisory board 
composed of representatives from both inside and outside the Federal 
Government. Alternative No. 2 to S. 3302 provides for an independent 
board composed of members from inside and outside the executive branch 
of Government with the President selecting the members of the board. 
In other respects the alternatives to S. 3302 were basically the same 
and had the following features: 
••• cost accounting standards would apply to negotiated 
contracts with all Federal agencies. The legislative 
proposals would also authorize the promulgation of ~ules 
and regulations for the implementation of cost-accounting 
standards. 
Such regulations may require contractors and subcontractors 
to disclose in writing their cost-accounting practices and 
to agree to contract price adjustment with interest for any 
increased cost incurred by the Government because of their 
failure to comply with the cost-accounting standards 
promulgated . 
..• We feel the advance disclosure of accounting practices 
and ~ requirement for consistent application of approved 
practices to be the basic essentials for successful imple-
mentation of cost-accounting standard~ (emphasis added) 
Staats enumerated the following differences as he contrasted the 
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common features of S. 3302 with Alternatives No. 1 and No. 2. S. 3302 
limited the application of cost-accounting standards to contracts of 
$100,000 or more whereas neither of the alternatives placed any limita-
tion on the application. Neither of the alternatives placed a time 
limit on the promulgation of cost-accounting standards whereas S. 3302 
placed an 18 month time limit on the task. 
At the conclusion of his statement, Staats indicated that the GAO 
preferred Alternative No. 2 for two reasons: 
First, we question whether the GAO should become deeply in-
volved in the administration of negotiated contracts. The 
responsibility for administration of contracts, including 
promulgating, interpreting and administering cost-accounting 
standards seems basically to us an executive branch function. 
Rules and regulations covering Federal Government procurement 
are now a function of the executive branch. There does not 
appear to be any reason to divorce the promulgation of cost-
accounting standards from the executive branch. 
In addition, an independent board appointed by the President 
might well have greater prestige and attract more capable 
members. We are thinking here particularly of those outside 
of the Government. It could not be accused of having any 
bias by reason of having worked on the feasibility stud7 or 
any preconceived ideas of what the standards should be. 
Senator Mondale disagreed with Staat's suggestion that the Board 
be appointed by the President and indicated a preference for having the 
Board not be an .executive agency. 
In a discussion with Senator Proxrnire, Staats claimed the 
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Government was being double charged, in some cases, because there was no 
system of cost accounting standards and because of a lack of consistency 
in contract procurement activities. The concept of consistency to which 
Staats had reference was stated as follows: 
••. to apply the same practices consistently from the time your 
cost proposals are submitted and evaluated, as to what you are 
going to get in the contract, clear through the whole process 
of administration, which includ~s modifications, change orders, 
disputes, and final settlement. 
He expanded his concept of consistency in the following way: "You may 
have procurement with more than one service or more than one agency of 
the same general type. We think the same standards should apply in all 
those circumstances if they are the same."9 
Staats said that the GAO thought there were three standards that 
could be established rather quickly: a consistency standard, a written 
disclosure agreement laying the ground rules regarding the contract, and 
a written performance record. In response to a question by Proxmire, 
Staats refused to put a dollar figure on the amount he thought could be 
saved if cost accounting standards were promulgated and merely replied 
that the GAO thought the savings woul,d be substantial.--
Proxmire also raised the question of whether the Board should be 
an independent Board appointed by the President. Pointing out that the 
GAO had an established base of expertise upon which to build and alluding 
to the ineffectiveness of many independent agencies, Proxmire stated he 
favored having the GAO or the Comptroller General in charge. 
In addition to answering questions concerning other aspects of the 
GAO report and Alternatives No. 1 and No. 2, Staats briefly discussed 
the requirements of staffing the Board and later submitted a report of 
suggested staffing requirements for the record. His testimony was 
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followed in the record, by two reports (reviewed earlier in this study): 
"Analysis of Responses on the Suitability of Using Section XV of the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation in Developing Uniform Cost-
Accounting Standards" and "Review of ASBCA and Federal Courts Decisions 
Involving Accounting Matters." 
Testimony of Kenneth ~ Jackson 
Kenneth M. Jackson, chairman, procurement regulations committee 
of National Aerospace Services Association, was the third witness to 
appear before the committee. Jackson described National Aerospace 
Services Association (NASA) as being a national trade association with 
38 member companies, both large and small, engaged in a variety of aero-
space activities on an international scale. 
In beginning his testimony Jackson said" .•. I want to be crystal 
clear about my conclusions: It is feasible and desirable to develop 
uniform cost-accounting standards."10 He then stated that he felt the 
standards should not be limited to Government contracts but could be 
required for publicly owned companies and for the Federal Government 
and its agencies also. Jackson said, "Either cost-accounting standards 
are right for all or they are right for none."11 He also indicated 
that he thought cost-accounting standards should be applicable to all 
contracts and not to only negotiated contracts of Government agencies. 
Jackson gave his views on several issues raised in the GAO report 
and raised some not contained therein. He also listed some additional 
benefits that he thought would result from the promulgation of cost-
accounting standards and gave several suggestions regarding the proposed 
legislation. Additional benefits, cited by Jackson were: 
1. Developing a logic an (sic) language of cost accounting 
for improved communication, stability of relationships 
and confidence in dealings would promote less disputes 
between Government and industry 
2. It follows that one of the most important benefits will 
be clarity of relationships and some automatic protection 
on contractor's rights. 
3. Existing management systems used to track program progress 
would benefit from the application of standards by assuring 
that the contractor and the Government have policies and 
procedures adequate to produce data compatible with the 
objectives of the reports.l2 
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Suggestions regarding the proposed legislation as cited by Jackson were 
that all versions should: 
1. Be made independent of the Defense Production Act, because 
of the Comptroller General's recommendation to apply it 
Government-wide and in view of my suggestions to expand 
beyond the area of Government contracts into other Govern-
ment and private sector work. 
2. Remove any limitation in application to negotiated prime 
and subcontracts for reasons stated above. 
3. Prescribe the use of uniform cost accounting standards as 
a basis for SEC reporting, public regulated prices dis-
counts, necessary investigations, consumer protection, and 
Federal agency budgeting and accounting. 
4. Provide a mechanism for changes in the disclosure agreements 
to recognize changed circumstances. 
5. Provide a mechanism for "disputes" or appeal in the case of 
hardship cases or in the case of proposed imposition of 
penalties for noncompliance inconsistencies. 
6. Provide for a longer time period, at least 90 day~, for 
coordination of p~oposed implementation, or changes to 
implementations of the cost accounting standards. The 
reason for this is to reflect the time period necessarily 
consumed by affected groups trying to achieve the most 
equitable solution. 
7. Limit the access to records by the Comptroller General to 
the same period presently provided, namely 3 years after 
final payment, or in the case of nondefense companies, to 
no longer than the. t.ime period available under IRS rules. 
Otherwise, you Jould have a records nightmare, inequities, 
and dilatory reviews. 
8. Require changes to Federal- procurement regulations, ASPR, 
AEC, and other cost-related regulations in order to elim-
inate any separate statement of cost accounting principles 
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or standards; to eliminate selected cost principals which de-
pend for their interpretation upon cost accounting judgments 
of the type that would be covered by standards, (sic) and to 
minimize disallowances of legitimate business expenses. 
9. As suggested, it is most important to provide for incre-
mental review of the promulgation process and to have 
common effectivity dates to avoid any risks of impairing 
the competitive process.l3 
In response to a question from Proxmire, Jackson suggested that 
cost accounting standards might lighten record keeping requirements of 
small companies. Jackson also clarified the point that he was speaking 
for the National Aerospace Services Association when he said it is 
feasible and desirable to develop uniform cost-accounting standards. 
Proxmire found this to be interesting and helpful because industry 
associations had consistently opposed cost accounting standards. 14 
Testimony of Howard ~ Wright 
Howard W. Wright, professor and chairman, division of accounting, 
University of Maryland, and drafter of part 2, section XV, Armed 
Services Procurement Regulation, "Contract Cost Principles and Frace-
dures," was the fourth committee witness. In his opening remarks, 
Wright stated that he was a coauthor of the only book on Federal 
Government accounting and the sole author of "Accounting for Defense 
15 Contracts." 
Wright, while stating that he concurred with the Comptroll~r 
General's finding that it was feasible to establish and apply uniform 
cost-accounting standards, said he had some concern about" .•. UCAS 
incorporating general rules of procedures since' the report does not 
distinguish between geneqil rules and specific rules. "16 He also 
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expressed grave doubts about the magnitude of the proposed effort and 
discussed reservations he had about some of the recommendations of the 
report. Regarding the problem areas cited in the GAO report, Wright 
said: 
I suggest that the Comptroller General primarily has cited cases 
which already are violations of existing regulations. No change 
in a regulation is going to be self-enforcing. Thus, the cases, 
which seem to demonstrate a need for UCAS in my judgment fail to 
do so in the degree implied.l7 
Wright also challenged the small number of cases presented--120 of more 
than 200,000 contract actions over $10,000 of the Department of Defense 
annually--by the GAO in illustrating the problem areas. (Researcher's 
Note: Later in his testimony, Wright makes a broad generalization from 
a sample of two cases.) 
Wright argued that many of the conclusions and recommendations of 
the report dealt with administrative rather than accounting matters and 
he suggested there was no need for a change in existing cost principles. 
He also argued against disclosure and consistency as set forth by the 
GAO. Regarding disclosure, Wright suggested that although there might 
not be agreement between the contractor and the Government auditors 
regarding the methods used, there was a knowledge by both parties of 
what methods existed. Wright argued that the GAO concept of consistency 
was rigid and unrealistic. Expressing opposition to advance written 
disclosure statements, Wright cited two cases with which he was familiar 
in which they worked to the disadvantage of the parties to the agreement 
and suggested that these cases indicate the dangers of advance agree-
ments . 
. 
Concerning the GAO report as a whole, Wright said: 
.•• while I concur in the feasibility of establishing UCAS, I 
question the need for them or the wisdom in proceeding fur-
ther. No real evidence of need has been established. There 
is no estimate in the report of cost savings likely to result 
from UCAS. The report has in no way validated an earlier 
estimate of a probable $2 billion saving. Certainly had any 
supportive evidence existed, it would have been presented. 1H 
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Wright stated that the main reason he opposed the UCAS project was 
because, "Although I readily admit some improvements in ASPR XV can be 
made, I am concerned that any effort to do so may well destroy the bal-
ance which now exists."19 Stating that he recognized that legislation 
would probably result from the hearings, Wright expressed his views on 
the three proposed legislative bills and indicated a preference for 
Alternative No. 2 even though he had serious reservations concerning 
some of its provisions. 
He concluded his statement with the following observation and 
recommendation. 
In summary, this situation is much like a Greek tragedy. 
Circumstances seem to be inexorably moving toward an undesir-
able conclusion. No need for any major change has been 
established. No major faults have been exposed. No evidence 
of excess costs to the Government has been advanced. Three 
pieces of legislation have been proposed, all of which have 
major weaknesses. Of the three, I have endorsed that which 
appears to be the least undesirable. I do not consider it 
to be an optimum solution to whatever problem may exist. 
I recommend that the committee consider another alternative. 
I suggest that the Cost Accounting Standards Advisory Board 
be established within the General Accounting Office and that 
it have the power to make, promulgate, amend, and rescind 
rules and regulations concerning UCAS. The Board could be 
chaired by the Comptroller General or his representative with 
one permanent member from the D~partment of Defense, designated 
by the Secretary thereof. 
A second member should repres~nt the procurement activities of 
the civil agencies. He should be designated by the President 
of the United States. Two members from outside the Federal 
Government would be appointed by the Comptroller General. 
Alternatively, one member might be appointed by the Comptroller 
Gen~ra~ and one by the President o~ th~ United States. A 
board so constituted would avoid the possible charge of undue 
influence of the Comptroller General in the UCAS decision-
making process, it would be more representative of the parties 
at interest, yet would have a more viable environment in which 
to work than if it existed alone.20 
Wright spent much of the remainder of his appearance before the 
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committee in answering questions from Proxmire--questions which appeared 
to raise doubts concerning the objectivity of Wright as a witness. 
Among other things Proxrnire questioned statements in Wright's book and 
speeches and also pointed out that Wright was a consultant to 24 organi-
zations--all of which did work for the Defense Department. 
Testimony of Leonard M. Savoie 
The first witness on the second day of the subcommittee hearings 
was Leonard M. Savoie, executive vice president of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Savoie was accompanied by 
Louis M. Kessler, president of the AICPA and LeRoy Layton, chairman of 
the AICPA Accounting Principles Board. 
In his opening statement, Savoie said: "We see the concept of 
'uniform cost-accounting standards' not as a new radical idea but as a 
continuation of one segment of a body of accounting practice that has 
been developing for a long time."21 Indicating that generally accepted 
cost accounting principles were already in existence, he suggested 
there was a need for continual refinement of such principles. 
With regard to the GAO report, Savoie stated that several members 
of the AICPA questioned the representativeness of the sample of problem 
cases examiped by the GAO and observed that 
the case examples presented were not a representative sample, 
and that the bad effects illustrated in these cases were caused 
not by the absence of standards but by the contractors' failure 
to adhere to cost-accounting standards already prescribed by 
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section XV of the Armed Services procurement regulations. 22 
As indicated in the following quotation, Savoie also questioned 
some of the statements of the GAO report, pointed out areas in which it 
was weak, and disagreed with the GAO's idea of the function of cost 
accounting standards. 
The documentation on cost-accounting standards to date does not 
give consideration to one of the most important aspects of cost 
assignment, or cost allocation, which is the interrelationship 
of total costs between products and activities. This applies 
to a mixture of commercial products, a mixture of governmental 
products, or a mixture of both. 
The fundamental problem is proper and equitable allocation of 
costs according to their real causes and benefiting sources 
regardless of the cost type or origin. 
Many of the major problems stated in the Comptroller General's 
report are not necessarily founded in the method or concepts of 
cost accounting. Often cost determination is but a symptom, 
whereas the real problem is insufficiently defined contracting 
procedures. 
Two of the major problems (1) presenting costs in the same for-
mat as original contract estimates, and (2) changing cost assign-
ments after a contract is in process, can be corrected without 
cost-accounting standards but with appropriate cost-accounting 
specifications expressed in the contract terms. 
In defining standards, it may be appropriate for the framers to 
consider what should be covered in contract negotiations as well 
as how to account for the contract. Also, for practical reasons 
it may be prudent to concentrate initially on a specific indus-
try or a limited number of industries because the standards may 
vary for different industries.23 
Savoie, while not agreeing with everything contained in the GAO 
report, did state that: "Overall, however, our general impression is 
that the Comptroller General's report of January 19, 1970, sets forth a 
reasonable conceptual basis on which cost-accounting standards may be 
24 developed." He also suggested that the word "uniform" not be used, 
that the term "cost-accounting principles" be used instead of "cost-
accounting standards," and that the standards be broad in terms of 
application. 
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Savoie summarized the major conclusions and recommendations of the 
AICPA as follows: 
1. The "new machinery" preferably should call for an 
independent agency appointed by the President, consisting 
of a small number of members, such as five, all of whom 
should have competence in cost accounting. 
2. At least two members should be drawn from outside the 
Federal Government and at least one of them should be 
from the field of public accounting. 
3. The law should not exempt the agency from provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 
4. The law should require the agency to consult with the 
accounting profession and industry representatives.25 
In responding to questions from Senators, Savoie stated that the 
AIPCA agreed that cost-accounting standards were both feasible and de-
sirable and that with respect to economic feasibility" ... there are 
enough advantages even without any firm figures on costs involved or 
26 potential savings to warrant proceeding." 
Testimony of Max Lehrer 
Max Lehrer, vice president, defense finance, of the RCA Corp. 
represented the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) before the 
committee. In stating EIA's opposition to uniform cost-accounting 
standards, Lehrer said: "We believe this provision is unwarranted, 
unnecessary and unworkable. We believe adequate laws are already on the 
27 books to protect the Government's interest in procurement matters." 
He argued that instead of reducing costs on Government contracts, there 
would be increased costs res~lting from the development, implementation, 
and maintenance of the proposed standards. He also argued that there 
was no proper definition of the term "uniform cost-accounting standards." 
Willing to concede that the development of the 4-niform 
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cost-accounting standards might be feasible, Lehrer claimed there was no 
evidence to demonstrate" ••• that greater uniformity is necessary or 
28 desirable." Giving examples using a diversity of companies, Lehrer 
suggested the need for a diversity of accounting practices. 
Lehrer referred to various statements from the GAO report and 
claimed that" •.• the GAO report contains a number of statements which 
clearly indicate that the uniform cost-accounting standards are not 
feasible." 29 
Regarding the 120 cases used by the GAO to illustrate problem areas 
in defense contracting, Lehrer stated: "We believe that any thought 
that these cases represent excess charges to the Government involves a 
serious misinterpretation."30 He maintained that all the facts were not 
presented in the GAO report and further stated: 
It is particularly noteworthy that the majority of cases cited 
represented situations in which there was a difference of opin-
ion between the contractor and the Government auditor. It is 
our understanding that in many cases, the contractor's position 
was upheld by either the contracting officer or the Board of 
Contract Appeals.31 
Lehrer argued that the sample was not representative. 
Near the end of his statement Lehrer observed that in the view of 
EIA the feasibility study resulted primarily from Admiral Rickover's 
claim of a $2 billion a year savings on defense contracts. Lehrer 
claimed there was no evidence to support such an assertion and said that 
figures provided by the Renegotiation Board demonstrated that the idea 
of a $2 billion saving was farfetched. At this point in Lehrer's 
testimony, Proxmire challenged Lehrer's interpretation of what the 
Renegotiation Board had said and after an exchange of words Lehrer said: 
I would submit, Senator, that the degree of error in inter-
preting the Renegotiation Board's statistics is probably a lot 
narrower than the degree of error attributable to the sweeping 
statements of savings.32 
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During the question and answer session Senator Cranston (D., Cali-
fornia) requested that Senator Mondale (D., Minnesota) allow the compan-
ies alluded to in the GAO report to respond with a written statement to 
represent their point of view on the 120 cases referred to in the report. 
Mondale asked the GAO to supply the names of the companies but the 
Comptroller General refused to give the committee the names of the 
companies because of his pledge of confidentiality to industry. 
Testimony of Karl ~ Harr 
President of and representing the Aerospace Industries Association 
of America, Inc. (AlA), Karl G. Harr began his testimony by saying: 
"That which is feasible is often neither necessary nor desirable."33 
Mr. Harr said that although the AlA did not agree that the GAO report 
established the feasibility of promulgating uniform cost-accounting 
standards, it would concede such feasibility. Arguing that cost-
accounting principles (emphasis added) were both feasible and desirable, 
Harr suggested that such principles were already in existence and that 
none of the authorities behind such principles " seeks to affect the 
/ 
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accounting system of a particular company or type of company." Harr 
also suggested that conflicts might result between the proposed legis-
lation, the Internal Revenue Code, and other related legislation. 
Furthermore, he said that AlA was fearful that one of two things might 
result from the proposed legislation: "Either we will have to sub-
stantially alter o~r accounting systems, or we will in effect have to 
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establish dual systems--an economically absurd result." Also, Harr 
stated that additional regulations were not needed because: 
Not only is every American public corporation subject to con-
trols of both its own and public auditors in terms of procedures 
and principles, but the defense segment of American industry is 
the most scrutinized, observed, controlled, and audited business 
in the history of the world.36 
In a dialogue between Proxmire and Harr the following exchange 
occurred: 
Senator Proxmore .... let me ask you if regulations were to 
restrict your freedom to choose the accounting principles most 
advantageous to you, would you not, as a businessman, have a 
duty to oppose them? 
Mr. Harr. Would we have a duty to oppose them? 
Senator Proxmire. Oppose them, certainly. 
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Mr. Harr. Well, in a sense, I suppose that every day with respect 
to every regulation, every determination or every law or 
ordinance that affects an industry, you have an obligation to 
promote and defend the interests of your company within the 
established system.37 
Testimony of Joseph ~ Bacsik 
Joseph G. Bacsik, chairman of the Procurement and Finance Council 
of AIA also represented AIA at the hearings. In his testimony he pre-
sented the following four reasons as to why AIA opposed uniform cost-
accounting standards. 
First there is neither a generally acceptable definition nor a 
common understanding of the meaning of the term "uniform cost-
accounting standards," and feasibility has not been demonstrated. 
Second, the need for imposing standards has not been estab-
ished or justified. 
Third, credible evidence has not been offered to demonstrate 
that the mandatory imposition of standards would accomplish 
anything beneficial. 
Finally, as has been state-d by Mr. Harr, there are potential 
legislative conflicts and unforeseen consequences inherent in 
the unlimited authority granted by the proposed legislation.38 
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Testimony of James N. Donovan 
In his testimony, James N. Donovan, representing WEMA, expressed 
concern about the impact of S. 3302 upon small manufacturers by 
questioning whether the benefits to be gained would outweight the adverse 
effects of the proposal. He claimed that a careful study of the GAO 
report did not appear to support the conclusion that un1iform accounting 
standards are feasible. Donovan stated that his group had devoted much 
attention to the statement that there would be no significant increase 
in costs arising from the legislation under review. Donovan seriously 
questioned the statement and pointed out that each cost-accounting 
system should be geared to operations and therefore would in many cases 
be unique. To make changes in the existing systems would result in 
additional cost that would have to be charged to both Government and 
nongovernment work. Donovan stated: "We therefore, would be forced to 
absorb costs for a function that did not add any value to our accounting 
39 information used to control our operations." 
In concluding his statement, Donovan suggested that the proposal 
had not had an adequate review by subcontractors and smaller companies. 
Donovan also pointed out that no economic cost feasibility study had 
been done. 
In the question and answer session Senator Cranston asked if 
Donovan felt S. 3302 or either of the GAO alternatives would have any 
effect on cost-overruns. Donovan replied: 
I do not see where it could have any bearing whatsoever Con-
tract overruns occur because someone did not estimate the 
technical problems, for example, in developing a product, and 
it just took more engineering time than anybody thought it 
would in the beginning. 
I think overruns are the result of operations rather than the 
result of poor accounting.40 
In the conclusion to his written statement, Donovan made the 
following remarks that concisely state some of his and previous 
witnesses' views. 
Our members view the government as one of many customers and 
one who usually buys less than half of their output. It is 
simply not conceivable to them that it is proper for any one 
customer to tell them how to do their cost accounting or any 
other function which cuts across their whole business. 
There are problems in cost accounting for negotiated contracts, 
as there are in most human affairs. The GAO has reported the 
recollections of auditors in some 120 cases. Although the 
circumstances surrounding each case are so abbreviated as to 
preclude judgment as to the validity of the alleged abuses~ 
let's assume they are entirely valid. Our review indicates 
that most of them are violations of present ASPR principles 
or of the company's accounting rules. This is bad, should 
stop, and presumably has because of the auditors' work. These 
cases even without statistical evidence as to their frequency, 
provide sound arguments for good auditing and dealing with 
honest contractors. However, they provide no basis for the 
passage of S. 3302. Given the same type of administration and 
the same mix of dishonest contractors the abuses will be 
identical. 
Little has been said about the cost of "new machinery" for UCAS. 
It is clear from the GAO Report that any standards-setting body 
has a complex and lengthy job requiring continuing research. 
We are not in a position to estimate the costs, but suggest that 
serious consideration of this cost factor proceed (sic) the 
establishment of any such new bureaucracy. 
In view of the above it seems to us that the passage of S. 3302 
is another case of overreaction. Some problems do exist and 
may be sufficiently prevalent to need significant corrective 
administrative actions. This can be accomplished by minor 
modifications to the Section XV Cost Principles and better 
administration by both the government and the contractors. It 
would seem reasonable, for example, that contractors with sig-
nificant amounts of government business should routinely dis-
close their accounting principles and be required to adhere to 
them. However, nothing yet presented demonstrates the need 
for broad legislation of tqe type proposed.41 
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Testimony of Charles W. Stewart 
As president and spokesman for the Machinery and Allied Products 
Institute ( MAPI), Charles W. Stewart began his testimony by stating: 
There has been reference to the fact that, at least theoretic-
ally, contract cost principles under section XV, are not 
applicable to fixed price contracts. I would say in this con-
nection that as a practical matter that is not true in the 
great majority of cases. 
It is true that the rules say they shall be a guide as to 
fixed price contracts but when auditors approach companies 
with respect to fixed-price contracts and suggest that ASPR 
be used, it is a bit like an IRS agent asking for an extension 
on an audit. He always gets it.42 
Stewart described the selection of the 120 cases used in the GAO 
report as follows: "I think the Comptroller General said to DCAA, 
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'Give me some horror cases.'" Stewart said he felt there were aspects 
of the GAO sample that were suspect. 
Responding to a question from Senator Cranston, Stewart lamented 
the shotgun and piecemeal approach with respect to Government procure-
ment problems. He referred to the Holifield commission which had the 
responsibility of investigating all procurement issues, to an ongoing 
GAO profit study, and to an ongoing Pentagon study regarding the 
44 techniques of procurement and ASPR. Stewart suggested that all of 
these issues, including the cost accounting standards question, be 
consolidated and handled by the Holifield commission. 
Stewart, like some previous witnesses, expressed confusion as to 
the 'proper definition of cost-accounting standards. At one point in 
his testimony, he said the word "irresponsible" would be too strong to 
describe the action on the part of the Comptroller General of submitting 
a recommendation to the Government " •.• without being able to say what 
it will cost or 'without being able to offer a cost-benefit analysis."45 
Instead of "irresponsible" Stewart chose the word "unwise." 
In his prepared written statement, Stewart summarized MAPI's 
objections to uniform cost accounting standards as follows. 
1. The term "uniform cost accounting standards" is nowhere 
understandably defined. 
2. The need for such standards has not been adequately 
demonstrated. 
3. The cost of promulgating such standards is unknown and 
this uncertainty is matched by the uncertainty of benefits 
to be derived from UCAS. 
4. Adoption of UCAS is likely to influence if not control the 
normal development of commercial cost accounting practice 
and may well be the precursor of demands for uniform 
accounting standards or systems. 
5. Commercially oriented companies which, although important 
to the national defense, have substantial commercial mar-
kets for their products will have another important reason 
to abandon the defense market.46 
Stewart also presented five recommendations for Congress in the event 
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Congress decided to require the promulgation of uniform cost-accounting 
standards: (1) The standards should not be used to achieve uniformity 
in cost accounting systems, (2) No time limit should be placed on the 
development of standards, (3) The agency in charge of developing and 
applying UCAS should coordinate its program with interested professional 
organizatio~s, defense and nondefense industry, and affected Governmental 
agencies, (4) Congress should obtain input from the Armed Services 
Committees before taking action, and (5) " .•• Congress might wish to 
consider directing the Comptroller General to draft uniform accounting 
standards but not to finally promulgate them until Congress has had the 
\ 47 
opportunity to review the final product." 
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Testimony .£!_ Vice Adm. !G_ Q:_ Rickover 
Rickover, the first witness on the third day of the hearings, began 
his testimony by repeating a charge he often made at other appearances 
before Congressional committees: 
Under today's accounting rules, it is virtually impossible to 
tell how much defense equipment actually costs to manufacture 
or how much profit contractors make in producing it--unless 
the GoveLnment spends months reconstructing each supplier's 
books.48 
Saying that he was putting in perspective the arguments of some in 
industry who say that present regulations are sufficient, that defense 
profits are too low, and that the Renegotiation Board takes care of the 
rare instances in which the Government is overcharged, Rickover quoted 
the following statement from Peter Drucker, a management expert. 
Far too few management scientists for instance realize that 
practically every single definition of accounting is based on 
assumptions of high metaphysical content--and that any accoun-
tant worth his salt, can convert any profit figure into a loss 
figure, or vice versa, if given control of the accounting 
definitions, all unquestionably, 'Within the limits of the 
proper accounting practice. ,49 
Rickover then claimed that contractors control the accounting definitions 
used in determining what costs and profits are reported to interested 
Government agencies and to stockholders and also that the Renegotiation 
Board accepts at face value the reports given to it by industry. 
Rickover referred to the 120 cases the GAO cited in its' report, 
and stated that the " 120 examples of contractors juggling costs to 
their advantage under existing flexible accounting practices .• , are 
less than l percent of what actually goes on. You can find similar 
examples in any defense plant."50 Rickover then cited four cases with 
which he was personally familiar. 
Rickover strongly recommended that Congress require the Comptroller 
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General to develop and promulgate uniform cost accounting standards for 
defense contracts within 18 months as specified in S. 3302. Alluding to 
history, he said: "Since the time of Fabius the Cunctator, the strategy 
of defeat by delay has a long history of success. The only way to over-
come this tactic is to establish a timetable for the work and hold to it 
51 
rigidly." Later, the following exchange took place between Proxmire 
and Rickover. 
Senator Proxmire. Admiral, the Comptroller General says he 
should not be forced to work on a timetable in setting up 
uniform cost accounting standards. He says that especially 
on overhead, depreciation, and so forth, he should not be 
limited at all . 
What do you think of starting a project without having a 
completion date. 
Admiral Rickover: Mr. Chairman, I only wish my work could 
be conducted that way. But I have timetables set for me 
for everything I do, and I require timetables of all my people. 
Otherwise you develop the "manana" habit. With 2,500 auditors 
in his own organization and 3,000 others in the Defense Depart-
ment to call on, Mr. Chairman--if he does not want ~ do the52 job, why not turn it over to me? .! will do it in 18 months. 
(emphasis added) 
Rickover, in replying to the argument that uniform cost-accounting 
standards would hurt small businesses, claimed that the standards would 
primarily apply to the 100 largest defense contractors and to their 
subcontractors out of about 4 1/2 million firms in this country. 
Rickover stated that the standards would apply" ... at most to 1 or 2 
percent of all the companies in the country."53 
At one point Proxmire asked Rickover if increased cost was not the 
real reason for industry opposition, then what was the reason? Rickover 
replied: 
---- ---- ---- ----- --- ---- ---- ----
The opposition is like this: If I have a private monopoly and 
someone is trying to make it public, of course I am opposed to 
it •••. 
Look, industry is constantly claiming through their paid lobby-
ists that they do not make enough profit on defense business. 
If that is the case, what objection can they have to our find-
ing out what profits they actually make? If their profits are 
really too low, this would help them get higher profits. 54 
Rickover, in response to questions from Senator Proxmire and 
Senator Brooke (R., Massachusetts) regarding the effect of cost-
accounting standards on cost overruns, stated that he thought cost-
accounting standards would have" ..• a salutary effect on cost over-
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runs." However, Rickover pointed out that overruns are not entirely 
due to accounting systems but also are affected by the state of the art, 
the state of technology, and by the kind of management in charge. "But 
the accounting system will show you very quickly where your faults are 
from the money standpoint and the management standpoint in the factory." 56 
Indicating that cost overruns can always occur because of inflation and 
because much defense work is development work, Rickover still maintained 
that accounting standards would" ••• define to those responsible in the 
Defense Department and in industry where their money is going and why."57 
Rickover, in answering a question from Proxmire, suggested that all 
other witnesses, other than the GAO, at the hearings had a special 
interest in the outcome of the hearings. He drew laughter with the 
following remark: 
You ask those accountants and lobbyists who come here to 
testify whose flag they fly. They will display a dual flag, 
like the one of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.58 
Senator Brooke said he,felt there was the possibility of serious 
abuses in defense contracting because of the relationships between some 
Department of Defense procurement officers and companies which employ 
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former Defense Department personnel. In a rather lengthy reply to 
Brooke's statement, Rickover indicated that he felt many problems in 
defense procurement could be traced to such relationships. 
In his concluding remarks, Rickover stated that he felt if Congress 
pursued the matter of cost-accounting standards, the Government would 
save large sums of money and the country would get a more effective 
Defense establishment. 
Testimony of~~ Seidman 
J. S. Seidman, as past president of the AICPA and at the time of 
the hearings a member of the Accounting Principles Board, began his 
testimony by saying that he was representing no one. Seidman pointed 
out that during World War II, while serving as a captain in the Navy, 
he was involved in the establishment of cost and audit principles in 
Navy procurement. 
After briefly reviewing his testimony given at the 1968 Senate 
hearings, Seidman commented: 
Sadly must I report that my testimony of 2 years ago still holds 
good today. Considering that $40 billion a year of taxpayer 
money is riding on defense procurement, and that contract prices 
are pretty much geared to contractor costs and profits, there 
simply must be uniform cost accounting standards, if reported 
costs and profits are to be a useful guide. It is meaningless 
to compare costs among sup~liers and have a handle on which 
contractor to select, unless they are all figuring costs in 
the same way, on the same standards. 59 
Seidman said that he favored putting the Comptroller General in 
charge of the assignment of formulating the standards because of his 
experience, competence, and independence but that he thought the task 
would take more than 18 months. In responding to a question from 
I 
Proxmire, Seidman said" ... in my opinion this is a more comprehensive, 
60 
and even continuing task than we think." 
After hearing Seidman's entire statement, Senator Mondale made 
the following observation. 
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I think it is significant, at least at this point, that virtually 
every independent source of testimony from sophisticated sources, 
that is sources that understanding (sic) accounting, has favored 
some form of revision in this field. 
There have been some differences about timing and the insti-
tutional nature of reform, but all of them have endorsed the 
concepts, No. 1, that there is--a very serious problem and, 
No. 2, that we ought to move toward some accounting reform 
to overcome it. 
This has been true of the General Accounting Office, the 
American Institute for (sic) Certified Public Accountants--
I think you were once national president--and several other 
outside accounting sources, and from Admiral Rickover who 
speaks from the Government side, having had to deal with this 
procurement problem. Even the Defense Department has now 
made a statement, as well as the Budget Bureau--all generally 
in accord. 
The only testimony we are receiving which argues that nothing 
should be done are from sources where it can be said6i finan-
cial stake exists in perpetuating present confusion. 
In responding to Mondale's observation, Seidman referred to human 
behavior and stated: 
I think that if I were given a choice about having plenty of 
elbow-room about an accounting treatment, as against having 
one preset standard applicable to my facts, I think it would 
be perfectl62natural and human for me to preserve flexibility 
for myself. 
Seidman refused to put a dollar figure on the cost of developing 
and applying uniform cost accounting standards, but speculated that the 
cost of not doing so might be greater. Suggesting that such standards 
would facilitate reporting and auditing, provide for comparability 
and consistency, and eliminate much of the controversy surrounding 
defense contracting, he argued that since all parties should be playing 
by the ~ame rules, " •.. all of these thiiJ.gS fire bound to pay off."63 
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In responding to a question from Senator Cranston, Seidman indicated 
that he felt uniform cost accounting standards would reduce disputes 
between contractors and the Government. 
Testimony of Leonard Spacek 
As chairman of Arthur Andersen & Co., Leonard Spacek spoke on be-
half of his firm in his appearance before the committee. In his 
opening statement, Spacek said he was a director of the Logistics 
Management Institute (LMI) and a member of the Industry Advisory 
Council (IAC) of the Department of Defense. 
While agreeing that cost-accounting standards are feasible, 
Spacek urged the Senate to approve Alternative No. 2 because he did not 
feel the Comptroller General should both develop and judge new and 
improved accounting and also because he felt the addition of this task 
to the Comptroller General's duties would have a dilutive effect upon 
his existing position. 
Spacek suggested that the Board appointed by the President should 
appoint a commission to establish the cost standards that have been 
proposed after allowing for certain exchanges of ideas with interested 
parties. The commission and the Board would be permanent and all 
decisions of the Board would be final. 
Spacek said that his interpretation of the objective of cost 
standards was to "' increase the flow of cost information with less 
64 
effort and le~s e~pense to the Government.'" He also volunteered the 
following criteria or principles to give direction to the proposed 
Board and a newly created commission. 
1. Cost accounting standards represent definitions of cost 
accumulations and divisions of costs that will be brief 
and yet be sufficiently detailed to cover circumstances 
that no one can visualize at the time of drafting. Such 
cost definitions will be sufficient to give the cost 
information necessary to facilitate improved understand-
ing among the Government departments, the suppliers, and 
Congress--a sorely needed objective today. 
2. The cost definitions will be based upon fairness to the 
contractor and his stockholders, and the customer, which 
is the Government, as well as the public, who are users 
of commercial products that will be jointly produced. 
3. The cost definitions will include all costs--expended or 
incurred, disbursed or imputed--including the costs of 
(a) inflation; (b) capital (c) changed work; and (d) 
Government--furnished property. Costs that are conse-
quences of erroneous accounting or the result of imprudent 
expenditures that should not have been incurred, will be 
disallowed. 
4. It is realized as a basic premise of the cost accounting 
standards that where Government and non-Government work 
is jointly performed common costs be allocated to both 
types of work in an equitable manner, and the benefits of 
reduced costs created by the combined volume also be 
properly recognized as affecting both Government and 
non-Government work. 
5. The cost standards shall be applicable initially to all 
contractors having consolidated billings to the Govern-
m~t for products or services in the 2 fiscal years 
ending June 30, 1969, and 1970 of $5 million or more; 
and the standards will apply to all contractors 5 years 
subsequent to the effective date of the standards. 
6. It will be presumed that the Government and the contrac-
tors shall agree, at the time the services are requested 
or contracted for, to maintain a reasonably consistent 
subdivision of the work performed under the contract 
between proposals and actual costs. Consistency is 65 
important, but it is secondary to proper accounting. 
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In a letter to IAC members on January 21, 1970, (the letter is a 
part of the record of the hearings) Spacek stated: 
"Cost Standards" will provide better communication which in 
turn will result in a better understanding of costs by DOD, 
Congress and suppliers. I believe it might well be that 
CO$ts will increase, not decrease, but tqe communication 
benefits from "Cost Standards" will make the cost incurred 
better understood.66 
Spacek, in response to a question from Proxmire, indicated that he 
thought that if any additional cost and effort were required to adopt 
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uniform cost accounting standards, then such additional cost and effort 
was justified. 
Testimony of ~ Wayne Keller 
Speaking on behalf of the National Association of Accountants 
(NAA), I. Wayne Keller, chairman, Committee on Management Accounting 
Practices of the NAA stated that while the NAA endorsed the intent of 
S. 3302, some members of the association expressed reservations as to 
whether" .•• the new standards will in fact be an improvement over 
67 those that now exist." Keller suggested three things to consider 
in developing standards: (1) Formulate general concepts upon which to 
develop specific rules, (2) Do not have an arbitrary deadline for doing 
the work, and (3) The work should be done by an organization of the 
Federal Government. 
Proxmire asked Keller if he agreed with the claim that" ..• cost 
accounting standards would be too costly and would produce no signifi-
68 
cant results." Keller responded: 
No, sir. I think that they would eliminate many areas of 
controversy which are time-consuming today. I certainly 
agree with Mr. Spacek's testimony that with these standards 
we have the opportunity to direct our efforts toward con-
trol of costs which will save money for the Government rather 
than in negotiation of prices and profits.69 
Testimony of Joseph ~ Sciarrino 
Joseph A. Sciarrino, technical director of the Financial Executives 
Institute (FEI), appeared before the committee on behalf of the members 
of the FEI. Sciarrino stated that the FEI was opposed to S. 3302 for 
two reasons: 
First, we do not believe that uniform cost accounting standards 
are truly feasible in the sense contemplated by Public Law 
90-370, the precursor to this bill, and the hearing which 
preceded its enactment • 
••• Second, we recognize that some problems do exist in 
applying sound cost principles to Government contracts. How-
ever, we do not believe that legislation is required to change 
existing cost accounting standards. These changes can and 
should be accomplished within the framework of existing pro-
curement regulations under the administrative powers already 
delegated to the departments and executive agencies.70 
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Sciarrino challenged Rickover's claim of a $2 billion saving and 
also the claims concerning the 120 cases cited in the GAO study. He 
suggested that about 35 percent of the cases appeared to be pricing 
problems and stated that the balance" ... are either clear violations 
of existing regulations or represent differences of opinion between 
contractors and auditors." 71 
Sciarrino alluded to requirements of the IRS, DCAA, GAO, SEC, 
good industrial accounting practice, CPA's, and the Renegotiation Board 
to argue that existing controls and requirements were sufficient in the 
areas of consistency, disclosure, and record keeping. He stated that 
the FEI did not think the proposed legislation would eliminate the 
alleged abuses and excesses in defense procurement or improve 
communications between the Government, industry, and the general public. 
The FEI expr~ssed a preference for Alternative No. 2 but requested 
equal representation from industry, professional groups, and Government. 
In addition, they felt the independent Board should have 12 to 15 
members. 
Pages 565-573 of the committee hearings contain a copy of the 
"Financial Executives Institute Position Paper on Uniform Cost 
Accounting Standards." The paper is divided into the following sections: 
Actions Leading to the Feasibility Study, Evaluation of GAO's Positions, 
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Evaluation of the GAO Report, Suppqrt for UCAS Other Than GAO, FEI 
Position, and What Should Be Done. The following is a summary state-
ment of the FEI position. 
Uniform cost accounting standards are not feasible in the 
sense contemplated by Public Law 90-370 and the Hearings 
which preceded its enactment in 1968. 
No new evidence has been provided through the feasibility 
study authorized by Public Law 90-370, or through other 
sources, to indicate that legislation is required to pro-
mulgate UCAS or to demonstrate the need for UCAS. 
The uniform cost accounting standards that the GAO believes 
are feasible h~ve not been identified or defined adequately 
to provide an understanding of what is contemplated. There 
is no substantiation that such standards and advance agree-
ments, as recommended in the feasibility study, are 
economically feasible and practical, or that they would solve 
the accounting problems associated with applying sound cost 
principles to government contracts. 
Legislation is not necessary and is not recommended as a 
solution to problems that have been identified. Desirable 
changes to present cost accounting standards can be accom-
plished within the framework of established procurement 
regulation and delegated administrative powers. 
An Advisory Commission, to be established by the Secretary 
of Defense, is advocated as providing the best approach to 
equitable and practical solutions to existing accounting 
problems. This Commission, with equal representation from 
government, industry, and professional organizations, should 
examine the problems of, and relating to, defense cost 
accounting and pro7osal pricing and make recommendations for 
corrective action. 2 
Testimony ~ Adm. Joseph ~ Lyle 
President, and on behalf, of the National Security Industrial 
Association, J~seph M. Lyle, the last witness, argued that new legis~ 
lation was unnecessary in order to bring about necessary and feasible 
action concerning cost accounting standards because adequate standards 
already existed in section XV of ASPR. 73 Lyle said it was his 
personal opinion that Alternative No. 2 was the preferable legislative 
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action to take if any action were taken because he felt the audit and 
administrative functions should be separated~ 
In response to Lyle's comment about new legislation being unneces-
sary, Proxmire remarked: 
You place a great deal of emphasis on the notion that this 
isn't necessary and the agency doesn't need it and present 
law is adequate. Yet I find the present agencies unanimously 
disagree with that view. "The Bureau of the Budget, the 
Department of Defense, the space agencies, the AEC, all 
of them, as well as the other principal procurement agencies 
of the Government, agreed that this was good and necessary 
and desirable. 
Now I would think that you would expect a committee of 
Congress to pay a lot of attention to what the agencies say 
they need. It is perfectly clear, it seems to me, that these 
agencies don't have an axe to grind. On the other hand it 
would seem to me that contractors have a clear economic and 
financial and profit incentive for keeping as much flexibility 
as they can. It is a good way to maximize their profits, even 
though the effect is to increase costs to the Federal 
Government.74 
Written Statements of Other Parties 
In addition to the 16 witnesses appearing before the committee, the 
records of the hearings contained written statements from the following 
associations: Associated General Contractors of America; Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, Inc.; National Association of Manufacturers; 
and Shipbuilders Council of America. Without exception, the four 
associations expressed opposition to the proposed legislation. 
Summary 
Sixteen witnesses appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Production and Stabilization of the Committee on Banking and Currency. 
Eight witnesses supported and eight witnesses opposed the proposed cost 
accounting standards legislation. With one exception, representatives 
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of industry associations expressed opposition to the proposed legisla-
tion. Representatives of professional accounting associations, with 
the exception of the FEI representative, expressed varying degrees of 
support for the proposed legislation. 
Senate Report 91-890 
Introduction 
On the basis of the Senate Subcommittee hearing, an executive 
session of the Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization, and an 
executive session of the full committee, the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency submitted "Report No. 91-890" to accompany S. 3302, 
as amended. The basic purpose of the legislation is stated as follows: 
S. 3302 extends the Defense Production Act until June 30, 1972, 
and provides for the establishment of uniform cost accounting 
standards for certain defense contracts. The standards would 
be promulgated by a five member Cost-Accounting Standard Board 
appointed by the Comptroller General who would be designated 
as Chairman of the Board. 
The Board is directed to promulgate cost accounting standards 
designed to achieve uniformity and consistency in the cost 
accounting principles followed by defense contractors. 
The Board is also directed to issue regulations requiring 
defense contractors to disclose their own cost accounting 
practices in advance of a contract and to follow those 
practices consistently. 
The legislation would be applicable on all negotiated defense 
prime contracts and subcontra~ts where the contractor's sales 
to the Government in the preceding fiscal year did not exceed 
$25 million. 75 
Apparently, someone made an error in the drafting or printing of 
the last quoted paragraph. On page five of "Senate Report 91-890" in 
a section by section analysis of S. 3302 the Senate report states: 
Section 719 (h) (2).--This paragraph exempts defense contrac-
tors or subcontractors from the requirements of section 719 
if their annual sales volume with the Government did not 
exceed $25 million in the preceding fiscal year.76 
Also pages seven through nine of Senate "Report 91-890" make several 
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references to the fact that the exemption applies to those contractors 
whose annual sales volume did not exceed $25 million in the preceding 
fiscal year. 
Need for Uniform Cost Accounting Standards 
In presenting the "need for uniform cost accounting standards," 
the committee report briefly summarizes the arguments for such standards 
as given in the previous hearings. In addition, the report drew an 
analogy between cost overruns and the lack of uniform cost accounting 
standards by stating: "While the lack of cost accounting standards are 
not nearly as spectacular or dramatic as giant cost overruns on major 
weapons systems, their impact on the Federal taxpayer may be equally 
severe."77 The report (exclusive of additional views) concludes the 
section on the "need for uniform cost accounting standards" with this 
statement:. 
The committee was impressed with the thorough report of the 
GAO and the many helpful comments received from the account-
ing profession. Uniform cost accounting standards will not 
solve all of our defense procurement problems. Nonetheless, 
their adoption will constitute a major and substantial 
reform. 78 
Additional Views of Senators Brooke, Goodell, 
Mondale, Muskie, Proxmire, and Sparkman 
Senators Brooke (R., Massachusetts), Goodell, (R., New York), 
Mondale (D., Minnesota), Muskie (D., Maine), Proxmire (D., Wisconsin), 
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and Sparkman (D., Alabama) indicated that by an 8 to 6 vote of the full 
committee the bill was amended, and in their view weakened in terms of 
legislative effectiveness, to exempt all defense contractors whose 
11 ••• annual volume of business with the Government in the preceding 
fiscal year was less than $25 million. 1179 The Senators stated that in 
addition to their opposition, the GAO also opposed the amendment. 
Stating that the 11 ••• ostensible purpose of the amendment is to 
lighten the record keeping burden on 'small' defense contractors who 
bl ff d h h . . d ,.80 presuma y cannot a or to c ange t e1r account1ng proce ures •.• , 
the Senators suggested that the records of the hearings indicate there 
would be no substantial burden on any defense contractor, no matter 
what the size. 
The Senators also expressed concern because the bill as amended 
would not require contractors" .•• doing business of less than $25 
million a year to disclose their cost-accounting practices in advance 
of a contract or agree to follow those practices consistently."81 The 
Senators also pointed out that the amended bill would not require 
compliance with Federal Government accounting standards for a firm with 
a $200 million contract if in the previous year the firm had only $20 
82 
million of defense contracts. In addition, the Senators referred to 
a letter to Senator Proxmire from the Comptroller General to indicate 
that the amended bill was administratively unworkable. 
In summarizing their views, the Senators said that the $25 
million exemption amendment is: 
(1) Totally unjustified since there are not substantial costs 
of implementation; 
(2) Needlessly broad since it also exempts contractors from 
disclosing their own practices and adhering to them; 
(3) Grossly excessive in its definition of small business; 
(4) Loosely drafted with the result of possibly exempting much 
larger defense contractors; 
(5) Administratively unworkable; and 
(6) Unnecessarily rigid in view of the flexible administrative 
authority §iven the Board to exempt small firms if 
warranted. 3 
Additional Views of Senator Cranston 
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Senator Cranston (D., California) questioned whether the proposed 
legislation could satisfy the goals set forth by proponents of the bill 
and suggested that current ASPR was doing a sufficient job. Cranston 
doubted the claimed $2 billion savings per year and also questioned 
having the Comptroller General serve in both a legislative and executive 
capacity. Cranston concluded the statement of his views by saying: 
"I am not convinced that the case has been adequately made that this 
legislation will prove to be an effective instrument to prevent the 
84 
abuses which it is designed to correct." 
Additional Views of Senator Bennett 
Senator Bennett (R., Utah) suggested that: "Sufficient informa-
tion was not included in the cases reported by the GAO for a determina-
. b d h h 11 . . 1 . 1185 t1on to e rna e as to w et er a cases were 1n v1o at1on. Admitting 
that there probably was a need for improvements in present procedures, 
Bennett argued that this need did not warrant a misrepresentation of 
the facts. 
Bennett challenged the committee report statement that the GAO 
report had been thorough. Bennett suggested that the GAO report was 
not thorough because only orie side was presented in the 120 cases used 
to show improper practices by contractors. 
Pointing out that the GAO report and professional groups appearing 
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before the Senate committee gave no dollar estimate of cost savings, 
Bennett indicated that the promulgation of accounting standards could 
result in increased costs. Bennett also raised questions regarding the 
control of the Board by the Comptroller General and the possible loss to 
Congress of an independent audit agency. Noting that the Comptroller 
General had recommended the establishment of an independent Board with 
members appointed by the President, Bennett said he offered an amendment 
in committee to set up such a Board, " .•. but the amendment failed on a 
86 
tie-vote." Bennett also referred to a copy of a letter from the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the chairman of the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency in which the administration gave 
support to an independent Board appointed by the President. 87 
Report 91-890 that accompanied S. 3302 was dated May 21, 1970. 
The Senate debate on S. 3302 did not occur until July 9, 1970. In 
June and July, 1970, the House Committee on Banking and Currency was 
also looking into the cost accounting standards issue. 
Hearings Before the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency 
Introduction 
The House Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings on 
June 16 through 20, June 22 and July 7, 1970, on H. R. 17880, a bill to 
amend the Defense Production Act of 1950, and for other purposes. 
Section 718 of H. R. 17880 contained the following features; among 
others. 
(a) The Comptroller General, as an agent of the Congress, shall 
promulgate cost-accounting standards designed to achieve 
uniformity and consistency in the cost-acc.ounting practices 
followed by defense contractors and subcontractors under 
Federal contracts. Such promulgated standards shall be 
used by all relevant Federal agencies and by defense con-
tractors and subcontractors in estimating, accumulating, 
and reporting costs in connection with the pricing, 
administration, and settlement of all negotiated prime 
contract and subcontract defense procurements with the 
United States Government. 
(b) The Comptroller General is authorized to make, promulgate, 
amend, and rescind rules and regulations for the implemen-
tation of cost-accounting standards promulgated under sub-
section (a). Such regulations shall require contractors 
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and subcontractors to disclose in writing their cost-
accounting practices including methods of distinguishing 
direct costs, and to agree to a contract price adjustment, 
with interest, for any increased costs incurred by the 
United States because of the contractor's failure to comply 
with duly promulgated cost-accounting standards or to follow 
consistently his disclosed cost-accounting practices in 
pricing contract proposals and in accumulating and reporting 
contract performance cost data. 
(c) The rules, regulations, cost-accounting standards, and 
modifications thereof promulgated hereunder shall have the 
full force and effect of law and shall become effective not 
less than thirty days after publication in the Federal 
Register. 
(d) For the purpose of determining whether the contractor or 
subcontractor has complied with duly promulgated cost-
accounting standards and has followed consistently his 
disclosed cost-accounting practices, the contracting agency 
concerned and the Comptroller General or any representative 
of either shall have the right to examine and make copies 
of any documents, papers, or records of such contractor or 
subcontractor. 
(e) (1) There shall be established in the Office of the Comp-
troller General a Cost-Accounting Standards Advisory Board 
of no more than five members to be appointed by the Comp-
troller General. The Board shall be comprised of members 
both from the Federal Government (with the consent of the 
head of the agency concerned) and from outside the Federal 
Government. One member shall be selected by the Board as 
its Chairman. The Board shall advise the Comptroller 
General in the preparation of cost-accounting standards and 
of regulations implementing such standards. The Board shall 
also review promulgated standards and regulations and, as 
it deems appropriate, make recommendations to the Comptroller 
General with respect'to such-existing standards or regula-
tions. 
(2) The Comptroller General may appoint personnel from the 
Federal Government (with the consent of the head of the 
. agency concerned) or from outside the Federal Government 
to serve on advisory committees and task forces to advise 
the Comptroller General and the Board in carrying out 88 
their functions and responsibilities under this section. 
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Other matters unrelated to Sec. 718 of the bill were discussed during 
the seven days of the hearings. Sec. 718 of the bill was primarily 
discussed on June 19, 20, 22, and July 7. 
Testimony of Elmer B. Staats and 
Robert ~ Anthony 
Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States and 
Robert N. Anthony, Ross Graham Walker professor of management control, 
Harvard Business School were the first two witnesses before the com-
mittee with regard to Sec. 718 of the bill. Although giving statements 
at separate times, they were both questioned at the same time by the 
committee. 
Statement of Elmer B. Staats 
Staats began his statement by outlining for the committee the 
potential benefits from cost-accounting standards and by briefly ~tating 
some of the conclusions contained in the GAO report. The Comptroller 
General pointed out that the GAO consulted widely in preparing the GAO 
report and he stated that: 
All of the Federal agencies agree with the conclusion in our 
report as to the feasibility of applying cost standards for 
negotiated contracts. With one exception, all of the profes-
sional accounting organizations agree with our conclusions, 
although certain reservations and questions were raised with 
respect to the form of such standards &nd the manner in which 
they would be prepared ·and implemented. 
However, the industrial organizations generally are opposed 
to the establishment of such ~9andards and question the 
feasibility of applying them. 
Staats told the committee that he believed the 
••• responsibility for promulgating cost-accounting standards 
should rest in the executive branch of the Government. I 
favor this course of action because I question whether the 
GAO should become so deeply involved in the administration of 
negotiated contracts. The responsibility for administering 
contracts, including promulgation and the day to day inter-
pretation and administration of cost accounting seems to us 
basically an executive branch function.90 
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Staats also said he felt the advisory board should be a permanent board 
and that the legislation should be permanent, rather than subject to 
expiration every two years. In his written statement, Staats discussed 
f h . . d d 91 some o t e arguments aga1nst cost-account1ng stan ar s. 
Statement of Robert ~ Anthony 
Robert N. Anthony stated that he was, or had been, an author of 
textbooks, a chairman or member of cost concepts committees of several 
accounting organizations, a consultant to industrial firms, and an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. In endorsing Sec. 718 of 
the bill that would authorize the promulgation of cost accounting 
standards by the Comptroller General, Anthony said: 
In correspondence and testimony, some persons appear to 
argue that cost standards are unnecessary. Such an argument 
makes no sense at all. There must be some way of arriving at 
a meeting of the minds between the Government and a contractor 
as to which of the hundreds of possible cost accounting prac-
tices are to be employed in measuring the cost incurred on a 
particular contract. Section XV of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations does this today • 
••• The standards in section XV of ASPR are inadequate. The 
report of the Comptroller General on this subject contains 
ample evidence of these inadequacies.92 · 
To illustrate the claimed inadequacies, Anthony cited the cost account-
ing systems of 12 large defense contractors he had recently studied and 
stated that" .•• no two of these 12 contractors used the same method of 
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allocating overhead costs to contracts •... ASPR permits this 
diversity, and it results in wide differences in the reported costs of 
93 
a contract." He also expressed the opinion that the Pentagon had 
failed to make any improvements in the ASPR regulations and therefore 
there was a need for a fresh start outside of the Pentagon. 
Anthony also argued against the Senate bill that would limit the 
application of cost accounting standards to relatively large contractors. 
In arguing that he saw no merit to the proposal, he further said: 
"Those who favor this limitation imply that cost accounting standards 
will create a paperwork burden, and that small contractors should be 
exempted from this burden."94 Anthony said the argument was based on a 
misconception and that a good set of cost accounting standards would 
benefit many contractors. 
Question and Answer Session With Staats and 
Anthony 
Representative Patman (D., Texas) asked Anthony: 
••• is there general agreement with your statement that we 
should not exempt the smaller corporation or should we only 
deal with the big ones? Is the sentiment strongly either 
one way or the other in addition to your own?95 
Anthony replied that he had no way of knowing but suspected there was 
fairly general agreement with his stated position and also indicated 
the $25 million exemption was of recent origin and to his knowledge 
had never been widely discussed. Patman responded: "Your position 
seems to be the correct one to me. I don't claim to know too much 
about this but it seems fair and reasonable and in the public interest 
to protect the public interest:."96 
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In reply to Anthony's response, Staats stated: 
in all of the many discussions we have had within 
Government and outside of the Government and in written 
and oral comments, to the best of my knowledge, this idea 
of an exemption did not arise. We are somewhat at a loss 
to know why the provision was written into the Senate bill. 
We believe it would be very confusing. 97 
Representative Mize (R., Kansas), as a former financial officer 
of a steel foundry, expressed reservations about imposing standard 
cost accounting standards on companies that do both commercial and 
Government work. Representative Sullivan (D., Missouri) raised further 
questions concerning the $25 million exemption contained in the Senate 
version of the bill. In addition to answering her questions, Staats 
had a written statement entitled "Comments on Amendment of May 21, 1970, 
Proposed by Senate Banking and Currency Committee in S. 3302 Providing 
for a Limitation of $25 Million on Applicability of Cost-Accounting 
Standards" inserted into the record. The conclusion of the statement 
says: 
We suggest that the $25,000,000 limitation of the application 
of cost-accounting standards to negotiated national defense 
procurements be omitted from the proposed legislation. During 
the task of developing and promulgating cost-accounting stan-
dards it will be necessary for the Cost-Accounting Standards 
Board to consider cost-accounting practices, methodology, and 
techniques considered appropriate for various types of contrac-
tor activities reg~rdless of the size of contract or contractor's 
sales volume and to consider the probable cost of implementing 
such cost-accounting standards compared to the benefits to be 
derived therefrom. The matter of limiting the application of 
cost-accounting standards to negotiated national defense pro-
curements, under these circumstances could appropriately be 
left to the ultimate administrative recommendation of the 
Comptroller Peneral and the Cost-Accounting Standards Board 
based on their findings during the process of developing the 
cost-accounting standards. This would on the one hand permit 
for exemptions, and th~ other hand would allow for adminis-
trative discretion ,nd 'thus avoid inflexibility.98 
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Representative Moorhead (D., Pennsylvania) stated that representatives 
of companies which do a small amount of defense business had told him 
they would quit bidding on Government work if they were required to 
change their contracting methods. Both Staats and Anthony responded 
that the pending legislation would not prescribe uniform cost accounting 
systems but standards and they indicated there was no intent to over-
burden any company. 
Representative Brown (R., Michigan) expressed concern about the 
proper place in Government for the Board--legislative or executive, and 
also made the following observation: 
I have heard many complaints from constituent firms who say 
that it is a pain in the neck to do business with the Government 
because of the problems of not having the Government follow 
accepted contracting standards within the private sector, and 
so on. ... Uniformity mi~ht be a benefit to the contractor 
as well as the Government.9 
Representative Moorhead asked Staats if the newly created Holifield 
commission, an independent body established by Congress with members 
appointed by both the President and the Congress to examine the pro-
curement process, would be an appropriate agency to develop " 
100 
accounting rules." Staats pointed out that the commission was 
temporary, set up to run for 2 years, and had many problems. He 
added: 
Being one of the 12 members designated by the law itself I am 
rather familiar with the scope of the intended study. I 
certainly feel that it would be relevant to that Commission. 
Whether the Commission could feasibly undertake this in the 
detail which has already been reviewed, speaking only as one 
member I would have some doubt. I am sure though it would 
be a matter for the Commission to determine, but that would 
be my own personal reaction.lOl (emphasis added) 
Anthony also responded to Moorhead's quesion as follows: 
cost-
This effort will succeed only if the 
accounting profession are willing to 
Commission, there are perhaps two or 
any knowledge of accounting at all. 
simple fact that indicates that this 
place to get the job done.102 
Testimony of Admiral Rickover 
most able people in the 
work on it. Of that 
three people that have 
And I think it is that 
Commission is not the 
The only witness to appear before the committee on Saturday, 
June 20, 1970,, was Admiral Rickover, accompanied by M. C. Greer, 
associate director of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. Rickover 
set the stage for his comments in his opening remarks with this 
statement: 
I am a naval officer and an engineer, not an accountant. 
~have intruded into accounting matters because the accountants 
have neglected their own responsibilities, to the detriment~ 
mine. As long as they continue~ neglect their responsibili-
ties, ~ will continue to intrude. .!!_ is ~ duty to do ~.1°:3 
(emphasis added) 
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In addition to statements previously reviewed in earlier hearings, 
Rickover made additional remarks. First, Rickover described a problem 
he was having with one of the Nation's largest defense contractors 
regarding the procurement of equipment for a nuclear-powered submarine. 
Rickover maintained that the price quoted by the company was four times 
the price the Navy had paid for the equipment a few years earlier. 
Because the company said it did not keep actual cost records on previous 
orders, Rickover claimed it was impossible to determine the reason for 
the large price increase, and since the company was the only supplier 
of the equipment, the Navy would have to pay the high price. 
Rickover observed that since the 1968 Congressional hearings con-
cerning uniform cost accounting standards there had been a complete 
turnaround by the GAO, the Defense Department, and the professional 
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accountants regarding the feasibility and necessity of cost accounting 
standards. Rickover said: "Only defense industry groups, which have a 
vested interest in the present state of accounting anarchy, remain 
104 
opposed." 
Rickover argued that the GAO 11 ••• is the logical choice to develop 
and promulgate uniform cost accounting standards."105 Citing the GAO's 
charter and the Budget and Procedures Act of 1950 which states: "The 
Comptroller General .•• shall prescribe the principles, standards, and 
related requirements for accounting to be observed by each executive 
"106 k agency •.. , Ric over suggested that developing and promulgating 
uniform cost accounting standards was well within the scope of the 
Comptroller General's charter. 
Disagreement Within the Committee 
On Monday, June 22, 1970, after hearing from proponents of cost 
accounting standards, Representative Mize (R., Kansas) made the 
following remarks. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
We have three elements in this bill. No. 1 is the simple 
extension of the Defense Production Act of June 30, 1972. 
The second element is this matter of establishing standard 
cost accounting procedures for defense contractors. 
And the third element of course is this matter of granting 
standby wage and price controls. 
Now,we have really not given those who oppose the second 
element, that is, the matter of establishing standard cost 
accounting procedures, a chance to be heard. Here it is 
11:20, and this means.that we have about 40 minutes left to 
hear from some opponents, I believe, which I think is most 
unjust. 
This matter of establishing standard cost accounting procedures 
for defense contractors sounds like something that should be 
supported like motherhood and apple pie. But I feel this pro-
vision should be separated from the bill and more full and 
complete hearings held on it. The matter of price and wage 
controls was hashed over pretty thoroughly more last week . 
.•. I am going to announce right now that when we go into 
executive session on this bill I am going to move that we 
strike everything from line 8, and have a simple extension 
of the Defense Production Act of June 7, 1962. And we can go 
into those matters more carefully later on . 
.•• I would like to hear from some of those opponents on the 
matter of establishing the standard cost accounting procedures. 
But at the rate we are going we will never get' to those. They 
are not going to have their day in court.lOl (emphasis added) 
(Researcher's Note: It is of interest to observe Mize's use of the 
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term "standard cost accounting procedures.") After Mize's remarks, the 
Chairman directed the hearings back to the subject of wage and price 
controls. 
At a later point in the hearings, Representative Blackburn (R., 
Georgia) also had the following exchange of words with Chairman Patman. 
The Chairman. Mr. Blackburn? 
Mr. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I want to welcome the witness before the committee. 
I want also to second the sentiment expressed by Mr. Mize, that 
is, I think it is grossly unfair the way this committee has a 
practice of scheduling full and complete testimony from those 
people who are sympathetic to the chairman's views, and those 
who oppose the chairman's views for some reason find themselves 
left to the last minute without an opportunity to express 
their opinions. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to see us 
continue the hearings in order to permit full testimony from 
those who oppose this uniform accounting practice. 
The Chairman. May I bring you up to date on it? 
Mr. Blackburn. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. We are asking for permission now to convene the 
committee this afternoon and continue in session. If we are 
unable to do that we will go as long as we can after 12. And 
if we fail to get that we are going to have a meeting immed-
iately after the House adjourns. 
Mr. Blackburn. You mean to continue the hearing today? 
The Chairman. Yes, sir. We have a number of witnesses here 
today. 
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Mr. Blackburn. I understand that we have a number of witnesses. 
And I think it is grossly unfair to have them come, many of them 
at their own expense, with the understanding that they are going 
to have a full chance to express themselves before this committee. 
And it is notable that this is not an unusual development. 
The Chairman. We have heard every witness, or will hear every 
witness who has made a request. And if the gentleman has made 
a request we will hear his witnesses. 
Mr. Blackburn. I will comment fully to see that they have their 
day in court.l08 
After hearing the witnesses regarding wage and price controls, 
Chairman Patman made a short statement about how he conducted hearings 
and assured all parties that their views, whether oral or written, 
would be given consideration. Max Lehrer, representing EIA, expressed 
concern by stating: 
At a time when our young are questioning our democratic proce-
dures I think this committee would set a very unfortunate 
precedent in allowing the proponents of this legislation 2 
full days to present their case and giving the opponents of 
permanent legislation only the opportunity to put their re-
marks in the record where they will be printed in 6-point type 
that almost defies reading.lOY 
After a brief exchange of words with Lehrer, Patman called the next 
witness. The witnesses were given ten minutes to use in any way they 
wanted. Some questions were submitted by some committeemen in 
writiqg and later answered by the witnesses in written form. Most of 
the testimony was similar to that given in earlier hearings and much of 
it will not be repeated. The following testimonies consists primarily 
of new arguments given by opponents to /the proposed legislation. 
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Testimony of Joseph ~ Lyle 
Joseph M. Lyle, representing the National Security Industrial 
Association, opposed the proposed legislation on the grounds that 
existing agencies and laws were sufficient, the alleged procurement 
problems were exaggerated and distorted, and" .•• that GAO auditors 
have not had any significant difficulty in determining what contractors' 
110 
actual costs were." 
Lyle further pointed out that effective July 1, 1970, as a result 
of Defense Procurement circular No. 79, the use of section XV of ASPR 
would be mandatory in the" .•• pricing of all contracts and adjustments 
negotiated on the basis of costs,••111 and therefore the necessity for 
legislation on this subject was eliminated. Even though considering the 
legislation unnecessary, Lyle pointed but some points in H. R. 17880 
to consider: (1) The term "cost accounting standards" is undefined, 
(2) The GAO should not promulgate the standards, (3) The proposed 
legislation should not apply to small businesses as defined by the 
Small Business Act, (4) The bill contains no appeal process, (5) Economic 
feasibility of a standard has been ignored, and (6) The right to examine 
documents should be limited. 112 
Testimony of Karl ~ Harr 
With very minor revisions, the testimony of Harr was the same as 
that given at the 1970 Senate hearings. 
Testimony of Charles W. Stewart 
Charles W. Stewart, representing MAPI, began his testimony by 
suggesting that" ..• there has been an absence of some elements of 
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due process in terms of bringing all of the information from the 
interested parties before a forum where the full complexities of this 
subject could be adequately discussed."113 Stewart stated that no one, 
including the Comptroller General and the proponents of uniform cost 
accounting standards, understood what was meant by the term "uniform 
cost accounting standards." 
Stewart suggested that the proposed standards and their advocacy 
needed to be put in the proper perspective and remarked: "I would 
suggest first that they have been caught up in the swirl of the unpopu-
larity of the Vietnam war, which has colored certain attitudes of 
114 Congress." He also said the GAO was incapable or refused to submit 
to Congress a cost-benefit study relating to the promulgation of cost 
accounting standards. 
In his written statement, Stewart questioned the constitutionality 
of the Comptroller General's being responsible for promulgating 
standards, and he also summarized the position of MAPI to the proposed 
cost accounting standards. 
1. The term "cost-accounting standards" is nowhere under-
standably defined. 
2. The need for such standards has not been adequately 
demonstrated. 
3. The cost of promulgating such standards is unknown and 
this uncertainty is matched by the uncertainty of bene-
fits to be derived from their promulgation. 
4. Commercially oriented companies which, although important 
to the national defense, have substantial commercial 
markets for their products will have another important 
reason to abandon the defense market.ll5 
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In a list of written recommendations, the same list as contained in the 
Senate hearings record except for the following, MAPI indicated it 
strongly preferred S. 3302 to H. R. 17880 because: (1) S. 3302 called 
for an independent Board, (2) S. 3302 contained an exemption require-
ment, (3) S. 3302 contained a more reasonable audit requirement, and 
(4) S. 3302 contained a requirement of public notice in the "Federal 
Register" of proposed standards and the opportunity for connnent by 
interested parties before standards and regulations were published in 
final form. 116 
Another Disagreement Within the Committee 
At the conclusion of Stewart's statement, Representative Blackburn 
asked the chairman if the committee members had the right to question 
the witnesses as they had the pro-bill witnesses. Chairman Patman 
indicated the witnesses would be given 10 minutes to present their views 
and at that time there would be no question and answer session. 
Blackburn suggested that on such far-reaching legislation the represen-
tatives of a major segment of the economy should not be deprived of 
adequate time and opportunity to express themselves and further 
suggested that action on uniform cost accounting standards be postponed. 
Stewart then said that industry had not received adequate notice of the 
hearings. The disagreement continued for a short time and after 
Stewart said that he had filed a statement on several occasions to 
refute the Comptroller General's report as being inconclusive and short 
of proof Patman said: "All right;, then you have had your day in court." 
Blackburn responded: "I doubt, (sic) it. Half the jury is not here, 
Mr. Chairman. I would hate to try a case with one-third of the jury in 
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117 the room." The chairman then called the next witness. 
Testimony of Joseph ~ Sciarrino 
Joseph A. Sciarrino, speaking on behalf of the FEI, expressed 
opposition to the proposed legislation on cost accounting standards on 
the grounds that it was unnecessary. Sciarrino stated that the FEI 
did think that cost accounting principles should be subject to a 
continuous examination and that instead of promulgating standards, that 
had eluded description, the accounting profession should conduct a 
study with the following objectives: 
1. A codification of cost accounting principles which 
already exist. 
2. An examination and evaluation of the degree of latitude 
and flexibility which exists in the interpretation and 
use of these principles. 
3. A diagnosis of the problems in the use of cost accounting 
principles by defense contractors and the contracting 
agencies as suggested by the problem areas identified in 
the GAO report. 
4. Recommendations for corrective measures to eliminate the 
problems diagnosed.ll8 
If Congress felt legislation was necessary, the FEI preferred a 
nine-man independent board with equal representation from industry, 
the accounting profession, and the Government. Sciarrino stated: 
"Let the Presidential board determine whether in fact a need exists for 
standards and shape its actions. accordingly."119 
Testimony of John ~ Gilpin ' 
John W. Gilpin, director of governmental affairs of Varian Asso-
ciates, spoke on behalf of WEMA and generally gave the same testimony 
that was given by James N. Donovan when he represented WEMA before the 
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1970 Senate subcommittee. Gilpin's testimony centered aronnd the claim 
by proponents of cost accounting standards that 11 ••• there should be 
· if· · · 1· f UCAS were to become law. 11120 no s1gn 1cant 1ncrease 1n costs In 
disagreeing with this statement, Gilpin argued that the costs of 
implementing and maintaining standards would be costly, especially to 
small firms. 
Testimony of Max Lehrer 
Max Lehrer, representing EIA, began his statement in much the same 
way as he did his Senate subcommittee statement by saying the proposed 
legislation was 11 
Lehrer further said: 
121 
unwarranted, unnecessary, and unworkable." 
It is clear from the record that this proposed legislation, 
and the feasibility study that preceded it, resulted primarily 
from claims that uniform cost accounting standards would result 
in major savings in defense procurement.l22 
Lehrer suggested that the claim of cost savings stemmed from Rickover's 
earlier statement ~nd that proponents of the legislation were accepting 
the $2 billion figure at face value. Also, the $2 billion figure was 
being used to convince unwary bystanders of the desirability of legis-
lation. Lehrer claimed that the enactment of H. R. 17880 would increase 
the costs of Government procurement and he suggested the need for a 
cost-benefit study. 
In addition to arguing that the legislation was unnecessary, 
Lehrer pointed out what he considered to be inequities of H. R. 17880. 
First he questioned whether or not the Comptroller General should both 
promul9ate and enforce the standards and qe ppinted out that H. R. 17880 
contained no provision for an appeal process. Second, there was no 
provision in H. R. 17880 for seeking the ~iews of affected parties 
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before the promulgation of standards. Third, the time period between 
publication in the "Federal Register" and the effective date of a new 
standard was too short. Fourth, H. R. 17880 was too broad regarding 
the degree of access to industries records. Finally, H. R. 17880 
contained no exemption related to size of business or procurement 
123 programs. 
Lehrer concluded his statement by suggesting that action on cost 
accounting standards should be postponed until the Commission on 
Government Procurement (the Holifield Commission) had done its job. 
Specifically Lehrer said: 
Any problems of cost accounting are secondary to and dependent 
upon, fundamental decisions concerning the procurement process 
itself. It would seem prudent to give the Commission an 
opportunity to do the job for which it was created, including 
consideration of the cost accounting aspects of Government 
procurement, rather than preempt it by hasty and ill-
considered legislation such as section 718 of H. R. 17880. 
This is a vital matter, Mr. Chairman, and should not be treated 
in a kangaroo-court fashion.l24 
A Third Disagreement Within the Committee 
At the conclusion of Lehrer's statement, Chairman Patman indicated 
that there was no more time, whereupon the following exchange took 
place. 
The Chairman. We do not really have the time. You do not 
know exactly what we are up against, I am afraid. Now, we 
have another committee meeting tomorrow, and if the committee 
decides to have further hearings on this, I would be delighted 
to have them. But we have some other commitments, and have 
other things, and we have to arrange for the time to do it. 
Mr. Lehrer. Mr. Chairman, you had the foresight to intro-
duce House Resolution 1259 which proposed a 30-day extension 
of the Defense Production Act. I would respectfully suggest 
that the committee proceed on that and defer action on uniform 
cost accounting standards until the full facts can be consider-
ed, rather than saddle all American industry, big and small, 
with legislation based on very inadequate and incomplete 
information. 
The Chairman. We have somemightyfine public relations 
people in this country, and I believe you are one, too. And 
it is not necessary that you have so much time--of course it 
is better for you, and I would like to see you have it. 
Did you have time before the Senate committee? 
Mr. Lehrer. All witnesses were given approximately equal 
time before the Senate committee. 
The Chairman. What was equal time? 
Mr. Lehrer. Whatever was considered appropriate for the 
matter. 
The Chairman. Well, you do not say how much. But anyway, 
you were heard there, and you are heard here. 
Now, a good public relations man--I know there are lots of 
them that are really good, in fact I have never known one that 
was not good--he always earns his money. But he does not 
necessarily depend upon what he actually says before a congres-
sional committee. That is a small part of it. He takes it up 
with the Members of Congress, and he takes it up particularly 
with the Members of Congress having industries in the district 
of the Representative. 
How many industries do you represent? 
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Mr. Lehrer. Mr. Chairman, we represent some 300 manufacturers 
of all types of equipment. 
But if I may speak bluntly, I think it is shocking to have an 
intimation that legislation of such far-reaching character is 
something that should be handled in the court of public rela-
tions. I spent 2 years as a staff member of a Senate committee, 
and we prided ourselves that any hearing was a full hearing. 
The Chairman. You indicate that you depend upon what you do 
before a congressional committee. I have been around here a 
long time, and I would not consider that the thing to do. If I 
were a public relations man, and not a Member of Congress, I 
would not mind just having limited time before a committee, I 
would not depend upon what I said before the committee. 
That does not count so much. But whenever you take this 
testimony and you acquaint the Members of Congress with it, and 
say, get a hold of these Congressmen, 36 members of the Banking 
and Currency, here is what was said, it is documented and 
approved, and get them to vote that way. And it is the same way 
in the U.S. Senate. 
Mr. Lehrer. Mr. Chairman, there are thousands of small 
businesses affected--
The Chairman. Just a minute. Give me a chance to talk. You 
had time to talk. 
You see, these industries that you represent are all over the 
Nation. And a lot of these Members of Congress live in their 
districts. They have tremendous influence with them. And 
therefore you can get in touch with them. There are a lot of 
things you can do without just appearing before the committee. 
And when you do appear the fact that you get your message across 
is the important thing. Certainly I do not want to deny you the 
,privilege. But sometimes you get in a bind and cannot do it. 
If the committee were to vote tomQrrow to have more hearings 
and give me the time to do it--we have several other bills to 
consider, of course--and give me the time to do it I would be 
delighted to do it, because I have always wanted witnesses to 
have plenty of time where it is possible, and each member 
of this committee to have an opportunity to interrogate the 
witnesses. 
Now, that did not apply until I became chairman of this 
committee. For a long period of time we would come in and 
only just two or three of the senior members would get to ask 
questions and the others would not get to ask questions at all. 
But I adopted the rule of going around at least 5 minutes, and 
when I became chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, which 
is half Senators and half Representatives, I could not get the 
5-minute rule, but I had the 10-minute rule. And the Senators 
at first would not pay any attention to it, we just had to 
hammer them down. They did not like to do it because they were 
not used to being restricted as to time. 
So I am one that has been in favor of all this all the time. 
And I am certainly not entitled to any abuse for it. 
Mr. Lehrer. Mr. Chairman, I am heartened by the statement 
that you wish to be fair, because I think that is in our common 
interest. 
Mr. Stewart made the observation that the GAO report--and 
this is a copy of it--is replete with inconsistencies and 
inadequacies. 
The Chairman. Very well. Have you pointed them out? 
Mr. Lehrer. May I continue, please. 
This is also a remarkably complex subject. It is not the 
kind of thing that can be handled lightly. Yet if the 
permanent legislation is enacted on the basis of some gross 
oversimplifications we will live with the result for a long 
time. 
Therefore I again respectfully suggest that the way for you 
to enable us to get the facts across and to have fair and full 
consideration is not to rush through with legislation. This 
is like having an execution and then asking for a fair trial 
afterward, and being sorry that there may have been a mis-
carriage of justice. 
The Chairman. I believe you knew in March we were going to 
have these hearings, because June 30 the law expires. And I 
think you have a challenge there to get around and see Members 
of Congress who vote and let them know your testimony, let 
your industries know about it, let them contact the Members of 
the Congress, both House and Senate. 
Mr. Blackburn. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. 
The Chairman. Just one moment. 
This was put out in January 1970. You have had a long time 
to get up an answer, a long time. 
Mr. Lehrer. That is right, Mr. Chairman. And we have very 
great difficulty in getting to you or any other member of 
the committee to discuss it. 
The Chairman. You have got a job to do it yourself. 
Mr. Lehrer. Of cours~, and we would like the opportunity 
to do it and not be preempted. 
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Mr. Blackburn. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask, how did this 
witness know that the wage and price controls and uniform 
accounting were going to be included in this bill which is 
expiring in June? This bill was not introduced until June 2, 
and you announced the hearings on June 15 for a 2-week period. 
Now, to me there is a real gross inequity when we sit here 
for one full hearing and allow Mr. John Kenneth Galbraith 
whose economic theories have been repudiated by Democrats 
and Republicans alike for 25 years, and yet we have to sit 
here and listen to his economic nonsense, whereas these 
gentlemen represent millions of jobs, millions in industries, 
and in fact the defense of this country could depend on the 
job that the defense industry does. And we are giving them 
10 minutes apiece to talk about a subject that is as involved 
as accounting which I studied in law school, and I know it is 
a very complicated subject matter. 
Mr. Lehrer. As a matter of fact, Mr. Blackburn, it was not 
easy for us to find out when the committee was holding the 
hearing. 
The Chairman. The gentleman is not entirely on solid ground 
in what he said, that this gentleman did not know that the cost 
accounting issue was coming up. It was in our bill 3 years ago. 
Mr. Blackburn. Am I to understand that when anything which 
has been professed in the last 200 years of this country is 
ready to come up we should know about it? 
The Chairman. It has been debated 2 years ago, and has been 
debated in the Senate. 
Mr. Blackburn. The fact that something was proposed 2 years 
or 10 years ago does not mean that it is likely to come up in 
the morning. 
The Chairman. If I represented industry like he does I 
would be on my toes. 
Mr. Lehrer. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately the industry that 
will suffer most if this bill is railroaded through is small 
business, which has not had an opportunity to be heard. 
The Chairman. You say that some small businesses what to 
be heard that have not been heard. Name me one. 
Mr. Lehrer. I did not say they have asked to be heard, I 
said they are the ones that will be most affected. On the 5th 
of June we requested this committee to appear only because we 
knew something had to be done. And finally on the 15th of 
June your committee--
The Chairman. I will admit that we have something to do, 
and we want to be fair with you. But you have something to 
do. The challenge is on you. 
Mr. Lehrer. I agree, Mr. Chairman, I would merely reiter-
ate my plea, Mr. Chairman, I would like you to give us an 
opportunity to consider this fairly and on the merits. I 
submit that that has not been done. 
The Chairman. Well, 2 years ago you knew that it was 
coming up again this year, it would be up again. You expected 
it, didn't you? 
Mr. Lehrer. Eighteen months ago you asked the Comptroller 
General to make a study. For 15 months of that 18 months we 
were engaged with the Comptroller General's staff. And the 
draft report that came out was one of the most monstrous--and 
I use the word advisely--pieces of literature ever perpetrated. 
The Comptroller General personally got in the act--and I pay 
tribute to the General--he did make some very sig~ificant 
changes. However, we were in a tremendous quandry, and still 
are. 
Just what do we mean by cost accounting standards, to what 
degree will these become a straitjacket of practices? The 
Comptroller General speaks in reasonable terms. The senior 
staff members of GAO do not. And the Comptroller himself has 
pleaded that he not be saddled with the responsibility which 
the committee bill would propose to do. 
The Chairman. You have a challenge yourself, and if I were 
you--I know you will get busy, because I am sure--
Mr. Lehrer. If the committee is going to mark up in the next 
day or two it is hard to see how the challenge can be met. 
The Chairman. But you have known about it for 2 years. 
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Mr. Blackburn. Can we get the Comptroller General to testify, 
Mr. Chairman, as to whether or not he wants to administer this 
bill? 
The Chairman. If the Congressman stayed around all the time 
he would know that the Comptroller General did testify. 
Mr. Moore. And it is noteworthy, Mr. Chairman, that the 
Comptroller General said he would like not to have to administer 
this. 
The Chairman. That is what the committee would like to decide. 
Anything else from the members of the committee? 
Mr. Mize. I would just like to point out that you do have a 
few friends in court, and we are going to work like the dickens 
for you. 
Mr. Lehrer. I thank you and the American people thank you. 
The Chairman. If you want to get together and vote for 
future time we would be glad to hear you on that. 
Mr. Lehrer. Is it my understanding that the entire state-
ment will be printed in large type? 
The Chairman. Yes, sir. And if you want to add to it, 
add to it. 
Questioning ~ Witnesses 
On Tuesday, July 7, 1970, the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency met to allow the witnesses of June 22 to answer questions 
from committee members. In Chairman Patman's opening statement he 
stated that a one month extension of the Defense Production Act had 
been secured and it would now expire at the end of July and that he 
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would like to see prompt action on the bill. Regarding the hearing of 
July 7, Patman said: 
••• I did want to give these gentlemen an opportunity to 
answer any questions that might be on the members' minds 
before final action on this bill. Therefore, we are holding 
this session this morning.l26 
The men present at the hearing who were primarily concerned with the 
provision of the bill relating to uniform cost accounting standards 
were: Karl G. Harr representing AlA; Charles W. Steward representing 
MAPI; Max Lehrer representing EIA; J. M. Lyle representing NSIA and 
accompanied by Cecil L. Covington, manager for government relations, 
equipment group, Texas Instruments, Corp. and chairman of the task 
force on cost accounting standards of the NSIA; and W. Stewart Hotchkiss 
representing FEI. 
Each representative was allowed five minutes to ask questions and 
get answers and this section of the study presents a sampling of those 
questions and answers. Representatives Moorhead and Brown questioned 
the witnesses concerning the best type of exemption to have in the 
pend~ng legislation. Lehrer, Stewart, and Covington agreed that they 
were opposed to any legislation. Lehrer and Stewart also agreed, that 
the $25 million exemption contained in S. 3302 was a sensible approach 
while Covington stated that in addition he would like to see an 
exemption for firms which did less than a certain percent of their work 
with the Federal Government. 
Representative Johnson (R., Pennsylvania) asked if it were not 
possible for the Government to get the information it needed under 
existing conditions. Lehrer said in response; II the government 
127 does have, in our view, all the powers that it now needs." Harr 
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explained that large companies have sophisticated surveillance and 
control features that seem to " ..• vitiate the argument for the uni-
f t . t 11128 ( . orm accoun 1ng sys em. emphas1s added) 
At one point Stewart said he wanted to return to the central points 
of consideration--" ... what are we considering in the first place?'~29 
Stewart then said: "We don't know and nobody knows. When you get 
through reading the Comptroller General's Report you don't know. 
130 What are uniform cost standards?" Following a few other remarks by 
Stewart, Representative Mize said: 
Mr. Stewart, proceed. I am with you a hundred percent. I 
think imposing uniform cost accounting standards in this 
bill is absolutely ludicrous.l31 
Shortly thereafter Stewart labeled as verging on blackmail the provision 
in the House bill requiring the payment of interest on any refund to 
the Government as a result of a contractor deviating from uniform 
accounting standards. 
Representative Hanna (D., California) raised the question of the 
intended application of the work "uniform" in the proposed legislation 
and indicated that he thought the idea of a uniform system for every-
body was ridiculous. Representative Blackburn raised the following 
question: 
I think a lot of pressure for this type legislation has arisen 
because of the cost overruns on certain very notable and famous 
or infamout contracts engineered by Mr. McNamara--that is, his 
C-SA contract, a very good airplane but a bad contract, the 
F-111 and the main battle tank and several other devices that 
he envisioned. Does the way you keep books determine the cost 
of these systems. I mean could you change your bookkeeping and 
reduce the cost of the c~SA by 25 percent? 
Mr. Harr. It would have no effect on it, substantial effect 
on it at all. 
Mr. Blackburn. And so the talk about cost overruns would not 
be affected by the way the books are being kept, would they? 
Mr. Harr. 132 That is precisely correct. 
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Representative Gettys (D., South Carolina) asked if there was in 
the interest of the Government, industry, or the public any need for a 
change in the " present cost accounting procedures in this field. ,;L33 
(emphasis added) When told there was no demonstrated need, Gettys 
asked for the origin of the standards concept contained in the bill. 
Before getting an answer Gettys stated: 
I get the impression that it is a direct move to put a strait-
jacket on private industry, to eliminate flexibility, to eliminate 
the innovation of private industry, to eliminate the traditional 
concept of competition and improvement within industry (sic) 
Does this strike a note--is my impression which I am beginning to 
form--134 
At that point Lehrer interrupted and agreed. Lehrer then indicated 
that Rickover was responsible for the concept contained in the proposal 
and after challenging some of Rickover's ideas concluded with this 
remark: " I would like to record to be clear that I am not here to 
attack Admiral Rickover. I have profound admiration for his genious as 
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a technical innovater, but as an accountant, no." 
Representative Brown raised the issue of the Holifield Commission 
on Government Procurement Practices to which Lehrer and Harr suggested 
that a proper approach would be to make the question of cost accounting 
standards a part of the consideration of the Holifield Commission. 
Representative Rees (D., California) began a statement, rather than 
asking questions, with the following: "In all our hearings I have never 
136 heard so many leading questions in one session." Rees then summar-
ized the Senate bill as approv:ed by the Senate committee and also 
challenged some of the earlier remarks made by the witnesses. 
243 
Representative Heckler (R., Massachusetts) and Lehrer discussed 
the role of the GAO under the Senate version of the proposed legisla-
tion and Lehrer expressed reservations about only having an appeal to 
what he considered the prosecuting attorney and the judge--the GAO. 
To this Representative Heckler responded: 
May I suggest that the public is a far more unsympathetic 
critic of the defense industry than the GAO and that the 
issue here is the public versus the defense industry. And 
that the reason that the distinguished admiral's name is 
heard so much is that so many millions of Americans happen 
to feel that he is probably on the right track and that our 
function as members of this committee, as a committee itself, 
is not to persecute an industry nor is it to ignore a public 
outcry or a public recognition of a public problem.l37 
Representative Galifianakis (D., North Carolina) suggested that it 
was not the statement by Rickover of a possible $2 billion savings that 
was so impressive to members of the committee but his statement regarding 
the inability of contractors to tell how they determined their costs. 
In responding to questions from Representative Bevill (D., Alabama), 
Harr and Lehrer indicated that the proposed legislation might lead to a 
single uniform cost accounting system throughout the Department of 
Defense. 
Representative St Germain (D., Rhode Island) stated that he had 
been present at all the hearings that led to the creation of the 
Holifield Commission on Government Procurement and that he was a member 
of the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the Government Operations 
Committee. On that basis St Germain stated: 
•.. I reject the contention of all the witnesses this morning 
that we should wait for the results of what is done by that 
Commission, because very frankly, there wasn't that much time 
spent in those hearing~~ith reference to uniform cost 
accounting. 
W lk . b . 138 e were ta 1ng a out contract1ng. 
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In his questioning Representative Ninish (D., New Jersey) alluded 
to an aspect of the military-industrial complex when he referred to 
people who formerly worked for the Defense Department who are now 
representing industry. Ninish questioned such an arrangement. 
Written Statements Ez. Interested Parties 
Attached as an appendix to the record were several statements about 
the cost accounting standards proposal. In a letter to Chairman Patman, 
Secretary of Commerc~ Maurice Stans, while agreeing that the feasibility 
of uniform cost accounting standards had been established, presented 
arguments for establishing an independent ~oard within the executive 
branch of Government. The appendix included a written statement from 
the following organizations which opposed, for various reasons, the 
proposed legislation: The Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc.; 
Electronic Industries Association; The Strategic Industries Association; 
The Barden Corp.; Humble Oil & Refining Co.; Daniel, Mann, Johnson & 
Mendenhall; A. 0. Smith Corp.; Woodward Governor Co.; Xerox Corp.; 
Tektronix, Inc.; Armco Steel Corp.; International Electronic Research 
Corp.; and The Proprietary Association. Also included in the appendix 
were written statements that contained some support for the cost 
accounting standards from the following organizations: the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the National Association of 
Accountants, and the Federal Government Accounting Association. 
Summary 
Representatives of industry associations testifying at the House 
hearings, without exception, opposed the proposed cost accounting 
standards legislation. In addition to presenting arguments against 
the proposed legislation, some of the representatives of industry 
associations offered suggestions regarding the form of legislation 
they favored--if there was to be legislation. 
A highlight of the hearings was the disagreements that arose 
between Chairman Patman, committee members and some witnesses on 
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whether the witnesses who opposed the proposed legislation would be 
allowed sufficient time to present their position. Eventually, the 
opponents were given some time to respond to questions from committee 
members. The House Committee hearings ended on July 7, 1970, and the 
next action on the cost accounting standards legislation was taken by 
the Senate. 
Senate Action on S. 3302 
Introduction 
On July 9, 1970, members of the Senate engaged in debate regarding 
various aspects of the amendment to S. 3302 requiring uniform cost 
accounting standards. Senator Mondale introduced and summarized the 
basic features of the proposed legislation. In his remarks he presented 
arguments that the legislation was needed and that it would not be 
burdensome on industry. Senator Proxmire then explained in some 
detail that the standards were needed because: there is no competition 
on 89 percent of military procurement, the existing laws are inadequate, 
there is great flexibility in the determination of costs of defense 
contracts, there is the P?tential for saving substantial amounts of 
taxpayer's money, and the GAO determined the standards were feasible 
139 
and needed. 
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Bennett Amendment 
Following Proxmire's statement, Senator Bennett offered an amend-
ment to the bill which would require that the Board be established as 
an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government. The 
Comptroller General would serve as chairman with four other members to 
• be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. 
Two members would come from the accounting profession, one member from 
industry, and one member from the Federal Government. Bennett discussed 
at some length the following reasons for his amendment: (1) Most of the 
witnesses, including the Comptroller General, preferred that the Board 
members be appointed by the President, (2) Half of the committee 
favored the approach contained in the amendment, (3) The present bill's 
proposal would undermine the independence of the GAO, (4) There was a 
constitutional question of the separation of powers, and (5) The GAO had 
failed to tell the full story on the 120 cases referred to in the 
feasibility study and this reflected adversely on the attitude of the 
GAO and implied the GAO might not be neutral in its duties. 140 Senator 
Cranston, citing his previous experience as comptroller of the State of 
California, supported the Bennett amendment on the basis that it would 
be necessary in order to" ... have the Comptroller General of the 
United States a totally independent man. ,141 
Senator Proxmire discussed at some length the following arguments 
against the Bennett amendment: (1) The Bennett amendment would weaken 
the administration of the bill, (2) Executive regulatory agencies tend 
to " •.• become the captives of those whom they ostensibly regulate, ,;1. 42 
(3) The executive branch had been inactive in this area of concern for 
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some time and there was no evidence to suggest a change in attitude, 
(4) The Comptroller General is appointed to a 15 year term and therefore 
completely independent, and (5) The proposed role of the Comptroller 
General, under the committee bill was compatible with the description 
of the Comptroller General's duties specified in the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. 143 
In arguing for the Board as described in the committee bill, 
Proxmire said: 
If anyone is immune to the blandishments of the military-
industrial complex, it is the Comptroller General. It 
comes as no great surprise, therefore, to see defense industry 
lobbyists urging the establishment of a Presidential board.l44 
Senator Brooke suggested that it might be better if the Comptroller 
General appointed the other members of the Board subject to Senate 
approval. Proxmire suggested that there was considerable question as to 
the constitutionality of such a proposal and cited seven court cases to 
support his position. 
Senator Mondale also expressed opposition to the Bennett amend-
ment for many of the reasons given by Proxmire. The Bennett amendment 
was rejected 36-44 with the Republicans voting 30-5 and the Democrats 
6-39. 
Proxmire Amendment 
Senator Proxmire introduced an amendment to eliminate the $25 
million exemption contained in the committee bill and then discussed 
in some detail the arguments previously stated in the committee report. 
(Those arguments are given on pages 217 and 218 of this study.) 
Senator Cranston opposed the amendment primarily because he felt it 
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would place a burden on smaller defense contractors. Proxmire's 
amendment was adopted 51-22 with the Republicans voting 19-11 and the 
Democrats 32-11. 
With little or no debate the Senate, by voice votes, adopted 
amendments to exempt contracts of $100,000 or less from the standards 
requirement; to eliminate a requirement for Government contracting 
offices to make payments, with interest, to defense contractors for 
added costs of adopting cost accounting standards; and to make the 
Cost Accounting Standards Board a permanent Board. S. 3302, as 
amended, passed 69-1 with the Republicans voting 28-0 and the 
Democrats 41-1. 
On the basis of the House Committee on Banking and Currency 
hearings of June 16 through 20, June 22, and July 7, 1970, and an 
executive session of the committee, the House committee submitted 
"Report No. 91-1330" to accompany H. R. 17880 as amended. 
Report of the House Committee on Banking 
and Currency Report No. 91~1330 
Uniform Cost-Accounting Standards 
Pages two and three of the committee report, dated July 27, 1970, 
present the committee amendment to H. R. 17880 with respect to uniform 
cost-accounting standards. The basic features of the amendment, as 
concerns this study, are as follow: (1) The Board would be an agent 
of Congress and independent of the executive departments; (2) The 
Comptroller General would chair,the Board and appoint four additional 
members--two from the accounting profession with particular knowledge 
about cost accounting problems of small businesses, one from industry, 
and one from the Federal Government; and (3) The Board shall by 
June 30, 1971, recommend to Congress cost-accounting standards 
designed to achieve uniformity and consistency in the cost-
accounting principle followed by defense contractors and sub-
contractors under Federal contracts. The Board shall also 
recommend uniform bid procedures and bid forms for Government 
agencies to require to be used by all contractors and subcon-
tractors to whom the recommended cost-accounting standards 
apply.l45 (emphasis added) 
The Need for Cost-Accounting Standards 
The committee report summarized the arguments presented in the 
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hearings about the need for cost-accounting standards. In particular, 
the report cited the large percentage of negotiated defense contracts 
and the difficulty of determining contract costs, the ineffectiveness 
of section XV of ASPR, the inapplicability of IRS, SEC, and Renegotia-
tion Board regulations, the possiblity of substantial costs savings, and 
the questionable accounting practices identified by the DCAA and GAO. 
The report stated: "The commit-tee feels that the careful develop-
ment of cost-accounting standards would not place industry in a 
straitjacket or eliminate the flexibility, innovation, or competition 
146 in the operations of defense contractors." 
Responding to the testimony of industry representatives that there 
already existed a vast body of knowledge about cost accounting, the 
committee postpon~d any action requiring the development of new stan-
dards and instead recommended the establishment of a Board to: 
1. Examine those standards that already exist and are in use. 
2. Determine their adequacy. 
3. Recommend to Congress cost-accounting standards designed to 
achieve uniformity and consistency in the cost-aGcounting 
practices of defense contractors and subcontractors.l47 
(emphasis added) 
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Minority Views 
The Republican members of the committee disagreed with the full 
committee report on two points: (1) They expressed a preference for 
Presidential appointment of Board members--with the Comptroller General 
being included, and (2) They felt more time should be given the Board 
to accomplish its assigned task. 
Additional Views 
Representative Garry Btown (R., Michigan), with Lawrence G. 
Williams (R., Pennsylvania) and Albert W. Johnson (R., Pennsylvania) 
concurring, expressed the following additional views. 
Brown claimed that the feasibility and wisdom of a Congressional 
mandate on the adoption of cost accounting standards was never resolved 
by the committee. He cited the Rees amendment to the committee version 
of the bill as evidence of this claim. The Rees amendment 
•.. directs the Comptroller General through a committee 
appointed and chaired by him to develop and report a 
recommended code of uniform accounting standards to the 
Congress not later than June 30, 1971.148 
Brown referred to testimony given to the committee regarding the 
fact that the Board should be independent of the GAO and raised questions 
concerning the separation of powers. Regarding the appointment and 
composition of the Board, Brown said: " .•. I will offer an amendment 
I 
which would have carried in committee had it not been ruled out of 
d i h 1 . 11149 or er w tout exp anat~on •... 
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Joint Resolution 
On July 30, 1970, because no definite action had been taken on 
certain amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950, a joint 
resolution extended the effectiveness of the Defense Production Act of 
1950 until August 15, 1970. 
House Debate on H. R. 17880 
Introduction 
On JulY 31, 1970, the House engaged in debate on various aspects of 
H. R. 17880 related to cost accounting standards and also simultaneously 
debated various aspects of wage and price controls. For a few minutes 
the debate would center on cost accounting standards and then it would 
center on wage and price controls, alternating back and forth with no 
apparent pattern. 
Introdudion of Cost Accounting Provision 
Representative Patman introduced and summarized the basic features 
of the proposed legislation on cost accounting standards. In his re-
marks, Patman observed the comprehensiveness of the GAO study and 
referred to organizations that supported the conclusions of the GAO 
study. Patman indicated that cost accounting standards were needed 
·because: (1) They would enhance relationships and communications 
between all parties, (2) Existing regulations were inadequate or 
inappropriate, (3) Contractors have too much flexibility in their choice 
of accounting methods, (4) Contractors were not consistent in the way in 
which they determine actual costs of contracts, and (5) Present standards 
150 
were misunderstood. 
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Opposition ~ the Cost Accounting Provision 
Representative Widnall (R., New Jersey) was the first member to 
oppose the committee bill. He began his remarks by observing that all 
members of Congress were concerned about the size of the defense budget 
and the possibilities of waste, dishonesty, and mismanagement. Widnall 
noted that the feasibility study was done because 
..• it was suggested that if all defense contractors were re-
quired to utilize uniform cost accounting procedures, it would 
facilitate administration of previously authorized safeguards. 
It is interesting to note that both Admiral Rickover and Dr. 
Robert Anthony, the former Comptroller of the Department of 
Defense, testified to the effect that administrative procedures 
could be made effective without the benefit £51 these standards. 
Nevertheless, we are moving ahead with thero. . 
Widnall stated that the GAO report did not say it was feasible to 
establish uniform cost accounting standards but that it was feasible to 
establish "'cost accounting standards to provide a greater degree of 
uniformity and cost accounting as a basis for negotiating and 
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administering procurement contracts.'" Widnall also suggested that 
no one had defined or given an example of a cost accounting standard 
and also that no one could draw a line of distinction between a cost 
accounting system and a cost accounting standard. By presenting some 
of Rickover's stated ideas on the subject and comparing them with the 
committee version of the bill, Widnall concluded that the bill was 
highly responsive to the recommendations of Rickover. In discussing 
Rickover's estimate of a $2 billion saving, Widnall labeled it as the 
kind of guessowrk not adequate for responsible legislation. 153 
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Other Views on the Cost Accounting Provision 
In speaking for the committee bill, Representative Sullivan suggest-
ed that in evaluating testimony two things should be considered: (1) 
Is the testimony based on evidence or unsupported opinion? (2) If based 
i i . . k 1 d bl . . ? 154 on op n on, 1s 1t a now e gea e op1n1on. Sullivan then briefly 
described the GAO feasibility study and its findings and stated that 
" ••. great reliance can be placed on such evidence."155 She then 
labeled as unsupported opinion the testimony of opponents to cost 
accounting standards and suggested they were unknowledgeable about the 
subject. Representative Dwyer expressed support' for cost accounting 
standards and indicated she favored the House version of the bill over 
the Senate version. 
Representative Moorhead (D., Pennsylvania) suggested that uniform 
cost accounting standards would be an effective anti-inflationary tool 
and made the following comment. 
This other form of inflation I refer to is the inflated cost 
of defense equipment due to cost overruns on defense contracts. 
Uniform cost accounting standards would not eliminate all cost 
overruns, of course, but such standa~gs could have a signifi-
cant effect on the overrun problem. 1) 
Moorhead thought the requirement to have the contractor use the same 
method in estimating cost for cost proposals and for reporting costs 
could have a desirable effect on cost overruns. Moorhead also argued 
that standards would be beneficial to small contractors rather than 
detrimental. 
Representative Brown expressed his views, as contained in the 
committee report, about the appointment of Board members and the length 
of time for the task. Representative Williams stated that he favored 
the portion of the bill on uniform cost accounting standards. In 
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expressing support for UCAS, Representative Heckler also expressed 
concern for the needs and problems of small business. 
Representative Ashley (D., Ohio), identifying himself as one of the 
11 original sponsors of the bill, stated: 
We, the 11 original sponsors of this legislation felt this was 
necessary in. order to reduce the massive cost overruns, late 
delivery and nonperformance that have been associated with 
military procurement. I want to make it clear that I favor a 
uniform cost-accounting procedure.l57 (emphasis added) 
Representative Gonzalez (D., Texas) suggested that cost accounting 
was a highly technical subject, that most members of the House were not 
qualified in the area, that the Comptroller General was Congress's 
accounting expert, that the Comptroller General had no vested interest 
in the matter, that improvements were needed in the procurement process, 
and therefore, the House should accept the Comptroller General's recom-
mendation. 
Hanna Amendment 
Representative Hanna (D., California) offered an amendment that 
would allow the Board to make recommendations during the five year life 
of the Board. The amendment was adopted by voice vote .. 
Brown Amendment 
Representative Brown offered an amendment that would establish 
the Board as an independent agency of the exeuctive branch with members 
being appointed by the President. Representatives Williams and Blackburn 
joined Brown in presenting arguments previously cited in this study. 
Representative Patman expressed fears that the Board would be 
ineffective as an executive agency and claimed that the President did not 
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want the Board. 158 Brown labeled Patman's statement about the 
President as being inaccurate and said: 11 ••• I do not think the 
gentleman can point to any significant statement from the President to 
the effect that he is opposed to the cost accounting standards provi-
sions of this bill. 11159 
Representative Waggonner (D., Louisiana) suggested that since it 
was the purpose of the Defense Production Act to protect the legisla-
tive branch he thought it would be 11 ••• the height of wisdom ... "160 
for the control of the Board membership to be under the legislative 
branch rather than the executive branch. When the amendment was con-
sidered tellers were taken and on a vote of 73-81 the amendment was 
rejected. 
Following the rejection of the Brown amendment, the committee 
amendment, described on page 248, was adopted by a voice vote. 
Conference Report 
Introduction 
Since the Senate disagreed with the House version of the cost 
accounting standards amendment, a conference was held. The Senate 
conferees were: Sparkman (D., TexFs), Proxmire (D., Wisconsin), 
Muskie (D., Maine), Mondale (D. , Minnesota), Hollings (D., So. Carolina), 
Bennett (R., Utah), Tower (R., Texas), Goodell (R., New York), and 
Packwood (R., Oregon). House conferees were: Patman (D., Texas), 
Sullivan (D., Missouri), Reuss (D., Wisconsin), Ashley (D., Ohio), 
Widnall (R., New Jersey), Mize (R., Kansas), and Blackburn 
(R. , Georgia) . 
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In a conference report dated August 8, 1970, the" ... House 
conferees agreed to recede to the Senate version concerning the pro-
visions dealing with uniform accounting standards with two amend-
161 
ments." The two amendments contained: (1) A requirement that one 
of the two professional accountants on the Board must have knowledge of 
small business accounting, and (2) A requirement that 
••• any proposed standards, rules or regulations to be pro-
mulgated by the Board be transmitted to Congress for 60 
days of continuous session, during which Congress could by 
concurrent resolution block the proposed standards from 
taking effect.l62 
Senate Action on Conference Report 
On August 12, 1970, the Conference Report was presented to the 
Senate for consideration. Representative Bennett stated that although 
he was a conferee on the bill he was unable to attend the conference, 
but had he been there he would not have signed the report. 
The debate on the issue was limited and redundant. Bennett made 
an astute observation when he stated: 
••. I realize that under the circumstances, these comments 
and criticisms of mine are more or less meaningless because 
we have gone too far down the legislative path to change 
that path.l63 
The conference report was agreed to by a voice vote. 
House Action on Conference Report 
On August 13, 1970, Representative Patman explained to the House 
why the House conferees had receped to the Senate yersion of the cost 
accounting standards proposal and pointed out the importance of the 
two amendments the House had required. Debate on the report was very 
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limited and redundant except for the following claim by Representative 
Blackburn: "I do not believe the House conferees adequately defended 
the position of this House. I do not believe they presented their case 
164 properly.'' On a roll call vote of 217-153, the conference report 
was agreed to. (It should be pointed out that the conference report 
also contained items relating to wage and price controls and the use of 
Defense Production Act loan guarantees.) 
Final Actions on S. 3302 
S. 3302 was signed by the appropriate persons in the House and 
Senate on August 14, 1970. The bill was approved and signed by the 
President on August 15, 1970. 
According to the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, President 
Nixon objected to all the major provisions (wage-price controls, the 
CASB, and loan guarantees) Congress added to the Defense Production 
Act. Regarding the CASB, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report stated: 
He [the President] also objected to the fact that the bill 
created the uniform cost-accounting board as an agency under 
the Comptroller General--independent of the Executive Branch. 
He said the administration and regulation of government con-
tracts was an Executive branch function and that the board's 
placement under an arm of Congress would violate the separation 
of powers doctrine. He asked Congress to amend the measure and 
put the board in the Executive Branch.l65 
A copy of the ~pplicable portion of Public Law 91-379 relating 
to this study is contained in Appendix A. 
Summary 
Senator Proxmire, on December 23, 1969, introduced S. 3302 which 
included a requirement that the ~ promulgate uniform cost accounting 
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standards within 18 months of the enactment of the legislation. On 
March 31, April 1 and 2, 1970, the Senate Subcommittee on Production and 
Stabilization of the Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings to 
discuss the standards requirement and two legislative proposals of the 
GAO. Following the hearings, the Senate subcommittee adopted an amend-
ment calling for a five-member CASE with the Comptroller General serving 
as Chairman of the Board and appointing the other four members. The 
Board was directed to promulgate cost accounting standards to achieve 
uniformity and consistency in cost accounting and the amendment also 
included a provision that would have exempted defense contractors and 
subcontractors from the requirements of the legislation if their annual 
sales to the Government in the preceding fiscal year was less than 
$25 million. 
In June and July, 1970, the House Committee on Banking and Currency 
conducted hearings on the House version of the cost accounting standards 
legislation. The House version of the bill would have required the 
Comptroller General to promulgate cost accounting standards. With only 
two or three exceptions, the witnesses at the House hearings were the 
same as those at the 1970 Senate hearings. Without exception, the 
industry association representatives testifying at the House hearings 
opposed the proposed legislation. 
The Senate, on July 9, 1970, rejected the $25 million exemption 
contained in the Senate committee version of the bill. The House, on 
July 27, 1970, presented the House committee amendment to H. R. 17880 
which would have required the establishment of a Cost Accounting 
Standards Board. The Comptroller General would head the Board and 
appoint four additional members. The Board was to recommend to 
259 
Congress cost accounting standards. 
Because of differences between the House and Senate versions of the 
bill, a conference was held. In conference the House receded to the 
Senate version with two amendments. 
The next chapter presents a brief summary of Chapters IV, V, and 
VI; an analysis of some of the features of Chapters IV, V, and VI; the 
conclusions of the study; and some suggestions for future research. 
FOOTNOTES 
1congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 115, Part 30 (Washington, D.C., 
1969), p. 41048. 
2congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 116, Part 6 (Washington, D.C., 
1970), p. 8317. 
3u. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Production and Stabiliza-
zation of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, Extension of 
the Defense Production Act and Uniform Cost Accounting Standards 
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 1. 
4Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
5Ibid. , p. 14. 
6Ibid. , p. 15. 
7 16. Ibid. , p. 
8Ibid. , p. 26. 
9Ibid. , p. 27. 
10Ibid., p. 331. 
11Ibid .• p. 332. 
12Ibid., p. 335. 
13Ibid., pp. 333-334. 
14Ibid. , pp. 336-337. 
15Ibid., p. 341. 
16Ibid. 
ll Ibid., p. 342. 
18Ibid., p. 344. 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid., p. 347. 
260 
261 
21 Ibid. , p. 368. 
22 Ibid. , p. 370. 
23 Ibid., pp. 370-371. 
24Ibid., p. 371. 
25Ibid., p. 374. 
26Ibid., p. 377. 
27 Ibid., p. 380. 
28Ibid., p. 381. 
29 Ibid., p. 382. 
30Ibid., p. 384. 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. , p. 385. 
33Ibid. , P· 401. 
34 Ibid. 
35Ibid., p. 403. 
36Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 406. 
38Ibid., p. 396. 
39Ibid., p. 411. 
40Ibid., p. 426. 
41Ibid., pp. 430-431. 
42 Ibid. , p. 432. 
43Ibid., p. 433. 
44Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 435. 
46Ibid., p. 439. 
4 7 Ibid., p. 446. 
262 
48 Ibid. , p. 492. 
49Ibid., p. 493. 
50Ibid, , p. 494. 
51Ibid., p. 495. 
52Ibid., pp. 521-522. 
53 Ibid., p. 496. 
54 Ibid., p. 500. 
55Ibid., p. 502. 
56 Ibid., p. 530. 
57Ibid., p. 531. 
58 . 521. Ib1d. , p. 
59 Ibid. , p. 540. 
60Ibid., P· 546. 
61Ibid., p. 543. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid., p. 544. 
~4 
. Ibid., p. 549. 
65Ibid., pp. 549-550. 
66Ibid., p. 553. 
67 Ibid., p. 557. 
68Ibid., p. 558. 
69 Ibid. 
70Ibid., p. 561. 
71 Ibid., P• 562. 
72Ibid., p. 566. 
73Ibid., p. 576. 
74Ibid., pp. 577..,..578. 
263 
75u. S. Congress, Senate, Report to Accompany~ 3302 (Washington, 
D.C., 1970), p. 1. 
76Ibid., p .. 5. 
77 Ibid. , p. 4. 
78Ibid., p. 5. 
79Ibid., p. 7. 
80Ibid. 
81Ibid., p. 8. 
82Ibid. 
83Ibid., p. 9. 
84Ibid., p. 11. 
85Ibid., p. 12. 
86Ibid., p. 13. 
87 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
88u. S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Hearings to Amend the Defense Production Act of 1950, and for Other 
Purposes (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 1-2. 
89Ibid., p. !"70. 
90Ibid., p. 171. 
91Ibid., pp. 174-177. 
92Ibid., p. 187. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., p. 188. 
95Ibid., p. 208. 
96Ibid., p. 209. 
97 Ibid. 
98Ibid., p. 219. 
99Ibid., P· Z32. 
100Ibid., p. 233. 
101rbid. 
102rbid. 
103Ibid., p. 235. 
104Ibid., p. 238. 
105rbid. 
106Ibid., p. 239. 
107Ibid., pp. 305-306. 
108Ibid., pp. 312-313. 
109Ibid., p. 322. 
110Ibid., p. 323. 
111Ibid., p. 324. 
112Ibid., p. 327. 
113Ibid.' p. 344. 
114rbid. 
115Ibid., p. 352. 
116Ibid., p. 359. 
117rbid., P· 397. 
118rbid., P· 448. 
119rbid. 
120rbid., p. 467. 
121rbid., P· 478. 
122rbid. 
123rbid., PP· 479-480. 
124rbid., p. 481. 
125Ibid., pp. 488-492. 
264 
265 
126Ibid., p. 493. 
127 Ibid., p. 500. 
128Ibid. 
129Ibid., P· 502. 
130Ibid. 
131Ibid. 
132Ibid., p. 508. 
133Ibid. 
134Ibid. 
135Ibid., P· 509. 
136Ibid., p. 511. 
137 Ibid., p. 515. 
138Ibid., P· 527. 
139congressional Record-Senate, 9lst Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 
116, Part 17 (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 23455-23456. 
140Ibid., pp. 23457-23459. 
141Ibid., p. 23459. 
142Ibid., p. 23460. 
143Ibid., pp. 23460-23461. 
144Ibid., p. 23460. 
145 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report Together With 
Minority Views and Additional Views~ Accompany~~ 17880, Report 
No. 91-1330 (Washington, D. C., 1970), p. 3. 
146Ibid., P• 6. 
147 Ibid., p. 8 
148Ibid., P• 17. 
149Ibid., p. 19. 
150congressional Record-House, 9lst Congress, 2~d Session, Vol. 
116, Part 20 (Washington~ D.C., 1970), pp. 26798-26799. 
266 
lSlibid., p. 26799. 
152Ibid. 
153Ibid., p. 26800. 
154Ibid., p. 26802. 
155Ibid., p. 26803. 
156Ibid., P· 26811. 
157Ibid., p. 26823. 
158Ibid., P· 26828. 
159Ibid. 
160Ibid. 
161u. S. Congress, House, Conference Report to Accompany~ 3302, 
Report No. 91-1386, 9lst Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C., 
1970)' p. 6. 
162Ibid. , p. 7. 
163congressional Record-Senate, 9lst Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 
116, Part 21 (Washington, D. C., 1970), p. 28491. 
164congressional Record-House, 9lst Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 
116, Part 2~ (Washington, D. C., 1970), p. 28802. 
165 
"Defense Production Act," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, Vol. XXVIII. Part 3 (Washington, D. C., August 21, 1970), 
p. 2091. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
Chapters III, IV, V, and VI of this study, when considered to-
gether, provide an adequate and credible account of the events leading 
to the establishment of the CASE and in so doing also provide some in-
sights into the events that caused Congress to establish the CASE. 
This chapter presents a brief summary of Chapters IV, V, and VI, 
examines some of the witnesses, presents the basic conclusions of the 
study, presents implications for financial accounting, and makes some 
suggestions for future research. 
Summary of Chapters IV, V, and VI 
Chapters IV, V, and Vl represent an attempt to tell the story of 
the establishment of the CASE in such a way that the story itself, and 
an awareness of the contents of Chapter III, provides an adequate 
explanation of the establishment of the CASE. This particular section 
of Chapter VII su~arizes the salient features of Chapter IV, V, and VI. 
Admiral Rickover, since 1963, had appeared before congressional 
committees and argued for uniform cost accounting standards. On 
April 11, 1968, Rickover argued that contractors made higher profits 
on defense contracts than commercial contracts, that it was not possible 
under the present system to determine what was cost and what was profit, 
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that contractors had unlimited flexibility in assigning costs to con-
tracts, that accountants could not agree on what constitutes generally 
accepted accounting principles, and that if there were uniform 
accounting standards the Government could save $2 billion a year. 
On June 4, 1968, the House considered an amendment to the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 requiring the Comptroller General to develop and 
recommend uniform standards of accounting for all negotiated prime 
contract and subcontract defense procurements in excess of $100,000 so 
that production costs and profits could be determined by individual 
order. Oppo~ents of the amendment argued that the subject was beyond 
the jurisdiction of the committee, that it implied all defense contrac-
tors were crooks and profiteers, that uniform procedures would increase 
contractor costs, that uniform accounting procedures would have an 
adverse effect on small contractors, that there had been no complaints 
from the Defense Department, and that the establishment of uniform 
procedures was impractical. After the committee amendment passed, 
Representative Gonzalez offered an amendment requiring the Comptroller 
General to·promulgate rather than recommend standards. His amendment 
was rejected. 
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency heard the testimony 
of 11 witnesses regarding Senator Proxrnire's amendment and the House 
amendment with respect to uniform accounting standards on June 11, 1968. 
Ten of the eleven witnesses expressed opposition to any legislation on 
the matter of uniform accounting standards. The opponents presented 
arguments such as follows: standards (sometimes referred to as systems 
and/or procedures) were unnecessary, impractical, costly, an harassment 
to business; the term "uniform accounting standards" was without 
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definition; that uniform standards would not necessarily eliminate 
excessive profits; some companies might have to keep another set of 
records; some companies might discontinue Government operations and 
thereby reduce competition; ASPR and other regulations were adequate; 
Rickover's claim of excessive profits was based on misunderstanding; 
and that uniform accounting standards would adversely affect the small 
contractor. J. S. Seidman, the only witness supporting uniform 
accounting standards, argued there was too much flexibility in the 
application of accounting principles and allocation methods. 
Proxmire's amendment failed to get out of committee and on 
June 26, 1968, he introduced an amendment requiring the feasibility 
study by the Comptroller General. Arguments against the amendment 
were basically the same as those given at the 1968 Senate hearings. 
Proxmire argued that cost accounting principles can have a large impact 
in determining contractor costs, therefore, there should be some 
standards to follow. The amendment passed the Senate by almost a 
2 to 1 margin and the House concurred. 
On the basis of an extensive study, the Comptroller General con-
cluded that it was feasible to establish and apply cost-accounting 
standards to provide a greater degree of uniformity and consistency in 
cost accounting as a basis for negotiating and administering procure-
ment contracts. 
On December 23, 1969, Senator Proxmire introduced S. 3302 which 
included a requirement that the GAO promulgate uniform cost accounting 
standards within 18 months of the enactment of the legislation. The 
Senate Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency held hearings on March 31, April 1 and 2, 1970, 
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about the standards requirement and two legislative proposals of the 
GAO. Of the sixteen witnesses, eight supported some form of legisla-
tion and eight opposed any legislation. In addition to arguments given 
previously at the 1968 Hearings, proponents gave these arguments. 
Standards would result in improved communications, more understanding 
by respective parties, better relationships, a reduction in disputes, 
and have a salutory effect on cost overruns. Opponents provided these 
additional arguments. The GAO study did not establish feasibility, 
desirability, need; the cases cited by the GAO were not representative; 
and, there had been no cost-benefit study. In addition to arguments for 
and against the promulgation of standards, several witnesses expressed 
their views about the three proposals and the predominate opinion 
seemed to be that the Board should be an independent agency within 
the executive branch. Many witnesses also offered alternative pro-
posals to S. 3302 for consideration. 
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency adopted an amendment 
calling for a five member CASB to be appointed by the Comptroller 
General who would be designated as chairman of the Board. The Board 
was directed to promulgate cost accounting standards to achieve 
uniformity and consistency in the cost accounting principles followed 
by defense contractors and to issue rules requiring advance disclosure 
of cost accounting practices used by the contractors. The amendment 
also contained a clause excluding certain contractors whose sales to 
the Government in the preceding fiscal year did not exceed $25 million. 
In June and July, 1970, the House Committee on Banking and Currency 
held hearings to get views on the House version of the cost accounting 
standards and for other purposes. The House version called for, among 
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other things, the Comptroller General, as an agent of Congress, to 
promulgate Gost-accounting standards_and ~lso to establish a Cost 
Accounting Standards Advisory Board. Basically, the arguments pre-
sented for and against were the same given in previous hearings and 
debates. Perhaps the highlight of the hearings was the question of 
I 
whether opponents of the proposal would be given a chance to express 
their views. 
On July 9, 1970, the Senate rejected an amendment by Representative 
Bennett to require the President to appoint the Board members, subject 
to Senate approval, and approved a Proxmire amendment to eliminate the 
$25 million exemption. 
On July 27, 1970, the House committee submitted an amendment 
calling for the Board to be an agent of Congress with the Comptroller 
General serving as chairman and appointing four other members. The 
Board would recommend rather than promulgate standards. On July 31, 
1970, the House debate centered on whether the Board should be an agent 
of Congress or the executive branch. With minor alteration the House 
accepted the committee amendment. 
Because the Senate disagreed to the House version of the amendment, 
a ,conference was held. In conference the House receded to the Senate 
version with two amendments. 
Examination of Witnesses 
Introduction 
This section of the study presents an examination of some of the 
witnesses. Elements of negative criticism are used to try to determine 
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the credibility, truthfulness, reliability, and trustworthiness of 
their statements. In performing this examination, the study, when 
possible, seeks answers to the following questions: (1) Was the 
witness qualified to testify on the subject? (2) Did the witness give 
reliable testimony? (3) Was the witness self-seeking? (4) Was the 
behavior of the witness consistent with long-term behavior? and (5) Was 
the testimony of the witness persuasive? 
In those cases where the study does not provide adequate evidence 
to answer one or more of the above questions, it will be so stated. 
Proponents of•Cost Accounting Standards 
Admiral Rickover 
Although not an accountant, Rickover over the years had demonstrat-
ed in his dealings with defense contractors that he is knowledgeable in 
the area of defense contracting. Witnesses at the hearings pointed out 
that Rickover was a tough negotiator and that some contractors preferred 
not to deal with him. Congressmen were seemingly impressed by Rickover's 
knowledge of contracting because in numerous hearings from 1963 forward, 
they asked for his views on defense contracting and defense costs. 
While admitting he was not an accountant, Rickover always carne well 
prepared to committee hearings and was able to talk authoritatively 
with respect to increasing costs and profits. Because of their lack 
of accounting expertise, it is highly questionable whether the members 
of Congress were aware of those cases in which Rickover gave inconsis-
tent or illogical testimony relating to accounting. 
In at least two cases, the testimony of Rickover was not reliable. 
Firs~, the twobillion dollar estimate. The manner by which Rickover 
arrived at the figure was labeled illogical by critics. In arriving 
at the figure, Rickover equated neg~tiation to cost accounting stan-
dards. In his 1970 House Testimony, Rickover said: 
I will tell you how I arrived at this figure, sir. Whenever 
I have the time to take on one oi' these contracting issues, 
I invariably find contractors claiming 5 to 10 percent or 
more higher than they actually are (sic). I believe that if 
people were able to determine costs readily, in.accordance 
with proper standards, this would reduce prices for defense 
equipment by at least 5 percent. On a total of $40 billion 
in procurement, if you save only 5 percent, that will amount 
to $2 billion.l 
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Another example that raises doubt concerning Rickover's reliability as 
a winness on accounting matters is his statement that if given the 
resources available to the Comptroller General he would set up uniform 
cost accounting standards in 18 months. 
While it is admitted that Rickover is concerned about the National 
defense, and perhaps the taxpayer, it must also be observed that some 
of his testimony presented in this study indicates that he is 
self-seeking (see page 226). 
It is in this respect, self-seeking, that Rickover's behavior is 
consistent over the long run. In Chapter IV of this study, it was 
pointed out that Rickover was inconsistent in his testimony regarding 
industry profits. However, Rickover is consistent in presenting 
arguments to support his position on particular issues. (See pages 
122-123.) 
Rickover and his opinions are highly respected by many Congress-
men. Throughout the hearings and the debates, numerous references 
were made by Congressmen to Rickover's testimony. Rickover is both a 
part of and a severe critic of the defense establishment. Members of 
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Congress were impressed by his previous successes and by his forthright 
manner of testifying before them. Because of all this, Rickover was 
probably one of the most persuasive witnesses before Congress. 
Senator Proxmire 
Senator Proxmire was the first witness to testify at the 1970 
Senate Subcommittee hearings and according to Senator Mondale was the 
chief sponsor of the uniform cost accounting concept. Of all men in 
Congress, Proxmire was probably one of the more qualified to testify in 
this area since he had established himself as a critic of waste and 
inefficiency in Government and had conducted his own hearings regarding 
defense profits and procurement. 
In general, Proxmire's testimony was reliable at the hearings and 
also at debates, but some accountants might question the reliability 
of his testimony because of his short-range view with respect to the 
time needed to promulgate accounting standards. Proxmire, like 
Rickover, envisioned the task as being less difficult than do 
accountants. 
As pointed out in Chapter III of this study, it is claimed that 
Proxmire has a secret ambition to be the best and most influential 
Senator, in his own way. In the past few years, Proxmire's own way 
seems to have been to identify with some seemingly obscure issue which 
later comes into prominence. He did so in this case and therefore in a 
sense could be said to be self-seeking. Proxmire was consistent in 
his attempt to put some controls on defense spending and in his fight 
against inefficiency in Government. 
Having developed a reputation as being a disciplined and effective 
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legislator as well as being well informed on the issues with which he 
associates himself, Proxmire was apparently persuasive in getting the 
cost accounting standards legislation through Congress. His influence 
is seen in the fact that even though, the amendment relative to cost 
accounting standards failed to get out of the Senate Committee in 1968 
Proxmire was able to get an amendment adopted on the floor of the Senate 
which required that the GAO feasibility study be done. Senator 
Mansfield (D., Montana) made the following remarks on the floor of the 
Senate shortly after S. 3302 passed the Senate on July 9, 1970: 
It was through the fine efforts and skill of the managers 
of this bill, the distinguished Senators from Minnesota 
(Mr. Mondale) and Wisconsin (Mr. Proxmire) that we were 
able to achieve completion today on this measure as well. 
They both demonstrated again what has been so evident to 
us in the Senate, that each masters fully their (sic) 
8t;b}ectbefore bri~g ~measure~ the floor. 2 
(emphasis added) 
J. S. Seidman 
J. S. Seidman was the only witness, other than Rickover, who 
supported the idea of uniform accounting standards prior to the GAO 
feasibility study. As a practicing C.P.A. with previous procurement 
experience in the Navy, it would seem that he was qualified to testify 
on the subject. The consistency and nature of Seidman's testimony 
tend to indicate his reliability as a witness. Seidman was the only 
proponent of cost accounting standards, other than Rickover, who con-
sistently supported the concept of cost accounting standards. Stating 
that he represented no organization, Seidman gave testimony that could 
not have been pleasing to industry and perhaps some of his clients. It 
seems that Seidman was a credible witness and that he was to some 
extent persuasive- e.g., reflecting two changes suggested by Seidman, 
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there is no mention of "accurate" production costs in the law and the 
development of cost accounting standards is a continuing process. 
Seidman had also recommended that the Comptroller General be in charge, 
which he is. This study does not provide evidence to allow a judgment 
of whether Seidman was self-seeking. 
Leonard Savoie 
Leonard Savoie, as executive vice president of the AICPA would 
seemingly be qualified to give testimony regarding cost-accounting 
standards. Even though the AICPA shifted from the role of being an 
opponent to the role of a qualified supporter of cost accounting 
standards, a careful reading of the record reveals Savoie's testimony 
was not necessarily totally inconsistent. A comparison of the synopsis 
of Savoie's testimonies on pages 130-132 and l9lf-196 of this study will 
lend support to this claim. However, the shift from being an opponent 
to a qualified supporter of cost accounting standards might cause one 
to wonder about the reliability of the testimony of Savoie. 
Because of the relationship between members of the AICPA and 
industry, it would be far-fetched to think that the AICPA was completely 
objective in its testimony. The post-GAO study testimony of Savoie 
evidently was persuasive because some of his recommendations given on 
page of this study were incorporated into the law. 
GAO Representatives 
On the basis of GAO experience in accounting and the procurement 
area, it would have to be conceded that the GAO was qualified to give 
testimony. The GAO, like the AICPA, changed its position on the 
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question of cost accounting standards and because of this apparent 
inconsistency some might question the reliability of the testimony of 
the GAO representatives. However, like the AICPA, a comparison of 
pages 129-130 and 185-189 of this study reveals the change was not as 
drastic as it appears on the surface. Of all the witnesses who gave 
testimony it seems that the GAO was the only one that did not have some 
kind of vested interest in the testimony given. Unless one accepts 
the argument that the GAO was under pressure from Congress to conclude 
that the development of cost accounting 'standards was feasible and 
needed it would have to be conceded that the GAO was to a very large 
degree not self-seeking. Apparently Congress did not see the GAO as 
having a special interest in the ou.tcome of the study. Also, there 
can be little doubt that the GAO feasibility study had a very signifi-
cant impact on the legislation. 
Kenneth M. Jackson 
As chairman, procurement regulations committee of the National 
Aerospace Services Association, Jackson would seemingly have an adequate 
awareness of the procurement process and, therefore, qualify as a 
witness in this area. Jackson was the only witness representing an 
industry association who supported cost accounting standards and in his 
testimony he called for stronger measures than were being considered. 
In view of the testimony given by other representatives of industry it 
is difficult to see how Jackson's testimony could be classified as self-
seeking. His comments obviously impressed Proxmire and some of Jacksons 
recommendations are reflected in the law. This study does not provide 
evidence to allow a judgment of whether or not Jackson's testimony was 
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consistent with his long-term behavior. Overall, Jackson's testimony 
appeared to be reliable. 
Leonard Spacek 
In his roles as chairman of Arthur Andersen & Co., a director of 
the Logistics Management Institute, and a member of the Industry 
Advisory Council, Leonard Spacek apparently had the background to give 
reliable testimony on the subject. In his testimony, Spacek alluded 
to the concept of fairness which was consistent with many of his 
previous statements regarding accounting principles and it is difficult 
to imagine how his testimony could be classified as self-seeking. As 
with other witnesses, some of Spacek's recommendations are reflected in 
the law. 
Opponents of Cost Accounting Standards 
Howard Wright 
As the drafter of part 1, section XV of ASPR and an author in the 
area of defense contracting, Howard Wright was certainly qualified to 
testify on the subject. The fact that he was the drafter of part 2, 
section XV of ASPR and that this document was under question as being 
inadequate causes one to question the objectivity and reliability of 
Wright's testimony. In fact, as indicated on page 194 of this study, 
Proxmire seemed to question Wright's motives and brought out the fact 
that Wright was a consultant to 24 organizations -- all of which did 
work for the Department of Defense. A comparison of the synopsis of 
Wright's testimonies on pages 112-133 and 191-194 of this study shows 
that Wright was consistent in his opposition to cost accounting 
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standards legislation. Some of Wright's recommendations were reflected 
in the legislation as it moved through Congress. 
\ -
Industry Associations 
The witnesses for the industry associations were either accountants, 
financial executives, procurement officials, and/or were accompanied by 
individuals with an accounting, financial, or procurement background 
and as such seemed qualified to testify on the subject in question. 
Apparently the industry associations were highly concerned about the 
effect on industry of the proposed standards. As indicated in Chapters 
IV and VI of this study, these associations were consistent in arguing 
against added government regulations. The nature of the testimony of 
representatives of industry associations tends to indicate that they 
were self-seeking. In at least one case, an industry representative 
gave some misleading testimony which was challenged and 
corrected by Senator Proxmire (see page 197). This could cause one to 
wonder about the reliability of that particular witness. Because of 
the self-interest of the industry associations, it seems that there 
could be some question concerning the reliability of their testimony. 
An examination of the changes that occurred in the legislation on 
cost accounting standards seems to indicate that the testimony of rep-
resentatives of industry associations was in some cases persuasive. 
For example, in testifying before the 1970 Senate Subcommittee, 
Charles W. Stewart recommended that no time limit be placed on the 
development of standards. He also recommended that the agency in 
charge of developing and applying the standards be required to 
coordinate its program with interested professional organizations, 
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defense and nondefense industry, and affected Governmental agencies. 
The final cost accounting standards legislation places no time limit 
on the development of standards and the legislation does require that 
the Board consult with interested parties. 
Basic Conclusions of the Study 
The Proper Question 
Gary Bulmash, in his 1974 "An Inquiry Into the Background of and 
Circumstances Leading to the Establishment of the Cost Accounting 
Standards Board," concluded, among other things, " ..• the Feasibility 
Study and the cases described therein failed to prove that cost 
accounting standards were needed and feasible." 3 The obvious question 
arises: "Failed to prove to whom?" The opponents? Bulmash? 
Accountants? It is of little importance whether these individuals or 
groups of individuals were convinced of the need or feasibility of cost 
accounting standards. The important point is that the Feasibility 
Study and the cases included therein plus other evidence presented 
either convinced Congress of the need and feasibility of cost accounting 
standards or members of Congress were not highly concerned about the 
matter and they merely followed the leaders. 
As indicated in Chapters IV and VI of this study, both proponents 
and opponents of cost-accounting standards regulations admitted that 
there were weaknesses in the then existing regulations. Congress 
appears to have had three alternatives concerning these weaknesses: 
(1) Ignore the problem, (2) Try to correct the problem by amending 
and strengthening the enforcement of existing regulations, and (3) 
Try to correct the problem by setting up a completely new mechanism. 
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Congress chose to set up a completely new mechanism. Why? 
First, proponents of a new mechanism argued that the old system 
had been ineffective and inadequate for years. Robert Anthony stated 
that" .•• a fresh start by an agency outside the Pentagon 114 Was 
needed. Anthony argued that the claimed inadequacies of section XV of 
ASPR could have been corrected by those in responsibility but the 
inadequacies had not been corrected, and he saw no indication that they 
would be in the future. Rickover also argued for a new mechanism and 
went so far as to say: "Effective cost accounting standards will not 
be established if Congress turns the job over to the executive branch 
5 
or to a special board." 
Second, the GAO Feasibility report recommended that: "New 
machinery should be established for the development of cost-accounting 
6 
standards." Throughout the hearings Congressmen expressed respect for 
and faith in the GAO and the Comptroller General and gave indication 
that the opinions of the GAO and Comptroller General were highly valued. 
As stated in this study, Representative Gonzalez suggested that cost 
accounting was a highly technical subject in which most Congressmen had 
little expertise; that the Comptroller General was Congress's accounting 
expert and had no vested interest in the matter under consideration; 
that improvements were needed in the procurement process; and, therefore, 
the House should accept the Comptroller General's recommendation. 
Obviously, the Congress heeded the Comptroller General's recommendation 
with respect to new machinery. Third, when one considers the extended 
debate in both the Senate and the House concerning whether the Board 
should be an executive agency or an independent agency within the 
legislative branch and the outcome of that debate, it appears that 
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Congress was interested in having control over the Board and also that 
Congress thought the Board would be more effective if it was not an 
executive agency. During the hearings and debates, several Congressmen 
argued that executive agencies were controlled by those parties they 
were set up to regulate. As was already pointed out, the then existing 
machinery was in the executive branch. 
This study concludes that it was not a question of whether or not 
the Feasibility Study and the cases described therein failed to prove 
that cost accounting standards were needed and feasible and that a new 
mechanism was needed. Because of the mood of Congress; Congress's high 
regard for Rickover, the GAO, the Comptroller General; and Congress's 
I 
lack of expertise in accounting matters, the probable question was: 
"Could industry to prove to Congress that cost accounting standards were 
not needed and not feasible?" Obviously, they failed. 
The Basis for Failure 
As indicated in Chapter III Congress was becoming increasingly 
concerned about defense spending and the press was applying a signifi-
cant amount of pressure. Committees of Congress that formerly were 
always pro-military were beginning to raise questions about defense 
spending. In 1969, the Senate engaged in the longest debate on any 
military procurement bill. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
described the mood of Congress in the following was: 
By the end of 1969, the mood had turned so completely 
against massive defense spending that the Administration 
and Congress were both moving to rein in military spending 
not only in the current year but in future years.7 
Congressmen were also expressing concern about cost-overruns and the 
military-industrial complex. 
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In the Congressional hearings and debates reviewed in Chapters IV 
and VI there is evidence that some Congressmen thought there was some 
kind of cause and effect relationship between cost-overruns and the lack 
of cost accounting standards. It is not known how prevalent that view 
was among members of Congress, but it apparently existed. Also, one of 
the basic arguments advanced for cost accounting standards was that the 
standards would help reduce the costs of defense contracts. While it 
was never proved that such standards would reduce costs, it also was 
not proved that they would not. Seemingly, at that particular point 
in time, Congress was interested in trying anything that might con-
ceivably reduce defense spending--either directly or indirectly--and 
perhaps, preferably, indirectly. Other testimony and arguments g~ven 
implied that the standards might help to negate the influence of the 
military-industrial complex. 
While the arguments for cost accounting standards were of a highly 
subjective nature, the arguments against the standards were no less 
subjective. Too, the technical nature of the subject seemed to confuse 
some members of Congress and some admitted their lack of expertise on 
the subject. Other members of Congress demonstrated their lack of 
expertise and understanding of the subject by their remarks. 
Based on the remarks of Representatives Sullivan and Galifianakis, 
it appears that one reason the opponents failed in their efforts to stop 
cost accounting standards legislation was because of a poor plan of 
attack and a misplaced emphasis. Sullivan implied that the GAO feasi-
bility study and its findings were good evidence and that the testimony 
of opponents was unsupported opinion based on little knowledge. 
Galifianakis suggested that the 1970 House Committee was more impressed 
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by Rickover's statement regarding the claimed inability of contractors 
to tell how they determined their costs than by his claim of a possible 
$2 billion savings. Seemingly, opponents of cost accounting legisla-
tion should have concentrated their efforts on a study or studies to 
support their arguments. Even then, when the mood and the lack of 
accounting expertise of Congress is considered, the question remains 
whether the opponents would have been effective. 
Conclusion ~ the Study 
The storytelling method of presenting'the evolutionary aspects of 
the CASB was primarily used to provide an explanation and to allow the 
reader to form his own conclusions on why the CASB came into being. 
This section of the concluding chapter sets forth the conclusions of 
the researcher. 
1. The mood of Congress was such that it was not a question 
of providing that cost accounting standards were feasible 
and needed but a question of proving that they were not 
feasible and not needed. 
2. The opponents of cost accounting standards legislation were 
unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent the legislation 
because they could not support their arguments and because 
they were seen by many Congressmen as having a vested interest 
in the subject--therefore, their testimony was subject to 
question. 
3. Admiral Rickover is highly regarded in Congress and his opinion 
is seldom subject to question. 
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4. Senator Proxmire kept the question alive in 1968 and used the 
committees of which he was a member to keep the issue before 
the Senate. Proxmire also utilized press releases about cost-
overruns and defense spending to advantage. 
5. Congress plac~s a great amount of confidence in the Comptroller 
General. In his report, he recommended that cost accounting 
standards be developed. It would seem the Comptroller General's 
recommendations helped to convince Congress there was a need 
for cost accounting standards. 
6. Representative Patman not only gave Admiral Rickover a sounding 
board for his views at a most opportune time, but also con-
trolled his committee and the House hearings in such a way as 
to keep the proposal alive. 
Implications for Financial Accounting 
Introduction 
This study has focused on the events leading to the establishment 
of the CASB. It is possible that events similar to those leading to 
the establishment of the CASB could occur in financial accounting. With 
this possibility in mind, it seems that this study could be used as a 
basis for a limited projection on implications for financial accounting. 
In the June 7, 1976, issue of Business Week, in an article 
entitled "Focus on Balance Sheet Reform" the following comments appear. 
It may already be too late to prevent a replay [referring to 
the investment credit and Congressioqal intervention]. Senator 
Lee Metcalf (D., Montana), Chairman of the Senate reports, 
accounting, and management subcommittee, has started an investi-
gation into how accounting rules are made, possibly to answer 
the question of why the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
turned rule-making over to the private sector. 
••• There is the constant threat that what the accountants 
do not do on their own, the SEC might someday do for them--
turning accounting into just another regulated industry. 8 
Even worse, Congress may take a,hand at writing the rules. 
(emphasis added) 
In the same article, Walter E. Hanson, senior partner of Peat 
Marwick Mitchell and Company, is quoted as saying: 
The FASB is the last chance for the private sector ... and 
if business tears that apart, we're right down to govern-
ment regulation--whether it be. through the SEC or Congress 
creating some other body to make accounting principles. 9 
(emphasis added) 
From these quotes, it appears that there is a growing awareness 
and concern that Congress may decide to play some role in financial 
accounting. Assuming that accountants in general oppose government 
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regulation of accounting and based on the contents and findings of this 
study, the following recommendations are offered. 
Recommendations 
If government regulation of financial accounting is not desired, 
accountants should consider the important role played by Congressional 
committees and the chairmen of Congressional committees. 
Congressional Committees 
In his book, In Congress Assembled, Daniel M. Berman, professor 
of Government and Public Administration, The American University, 
states: "It is difficult to exaggerate the power of a committee chair-
man."10 He then describes various ways in which the committee chairman 
exercises this power to satisfy his desires. Chairman Wright Patman 
demonstrated his power as chairman of the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency in the way he scheduled witnesses. He also demonstrated this 
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power in executive session when he ruled as being out of order an amend-
ment proposed by Representative Brown. 
Regarding subcommittees, Berman makes this observation: 
Such subcommittees, and particularly their chairmen, frequently 
become authorities on the subjects with which they deal, and 
anything they say will probably co~and attention both among 
their colleagues and in the press. 
Senator Proxmire fits this description in that as Chairman of the Joint 
Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government he has conducted num-
erous hearings regarding defense spending and related matters and is 
recognized as an authority in this area. 
Woodrow Wilson once described the American form of Government as 
12 
" •.• government by the standing committees of Congress." Recognizing 
the role of the committee chairman and the lack of technical accounting 
expertise on the part of most members of Congress, it seems that the 
accounting profession would be wise to keep a careful watch on all 
committees and subcommittees that are, or might become, involved in 
accounting matters. If and when a committee or subcommittee shows an 
interest in accounting matters, the accounting profession seemingly 
should be prepared to present sound and supportable arguments in such 
a way to have the desired affect upon the committee and the committee 
chairman. It seems clear, based upon the circumstances surrounding 
the establishment of the CASB, that if one is in a sense the "accused" 
party it becomes all important to build a solid foundation for arguments 
presented rather than to present what some Congressmen might label 
unsupported opinions. Also, if the battle is not won in committe it 
is in all probability doomed. 
288 
Mechanism 
If it becomes apparent that all efforts of preventing government 
regulation are going to fail, the accounting profession should already 
have available recommendations to offer as to the mechanism to be used. 
An analysis of the cost accounting standards legislation illustrates 
that recommendations from both proponents and opponents of the legis-
lation were considered and many of them were reflected in the final 
legislation. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
During the course of this study, several areas in which further 
research is needed were noted. Some of these areas are studies to 
determine: 
1. Whether the implementation and maintenance of cost accounting 
standards has had an effect on contract costs. 
2. If small and medium size firms have eliminated their defense 
business. 
3. If small contractors benefitted from the promulgation of cost 
accounting standards. 
4. For companies of all sizes, if extensive changes in accounting 
systems were (and are being) required to implement and 
maintain cost accounting standards. 
5. Whether the communication processes have improved and whether 
the frequency and seriousness of disputes has been reduced. 
6. If the GAO has lost any of its independence, in fact or appear-
ance, as a result of the Comptroller General's position. 
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Public Law 91-379 
91st Congress, S. 3302 
August 15, 1970 
~n §ct 
To amend the Defense Production Act of 1950, and for other purposes. 
Be it macted by the Senate and Hou.~e of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
TITLE I-- DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT AMENDMENTS 
§ 101. Extension of Act 
The first sentence of section 7 t7 (a) of the Defense Production 
Defense Produc· 
tion Act of 
I 950. amend-
ment. 
Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2166(a)) is amended- Ante,p.694. 
( 1) by striking out "August 15, 1970" and inserting in 
lieu thereof "June 30, 1972"; and 
( 2) by striking out "section 714" and inserting in lieu 
thereof "sections 714 and 719". Infra. 
~ I 02. Definitions 
Section 702 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
App. 2152) is amended--
( I ) by inserting "space," after "stockpiling," in subsec-
tion (d); and 
(2) hy adding at the end thereof a new subsection as 
follows: 
"(f) The term 'defense contractor' means any person who 
enters into a contract with the United States for the production 
of material or the performance of services for the national 
defense." 
§ 103. Uniform cost-accounting standards 
Title VIJ· of the Defense Production Act of 1950 is amended by 
adding at the end thereof a new section as follows: 
"COST-ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 
"Sec. 719. (a) ll1ere is est;J blished, as an agent of the Congress, 
a Cost-Accounting Standards Board which shall be independent 
of the executive departments and shall consist of the Comptroller 
General of the United States who shall serve as Chairman of the 
Board and four members to he appointed by the Comptroller 
General. Of the members appointed to the Board, two, of \vhom 
nne shall be particularly knowledgeable about the cost <Jccounting 
problem~ of sm;Jll business, shall be from the accounting pro-
fession. one shall be representative of industry, and one shall be 
from a department or agency of the Federal Government who 
shall be :ippointed with the consent of the head of the depart-
ment or agency concerned. The term of office of each of the 
appointed members of the Board shall be four years, except 
that any member appointed to fill a \'acancy in the Board shall 
64 Stat. 815; 
67 Stat. I 30. 
"Defense con-
tractor." 
82 Stat. 279. 
50 USC app. 
2151-2167. 
F:4 Stat. 796 
84 Stat. 797 
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HO Stat. 46 I; 
ln Stat. H64. 
5lJSC 5315 and 
note. 
5 usc 5101, 
5361, 7501; 
35 F. R. 6247. 
5 usc 5101, 
5361, 7501; 
35 F. R. 6247. 
RO Stat. 463; 
83 Stat. 864. 
5 usc 5316 
and note. 
RO Stat. 499; 
H3 Stat. 190. 
Standards. 
promulgation. 
84 Stat. 797 
84 Stat. 798 
serve for the remainder of the tcnn for which his predecessor 
was appointed. Each member of the noard appointed from private 
life shall. receive compensation at the rate of one two-hundred-
sixlieth of the rate prescribed for level lV of the Fednal Execu-
tive Salary Schedule for each day (including traveltime) in which 
he is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the 
Board. 
"(h) The Board shall have the power to appoint, fix the com-
pensation of, and remove an executive ~ecrctary and two addi-
tional stafT members without regard to chapter 51, suhchaptcrs 
Ill and VI of chapter 53, and ch:.1ptcr 75 of title 5, United Stales 
Code, and thnse provisions of such title relating to appointment 
in the competitive ~cn'ice. The executive secretary and the two 
additional staff members may be paid compensation at rates not 
to exceed the rates prescribed for levels IV and V of the Federal 
Executive Salary Schedule, respectively. 
"(c) The Board is authorized to appoint and fix the compen-
sation of such other personnel as the Board deems necessary to 
carry out its functions. 
"(d) The Board may utilize personnel from the Federal Gov-
ernment (with the consent of the head of the agency concerned) 
or appoint personnel from private life without regard to chapter 
51, subchapters III and VI of chapter 53, and chapter 75 of 
title 5, United States Code, and those provisions of such title 
relating to appointment in the competitive service, to serve on 
advisory committees and task forces to assist the Board in carry-
ing out its functions and responsibilities under this section. 
"(c) Except as othef\vise provided in subsection (a), mem-
bers of the Board and officers or employees of other agencies of 
the Federal Gmernment utilized under this ~cction shall receive 
no compensation for their services as such hut shall continue to 
receive the compensation of their regular positions. Appointees 
under subsection (d) from private life shall receive wmpcnsation 
at rates fixed bv the Board, not to exceed one two-hundred-
sixtieth of the rate prescribed for level V in the Federal Executive 
Salary Schedule for each day (including traveltime) in which 
they are engaged in the actual performance of their duties as pre-
scribed by the Board. While sen·ing away from their hnmes or 
regular place of business, Board members and other appointees 
serving on an intermittent basis under this section shall be 
allowed travel expenses in accordance with section 5703 of title 
5. United States Code. 
"(f) All departments and agencies of the Government are 
authorized to cooperate with the Board and to furnish informa-
tion, appropriate personnel with or without reimbursement, and 
such financial and other assistance as may be agreed to between 
the Board and the department or agency concerned. 
" (g) The Board shall from time to time promulgate cost-
accounting standards designed to ac)lieve uniformity and con-
sistency in the cost-accounting principles followed by ucfense 
contractors and subcontractors under Federal contracts. Such 
promulgated standards shall be used by all relevant Federal 
agencies and by defense contractors and subcontractors in esti-
mating, accumulating. and reporting costs in connection with the 
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pricing, administration and settlement of all negotiated prime con-
tract and subcontract national defense procurements with the 
United States in excess of $I 00,000, other than contracts or 
subcontracts where the price negotiated is based on (I) estab-
lished catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in sub-
stantial quantities to the general public, or (2) prices set by law 
or regulation. In promulgating such standards the Board shall 
take into account the probable costs of implementation com-
pared to the probable benefits. 
"(h) (I) The Board is authori;rcd t0 make, promulg;Ite, ;11ncnd, 
and rescind rules and regulations for the implementation of cost-
accounting standards promulgated under subsection (g). Such 
regulations shall require defense contractors ;!lld subcontractors 
as a condition of contracting to disclose in writing their cost-
accounting principles, including methods of distinguishing direct 
costs from indirect costs and the basis used for allocating indirect 
costs, and to agree to a contract price adjustment, with interest, 
for any increased costs paid to the defense contractor by the 
United States because of the defense contractor's failure to comply 
\\ith duly promulgated cost-accounting standards or to follow 
consistently his disclosed cost-accounting practices in pricing con-
tract proposals and in accumulating and reporting contract per-
form<Jnce cost data. Such interest shall not exceed 7 per centum 
per annum measured from the time such payments were made to 
the contr<Jctor or subcontractor to the time such price :.djustmcnt 
is effected. If the parties fail to agree as to whether the defense 
contr<Jctor or ~ubcuntractor has complied with cost-accounting 
>tandards, the ruks and regulations relating thereto, and cost 
adjuqmcnts demanded by the United States, such disagreement 
will constitute a dispute unJer the contract dispute clause. 
"(2) The Board is authorized, as S(lon as practicable after the 
date of enactment of this section, to prescribe rules and regulations 
exempting from the requirements of this section such classes or 
cat.:gnries of defense contractors or subcontr.actors under con-
tracts negotiated in connection v .. ith national dcfemc procure-
Iill'nts as it determines, on the basis of the size of the contracts 
involved or otherwise, arc appropriate and consistent with the 
purposes sought to be achieved by this section. 
"(3) Cost-accounting standards promulgated under subsec-
tion (g) and rules and regulations prescribed under this sub-
section shall take effect not earlier than the expiration of the 
first period of sixty cz!lcndar days of continuous session of the 
Congress fcdlowing the date on which a copy of the proposed 
stand<Jrds, rules, or regulations is transmitted to the Congress; 
if. hctween the date of tran~mittal and the expiration of such sixty-
day period. there is not passed by the two Houses a concurrent 
resolution stating in substance that the Congress docs not favor 
the proposed staml<Irds. rules, or regulations. For the purposes 
of this subparagraph. in the computation of the sixty-day reriod 
there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in 
session because of <Idjournmcnt of more than three days to a day 
certain or an adjournment of the Olngrcss sine die. The pro-
visions of this paragraph do not <1pply to modifications of cost 
accounting standards, rules, or regulations which ha\'C become 
effective in conformity with those provisions. 
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R4 Stat. 798. 
84 Stat. 799. 
RO Stat. 381, 
392. 
Rec·cHds, 
availability. 
Report to 
Congress. 
Appropriation. 
"(i) (A) Prior to the promulgation under this section of rules, 
regulations, cost-accounting standards, and modifications thereof, 
notice of the action proposed to be taken, including a description 
of the terms and substance thereof, shall be published in the 
Federal Register. All parties affected thereby shall be afforded a 
period of not less than thirty days after such publication in 
which to submit their views and comments with respect to the 
action proposed to be taken. After full consideration of the views 
and comments so submitted the Board may promulgate rules, 
regulations, cost-accounting standards, and modifications thereof 
which shall have the full force and effect of Jaw and shall become 
effective not later than the start of the second fiscal quarter 
beginning after the expiration of not Jess than thirty days after 
publication in the Federal Register. 
"(B) The functions exercised under this section are excluded 
from the operation of ~ections 551, 553-559, and 701-706 of 
title 5, United States Code. 
"(C) The provisions of paragraph (A) of this subsection 
shall not be applicable to rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Board pursuant to subsection (h) (2). 
"(j) For the purpose of determining whether a defense con-
tractor or subcontractor has complied with duly promulgated 
cost-accounting standards and has followed consistently his dis-
closL:d cost-accounting practices, any authorized representative 
of the head of the agency concerned, of the Board, or of the 
01mptrollcr General of the United States shall have the right to 
cx:1mine and make copies of any documents, papers, or records 
of such contractor or subcontr<Jctor relating to compliance with 
such cost-accounting standards and principles. 
"(k) The Bo<Jrd ~hall report to the Congress, not later than 
twenty-four months after the date of enactment of this section, 
concerning its progress in promulgating cost-accounting standards 
under subsection (g) and rules and regulations under subsection 
(h). Thereafter, the Board shall make an annual report to the 
Congress with respect to its activities and operations, together 
with such recommendations as it deems appropriate. 
"(I) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section." 
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